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Brazil is renowned worldwide for its remarkable reforms in pharmaceutical regulation, 
which have enhanced access to essential medicines while lowering drug costs. As part of 
these reforms, the Generic Drug Act was introduced in 1999. This policy mandates that 
pharmaceutical products that are no longer protected by a patent must be interchangeable 
with an innovator (reference) drug. This thesis examines how and why Brazil promoted this 
large-scale regulatory policy. The literature on pharmaceutical policy often invokes 
international guidelines that inspire countries to reformulate their regulatory regimes or 
argues that regulations emerge in order to serve the interests of powerful interest groups. In 
contrast, this thesis examines how changes in the regulatory environment affect actors’ 
policy preferences. It argues that as actors adapt and respond to new regulatory 
environments, they also push the policy path further along the way.   
 
This historical qualitative case study relies on in-depth interviews and documentary research 
to trace the policy process of generic drug regulation in Brazil. It finds that Brazil’s generic 
drug reform can be attributed to a convergence of the evolution of pharmaceutical regulation, 
unexpected events (AIDS epidemic and scandal of fake medicines) and political activity of 
the Minister of Health. In turn, this study demonstrates that the new regulatory development 
altered the preferences of local pharmaceutical firms, who now support and uphold a policy 
they once opposed because of the high costs associated with adapting their industrial plants 
and processes. The regulation of generic drugs has also culminated in other unintended 
consequences. Public pharmaceutical factories were still unable to fully adjust to the new 
regulatory environment and patient groups slowly became aware of these limitations. 
Paradoxically, the generic drug regulation introduced in the name of patients and opposed by 
local pharmaceutical firms, is today opposed by important patient advocacy groups but 
solidified by the strong support of local and multinational pharmaceutical firms.  
 
These findings suggest although pharmaceutical firms strongly support the generic drug 
regulation today; they did not control the policy process that created it. Although Brazil’s 
norms resemble international guidelines, they were developed locally. Brazil’s case 
demonstrates that evolution of domestic political institutions were the most important 
determinant of the timing and direction of the regulatory policy. Thus, this thesis concludes 
that the state still matters for pharmaceutical regulation and that pharmaceutical regulation is 
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Brazil is renowned worldwide for its remarkable reforms in pharmaceutical 
regulation, which have enhanced access to essential medicines while lowering drug 
costs (Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006; Piovesan and Labra 2007; Nunn 2008). As 
part of these reforms, the Brazilian Congress, with the support of the Ministry of 
Health, approved the Generic Drug Act in 1999. A generic drug is a pharmaceutical 
product that is no longer protected by a patent, and is interchangeable with an 
innovator drug (World Health Organization 2001). Normatively, a generic drug 
policy is an intervention to foster market competition, which would prompt price 
declines and increase access to safe and affordable medicines (ibid). In Brazil, over 
80% of drug expenses are paid for by patients themselves (Cohen 2000), resulting in 
pricing being a core determinant of access to medicines. Studies suggest that generic 
drugs enter the market with an average price of 40% lower than its patent version and 
this difference has increased over time, making medicines more affordable to the 
Brazilian population and governmental programmes (Vieira and Zucchi 2006). 
 
Other research suggests that the Minister of Health and presidential hopeful, Jose 
Serra, promoted the reform as a response to a crisis in the pharmaceutical sector 
triggered by a scandal involving fake birth control pills (Dias 2003; Franca 2004; 
Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006). However, because these studies focus only on the 
critical period of reform, little is known about the institutional antecedents and policy 
process that channeled this entrepreneur activity. Additionally, although much has 
been said about the remarkable impact of Brazil’s generic drug competition on the 
market and price structure (Abreu 2004; Nishijima 2008; Quental et al. 2008; 
Rosenberg et al. 2008; Rosenberg 2009), the process that influenced the adoption of 
this large-scale regulatory reform has not been well explored in the literature. This is 
particularly intriguing because a regulatory shift in the pharmaceutical sector 
requires the participation of a number of stakeholders and interest groups in the 
policy process. This thesis therefore examines how and why Brazil adopted a generic 
drug policy, examining the regulatory policy process from its genesis in 1990 to the 
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most recent developments in 2009. It appears that no study has approached the 
generic drug regulation in Brazil from this perspective.  
 
There are two prominent analytical explanations as to why countries promote large-
scale pharmaceutical policies. The first refers to the diffusion of international 
guidelines that inspire other countries to reformulate their regulatory regimes (cf. 
Carpenter 2010). Other scholars argue that regulations emerge in order to serve the 
interests of powerful interest groups, who are usually small and homogeneous. 
Apparently, these explanations are ill-equipped to understand Brazil’s case. If the 
World Health Organization (WHO) had been broadcasting generic drug policies 
since the 1980s, why did the idea not catch on in Brazil earlier? Why did previous 
studies of Brazil’s case focus on the political entrepreneurship of the Minister of 
Health, rather than powerful firms or patient advocacy as a key condition to the 
reform? Additionally, if the political entrepreneur (who has been credited as the main 
protagonist of the generic drug reform) is no longer in a position to influence 
decision making in the pharmaceutical sector, how can we explain the development 
of generic drug regulation? 
 
To answer these questions, this thesis takes an alternative approach to the 
mainstream literature on pharmaceutical regulation. It suggests that a more promising 
analytical frame is to observe how policy legacies shape the preferences of actors; 
that is, interest groups’ preferences are constructed within the regulatory policy 
process. Thus, to elucidate the regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil, this 
study examines the reform from its antecedent periods to the policy returns that 
follow this restructuring. This historical frame provides elements in which to assess 
the actors participating in the generic drug policy process, to understand the content 
of their demands, and how they pursue these claims. In turn, it assesses both policy 
change and sustainability. On a more abstract level, this study analyses two separate 
but related social phenomena. The first is policy outcome; this argues that policy 
decisions taken in critical periods of reform might become path dependent, that is, 
once a policy path is chosen, actors adapt to the existing policy in ways that push 
them further along that trajectory (cf. Pierson 2004). The second is preference 
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formation; this argues that it is in the interaction with the policy process that actors 
define what they want and how to portray their demands - in other words, their 
preferences are socially constructed (Hall 2005; Woll 2008). These two 
complementary analytical tools help to contextualise the circumstances by which 
Brazil decided to implement a generic drug policy, whilst assessing the effects on the 
participants involved with the making of pharmaceutical regulation. 
 
Research methods and empirical data 
This thesis is based on rich empirical qualitative and quantitative data and historical 
narrative that traces the process of generic drug policy in Brazil. The qualitative 
scope included 57 in-depth interviews with HIV/AIDS and diabetes activists, 
business representatives, experts on pharmaceutical regulation, government officials 
and politicians. It also included the 2002 and 2010 presidential candidate Jose Serra, 
who was responsible for championing the reform in 1999, and four former 
Congressmen who proposed generic drug bills in the past. All interviewees were 
selected based either on their engagement with the policy process to some extent or 
that they had some expertise on this topic. This thesis is also based on hundreds of 
government documents and newspaper articles, dating from the late 1980s to 2010. 
The quantitative component, which included information about economic outcomes 
of the generic drug regulation, is based on market intelligence data (e.g. 
Intercontinental Marketing Services – IMS Health), academic research and business 
association analysis. It also included historical spending on pharmaceutical 
assistance programmes that was informed by the Brazilian Ministry of Health.  
 
Key findings 
This study concludes that Brazil’s generic drug reform can be attributed to the 
contingent convergence of institutional evolution (e.g. enactment of an Intellectual 
Property Law in 1996) and the Minister of Health’s political activity. This reform 
aimed to improve the regulatory standards of off-patent pharmaceutical products 
commercialised in the country, foster market competition and increase patient access 
to safe and affordable medicines. This study demonstrates that regulatory 
development has altered the preferences of local pharmaceutical firms, who support 
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and uphold a policy that they were once opposed to, given the high costs to adapt 
their industrial plants and processes. However, in the face of a crisis in the sector, 
these firms decided to reformulate their preferences and demands, adjusting to the 
new regulatory environment. They supported preference in favour of generic drug 
regulation during the 2000s, in spite of the few governmental investments in mass 
media campaigns to promote these products among the population and the reported 
suspicious of consumers (health professionals and patients). Had the firms not 
adapted, pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil may not have changed much since 1999, 
and there would still be competition between patented and similar products.  
 
In addition, this thesis found that the regulation of generic drugs has also produced 
unintended consequences for public pharmaceutical factories, a core pillar of Brazil’s 
celebrated HIV/AIDS response, as they are still unable to fully adjust to the new 
regulatory environment. Brazil has produced antiretroviral medicines that do not fit 
the criteria for generic drug products for more than two decades in public factories 
for the National AIDS Program. The recent engagement of AIDS groups in the 
regulatory process highlights how actors’ preferences were slowly constructed within 
the regulatory process, but also underscores the limitations of changing the norms 
once they becomes path dependent. Because there is a consensus among suppliers on 
the regulatory norm enacted in 1999, it has been difficult for these groups to 
challenge the current state of affairs of generic drug regulation in Brazil. 
Paradoxically, the generic drug regulation, introduced in the name of patients and 
opposed by local pharmaceutical firms, is today opposed by important patient 
advocacy groups but locked in by the strong support of local and multinational 
pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Implications of this study 
The study of generic drug regulation is a field largely concerned with the economic 
effects of market intervention on the price of medicines, the structure of competition 
and also with the behaviour of health professionals and consumers in demanding this 
products (cf. Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Beecroft 2007; Grabowski and Kyle 
2007; Losifescu et al. 2008). Despite the clear political salience of pharmaceutical 
policies, the politics of generic drug regulation goes unnoticed and unresearched . 
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Although this single case study cannot be generalised in terms of causal inference, 
the intention here is to provide a theoretical and practical contribution. From a 
practical point of view, pharmaceutical policy has far-reaching consequences for 
public health; for instance, it can limit or foster the supply of affordable drugs, or 
poorly regulated products can cause abortions, malformation or even death. In this 
sense, important questions to be considered are whether generic drugs should go 
through the same approval process as innovator medicines in order to be considered a 
good quality product, or whether pharmaceutical products that are not 
interchangeable with an innovator drug should be considered substandard. The 
dilemma behind these questions goes beyond the scientific debates and mobilises 
different interests and groups of society with a stake in pharmaceutical regulation. 
Thus, analysing those factors that influence the formulation and development of 
generic drug regulation is important normatively.  
 
Theoretically, this thesis contributes to the studies of pharmaceutical regulation. An 
analysis in this field usually revolves around the emulation/isomorphism of 
international guidelines to regulate the sector or the purposive activity of interest 
groups as influencing policy outcome. However, the social processes discussed in 
this thesis suggest that the World Health Organization best practices can act as a 
stimuli for countries to rethink their regulatory norms, but it is domestic political 
institutions and policy legacies that matter the most as far as the timing and direction 
of the reform are concerned. Also, the case of Brazil illustrates that actors’ 
preferences (firms and patient groups) that capture the pharmaceutical regulatory 
process can, by contrast, be shaped by these processes themselves. When facing 
periods of major economic and political crisis, these groups rethink their demands 
and their strategies in order to pursue them. As they adapt and learn how to act in the 
new regulatory environment, they also push the policy path forward. 
 
Lastly, my personal motivation for this research developed after working on a variety 
of studies related to the politics of HIV/AIDS in Brazil and also a study about 
lobbying activity in European Union health policymaking (Nunn et al. 2007; Greer et 
al. 2008). The study of Brazil’s AIDS policy contributed to my willingness to 
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explore how and why this country enacted such controversial regulations as the 
generic drug policy, whilst the study of lobbying activity provided me with the 
theoretical and methodological motivation to explore this social phenomenon.  
 
This doctoral thesis might interest political scientists, health policy scholars and 
economists concerned with the political conflicts in the pharmaceutical sector, but 
also firms, NGOs, and other institutions concerned with pharmaceutical governance. 
 
The following section provides background information on the content of generic 
drug policy and an overview of the health system in Brazil. It is important to 
introduce the elements of a generic drug policy (e.g. policy instruments) and to 
introduce some contestations around these elements; but most importantly, to situate 
the case of Brazil within the context of Latin American regulation on this sector. The 
information regarding the health system in Brazil is important in order to 
contextualise the institutional background in which this policy was introduced. This 
will be revisited in detail within the thesis but, for now, it will give the reader a brief 
overview and guide to further discussions. The final section provides an outline of 




What is a generic drug policy? 
According to the World Health Organization, a generic medicine is a pharmaceutical 
product that is no longer protected by a patent, is interchangeable with an innovator 
drug and can be copied by other companies (World Health Organization 2001). 
WHO suggest that generic drug substitution should be a key component of a national 
drug policy in order to address what economics define as “market failure” in the 
pharmaceutical sector (World Health Organization 2001: 33). In perfect market 
conditions, buyers and sellers should be able to trade and negotiate their business 
without government interference, leading to an optimal solution (Bennett et al. 1997; 
Henry and Lexchin 2002). However, in the pharmaceutical sector this equilibrium 
would be inefficient mainly for two reasons (Bennett et al. 1997). The first reason is 
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that, in the pharmaceutical sector, the consumer (or patient) is not in a position to 
choose directly the product that is needed, relying instead on doctors’ expertise to 
prescribe the best type of product (ibid). In turn, doctors rely on information 
provided from pharmaceutical companies, medical journals or knowledge taught to 
them at medical schools. Economists call this information asymmetry in the 
transaction, as the party with better information could manipulate the relationship in 
order to maximise a particular interest. Secondly, the reason for market failures in 
this sector is due to the lack of competition created by patent protection, brand 
loyalty or market segmentation (ibid); for instance, brand loyalty promoted by 
marketing strategies that can lead to market monopoly even after a patent expires. 
Consequently, the use of generic drugs is usually promoted in the public and private 
sectors to foster market competition while reducing drug costs, and increasing drug 
availability and patient access (World Health Organization 2001).  
 
There are two elements of generic drug policy that are used to stimulate market 
competition: the use of a non-proprietary name and bioequivalence tests. Any given 
drug has three different names: (i) the chemical name, which describes the product's 
molecular structure to scientists; (ii) the generic name (or International Non-
proprietary Name), which is a shorter, simpler version of the chemical name; and (iii) 
the brand name, which is assigned by the manufacturer and given trademark 
protection (usually shorter and easier to remember than the generic name) (Hurwitz 
and Caves 1998). Each INN is a unique name that is globally recognised and is 
public property. WHO suggest the use of INN to facilitate the identification of 
pharmaceutical substances or active pharmaceutical ingredients worldwide (World 
Health Organization 2010b). For example, the simvastatin developed by Merck is 
marketed as Zocor®, Simlup®, Simcard® or Simvacor®. The use of INN (or generic 
name) facilitates a clear identification, safe prescription and the dispensing of 
medicines to patients, and for communication and exchange of information among 
health professionals and scientists (World Health Organization 2010). It also allows 
patients and institutional buyers to shop for the lowest price, as there might be 
different suppliers of the same pharmaceutical product. Some countries have defined 
the minimum size of characters in which the INN is printed vis-à-vis the trademark 
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and advertising (e.g. 30-50% of the brand name size; some countries require equal 
size for both, while others have adopted a radical approach by abolishing trademarks 
within the public sector) (World Health Organization 2001; World Health 
Organization 2010).  
 
The next relevant component of a generic drug policy is the 
interchangeable/bioequivalence requirement. According to WHO, generic drugs must 
be therapeutically equivalent to their innovator version, i.e. their rates and extent of 
absorption do not show a significant difference from their original version. Arguably, 
bioequivalence gives legitimacy to generic drugs as it implies that one commodity 
can be replaced for another one, thus establishing the parameters for a market 
transaction that is based on price (Carpenter and Tobbell 2011: 2). The discussion on 
interchangeable/bioequivalent tests is rather technical and complex. For the purpose 
of this study, it is important to understand that the bioequivalence test (BE) indicates 
that generic drugs will have the equivalent clinical effect with no difference in their 
potential for adverse effects. Bioavailability tests (BA) establish the rate/extent to 
which the active pharmaceutical ingredient is absorbed from a pharmaceutical 
dosage and becomes available in general circulation (World Health Organization 
2005). While the former is a parameter to establish equality between two products, 
the latter refers to the medicines’ performance in the human body1
Ascione et al. 2001
.  This regulatory 
and scientific parameter was first developed in the United States by the Food and 
Drug Administration and a network of experts engaged in the generic drug sector 
during the 1980s to facilitate the entry of these products into the market after patent 
protection expired ( ; Welage et al. 2001; Carpenter and Tobbell 
2011). Until then, generic drugs had to go through a similar (and lengthy) process of 
approval as innovator companies that, most of the time, duplicated the clinical trials 
that had been done previously.  
 
The generic drug policy can be promoted at various stages from the supply chain to 
the point of purchase (World Health Organization 2001; World Health Organization 
                                                 
1 These parameters are not required for intravenous drugs as they are 100% bioavailable – they are 
directly introduced in general circulation. 
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2004c). The policy goal is to encourage target actors to supply and demand generic 
drugs. For example, a government can promote a mass media campaign to stimulate 
doctors to prescribe generic drugs or patients to request generic drug substitution 
(when available). From a supply side, a government can stimulate firms by 
facilitating registration of these drugs with the National Regulatory Agency or even 
by committing to give preference to generic drugs in the public procurement of 
medicines.  
 
The concept of market failure helps to identify situations in which government 
should intervene in the pharmaceutical sector, thus is frequently used by policy 
makers as a diagnostic approach (cf. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). Used by the 
World Health Organization as a normative rationale, it guides member countries on 
how to identify problems in this sector (market failures) and which solutions should 
be taken to regulate the pharmaceutical sector. These policy investigations are vital 
but are only one side of the problem. The deliberation and implementation of INN 
and bioequivalence tests has proved to be a highly contested effort. Past studies have 
suggested that a pharmaceutical product marketing budget can be two to four times 
as large as the budget for its research and development (Comanor 1986), thus firms 
would be less willing to give up this important component of their business. Because 
of brand loyalty and the credibility attached to the product, some health 
professionals, consumers and retailers could be sceptical about the quality of drugs 
commercialised by generic names. A similar situation is regarding the use of 
bioequivalence tests (Welage et al. 2001). Studies conducted by international agency 
advisors argue that current bioequivalence requirements are too stringent and 
unnecessary for a number of medicines (e.g. some antiretroviral drugs such as 
ritonavir), which could possibly have sweeping effects on access to medicines in 
developing countries (Gonzalez and Rossi 2004; Hill and Johnson 2004; Osewe et al. 
2008). In other words, besides understanding what regulatory arrangements are 
necessary to improve access to medicines, it also relevant to understand how 
countries go about implementing them, i.e. how domestic political institutions (such 
as intellectual property legacy and health surveillance regimes, or the structure of 
interest group activity) mediate these external guidelines. In other words, this thesis 
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is concerned with the governmental approach to these guidelines in relation to its 
local domestic institution; therefore, the political process to regulate generic drug 
products.  
 
Market competition in the pharmaceutical sector differs substantially between 
developed and developing countries. In Europe and the United States, intellectual 
property law was consolidated in the 1950s (
Geographic variations in generic drug regulation 
Homedes and Ugalde 2005a). 
Consequently, competition in developed countries starts after patent monopoly 
expires and involves an innovator versus a generic drug. In this scenario, the 
introduction of bioequivalence parameters represents a reduction in regulatory 
requirements in order to register a generic drug, thus accelerating the market entry of 
pharmaceutical products no longer under patent. By contrast, in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, for example, intellectual property was introduced (or, for some 
countries, reintroduced) in 1995 with the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) (Gonzalez et al. 2008). Consequently, market competition in these countries 
began before the adoption of a patent system. For instance, in Brazil, until 1996, any 
pharmaceutical firm could manufacture innovator medicines without paying royalties 
to the research-based firm that developed the drug. These medicines that were copied 
were not classified as generic drugs as there was no such regulation during this 
period; they were named similar or “multisource” pharmaceutical products in current 
WHO terms (World Health Organization 2006).  
 
The introduction of mandatory bioequivalence tests in these countries represented an 
increase in the normative standards to register pharmaceutical products no longer 
under patent, regulating a market competition that was already in place. There is a 
wide variation among countries in the decision as to which products should provide 
bioequivalence tests and how to implement these tests. For instance, Brazil, Mexico, 
United States and Canada usually adopt bioequivalence requirements for drugs with 
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a narrow therapeutic range (NRT)2
Pan 
American Health Organization 2008a
 and for highly toxic drugs. From a list of 96 
drugs, based on the WHO Essential Medicine List that requires bioequivalence tests, 
in Brazil 87 products are required to provide bioequivalence tests, followed by 
Mexico with 59 products, Venezuela with 21 and Argentina with only 15 (
).  
 
Two studies carried out by the World Bank and Pan-American Health Organization 
advisors in 2003 and 2005 pointed out the differences and similarities in generic drug 
policy in Latin America (Homedes and Ugalde 2005a; Gonzalez et al. 2008). Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico use similar definitions for their pharmaceutical products. 
Generic is an off-patent drug, therapeutically interchangeable with an innovator 
product and identified by the INN – Brazil also uses the Brazilian Nonproprietary 
Name (BNN). In these countries, pharmaceutical products can be divided into three 
types: innovator drug (patent products); generic drugs (therapeutically equivalent 
with an innovator drug); and similar or multisource drugs (not bioequivalent, as it 
may have different form, size or shelf-life). Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru classify pharmaceutical products into two types: 
products identified by a brand name (can be patent or off-patent products) and 
generics (off-patent drugs identified by INN). Table 1 provides a summary of these 
different types. In short, in Latin American countries there is no consensus about 
labelling (brand name or INN) and technical requirements (bioequivalence and 
bioavailability requirements) for registering generic drug products. Nevertheless, 
these discrepancies can also be observed in developed countries. For instance, in the 
WHO Essential Medicines list of 96 bioequivalent drugs, Canada has 92 products 
that are required to provide bioequivalence, while the US has 88 medicines (Pan 
American Health Organization 2008a). Although the findings of Brazil’s case study 
cannot be generalised, it can provide important insights into why the generic drug 
regulation took the form it did and how national institutional and political processes 
influence the design and implementation of these policies.  
                                                 
2 Narrow Therapeutic Range (NRT) drugs “have less than a 2-fold difference between the minimum 
toxic concentration and minimum effective concentration in blood”. Since small differences in the 
amount of NTR drug administered may result in more serious consequences than with other 




Table 1. Types of pharmaceutical products in selected Latin American countries 
 
Country Type of pharmaceutical product 
Argentina Innovative drugs 
Similar drugs (or copies). These have the same active ingredient, concentration, 
pharmaceutical form and dosage and are used for the same indication as the 
innovative products. They are equivalent to the innovative product but might 
differ in size, shape, packaging and period of activity. They are pharmaceutically 
equivalent to the innovative drug. They may use a brand name. 
Generic drugs. These are drugs that have been proven to be bioequivalent to the 
innovative drug, They are off-patent and tend to be identified by an INN. 
 
Brazil  Innovative or reference drugs 
Similar drugs. These have the same active ingredient, concentration, dosage and 
pharmaceutical form as the reference drug. They are used for the same indications. 
They are equivalent to the reference drug but may have different size, shape, 
packaging and excipients. Need to be identified with a brand-name. 
Generic drugs. These are interchangeable with the reference drug and have been 
proven to have the same efficacy, security and quality. They are produced after 
patent expiration and are identified with an INN or Brazilian non-proprietary 
name.  
 
Mexico Innovative or reference drugs 
Generic interchangeable. These are interchangeable with a reference product as 
certified by the Health Secretariat. They are off-patent and are identified by an 
INN. 
Similar drug. These drugs have the same active ingredient as the reference 









Branded drugs. These are proprietary drugs and similar or copy drugs. 
Generic drugs. These use an INN or other internationally recognised names. 
They are off-patent.   
Source: Homedes and Ugalde (2005a). 
 
Lastly, the market for generic drug products range from freshly off-patent products 
(e.g. pravastatin, a medicine to lower cholesterol) to a broad range of older medicines 
(e.g. acetylsalicylic acid). Contestation can be quite prominent in the first case and 
limit or delay generic drug competition. A recent illustration is the 2008 European 
Commission’s Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (DG Competition), which suggested 
that innovator companies were using different loopholes in regulatory rules to delay 
entry of generic medicines into the European market (European Commission 2008). 
For example, by filing a number of patents for the same medicines, this leaves 
generic drug producers uncertain as to whether and when they can develop their 
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products without infringing one of the different patents (ibid). Another example is 
patent extension contestation, when research-based companies demand restoration of 
the patent life wasted during the regulatory review process for innovative 
pharmaceutical products, thus delaying the entry of a generic drug product. Finally, 
there is also the case of incremental innovation, which can be related to a new 
therapeutic use of a medicine (also called second medical use) or the improvement in 
a pharmaceutical product that is already patented; both could be (arguably) the object 
of a new patent (Correa 2004; Kunisawa 2009). Thus, intellectual property regimes 
are also important when understanding the process of generic drug regulation as they 
define which medicines can be legally copied and when. Because these are 
overlapping regulatory agendas, it is important to observe how they interact and are 
interpreted by the participants in the policy process in order to understand the extent 
to which IP agendas matter for Generic Drug regulation.  
 
Health system and pharmaceutical reforms in Brazil 
Brazil entered the 1990s with an infant democratic government after 20 years of 
military government. With the restoration of democracy, a new institutional context 
was designed with the introduction of the 1988 Federal Constitution (Brasil 1988). It 
established a highly decentralised political system, involving the transfer of services 
and resources from federal to states and municipal governments (Avelar and Cintra 
2004). It also established check and balance mechanisms with independent 
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches. Furthermore, the new Constitution 
expanded citizenship rights, including free and universal access to health care 
(section II of the Constitution). Previously, only 20-30% of the population had access 
to health care through medical groups, cooperatives or occupational health insurance 
(Falleti 2010: 41).  
 
The health reform was guided in by a health care movement, or sanitary movement 
(movimento sanitario), organised by intellectuals, health professionals, patients and 
leftist political parties (Escorel 1999). While some scholars suggest that these health 
activists had been working for decades and had infiltrated the military government to 
slowly advance the agenda of universal health coverage (Weyland 1995; Falleti 
2010), others argue that the critical period of democratic transition made the health 
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reform possible (Arretche 2004). For the purpose of this study, it is important to 
understand that the Brazilian Constitution mandates the right to equal access to 
health services for all citizens through the Unified Health System (Sistema Unico de 
Saude - SUS). However, in practice, health care provision is still fragmented with a 
private system coexisting alongside the public. It was estimated that, in 2008, nearly 
45 million people (~23% of the population) were covered by voluntary private 
insurance in Brazil (IBGE 2008). In the same year, total government spending on 
health represented 44% of the total health expenditure, while private expenditure 
represented 56% (among this 41.2% came from private insurance and 57.1% from 
out-of-pocket spending3 World Health Organization 2010c) ( ).  
 
Also, although one of the SUS commitments is the provision of pharmaceutical care 
to the population, over 80% of drug expenses are paid for by out-of-pocket spending 
(Cohen 2000). In Brazil, it is not mandatory for private health plans to cover 
expenditure on medicines, leaving this to the discretion of each supplier to define 
their package of service. To date, there are clauses in a few specific plans to cover up 
to 30% co-payment for selected drugs in associated drug stores. Rough statistics 
suggest that, in the early 1990s, 50% of the population had no access to medicines 
(ALANAC 2010). As Brazil is a country marked by deep inequality, this is also 
reflected in the skewed profile of drug consumption. For instance, in 1998 income 
group A represented 15% of the population, and its members consumed about 48% 
of all pharmaceuticals sold in Brazil’s marketplace; group B, meanwhile, represented 
34% of the population, and its members consumed about 36% of all drugs sold; and 
income group C, with 51% of the population, consumed a modest 16% of medicines 
(Abifarma 1998 in Cohen 2000). Additionally, because in Brazil the Constitution 
mandates that health is a duty of the state, patients who have been prescribed 
expensive, sometimes experimental, drugs that are not part of the essential drug lists 
request in the courts the right to have assess to these products (Victora et al. 2011). 
This obliges the Executive government to purchase these drugs immediately (at times 
                                                 
3 The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) defines out-of-pocket 
expenditure on health as “cost sharing, self-medication and other expenditure paid directly by private 
households, irrespective of whether the contact with the healthcare system was established on referral 
or on the patient’s own initiative” (http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm). 
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without price procurement, as these are patent/unique products), which could 
represent inefficient use of public sources (ibid). In sum, this combination of 
constitutional right to health care with a skewed access to medicines in a democratic 
context has turned pharmaceuticals into a highly sensitive political issue, as this 
thesis will demonstrate. 
 
At the pharmaceutical assistance level, the late 1990s represented a great 
transformation with the introduction for the first time of a National Drug Policy 
(Ministerio da Saude 1998). There were significant changes in the financing and 
delivery of basic medications to the population. Since January 1999, states and 
municipalities have been responsible for the purchasing and distribution of basic 
medications. Formerly, this was centralised at CEME (Medicines Central/Ministry of 
Health), and then under the national Farmacia Basica (Basic Pharmaceutical) 
programme4 (World Bank 2000). Currently, pharmaceutical assistance is divided into 
three core components: essential medicines, exceptional medicines and strategic 
medicines (see www.saude.gov.br/medicamentos). The essential medicines 
component is based on an essential medicines list that includes 375 pharmaceutical 
products and vaccines. Expenditure with essential medicines is a shared 
responsibility of three levels of government, while drug procurement and delivery is 
fully decentralised. The other two components are exceptional drugs (chronic illness, 
high treatment cost, frequently delivered in secondary/tertiary care, e.g. hepatitis, 
cancer, epilepsy) and strategic drugs (specific chronic or acute illness, part of 
Ministry of Health programmes and with established protocols, e.g. AIDS, TB, 
tobacco). In 2004, a new pharmaceutical assistance model was developed (Brasil 
2004). In the Farmacia Popular programme (Popular Pharmacy Programme), 
medicines are sold at the cost of production in government-owned pharmacies 
(suppliers are public pharmaceutical industries) (Brasil 2004). In 2009, the 
programme was further expanded to a co-payment system, including private drug 
stores, covering selected medicines in order to treat diabetes and heart conditions 
                                                 
4 Federal government continued to finance strategic drugs for diseases such as AIDS, TB, diabetes, 
and leprosy. 
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(suppliers for the Popular Pharmacy Programme-Expansion are usually private 
pharmaceutical firms, local or multinationals) (Brasil 2009).  
 
At a regulatory level, several important reforms were also introduced in the 1990s as, 
until then, this sector was poorly regulated. In 1996, Brazil introduced the Industrial 
Property Act (Brasil 1996a); until then, local pharmaceutical firms could legally 
copy any drug without paying royalties to the innovator company. This decision was 
taken after five years of intense debates in Congress that gained much media 
attention (cf. Revista Veja 1991; Folha de Sao Paulo 1995a). In 1999, motivated by 
several scandals of fake medicines commercialised in Brazil, and the dissatisfaction 
with the price of medicines, the Minister of Health proposed several regulatory 
reforms in this sector (cf. O Globo 1998; Revista Veja 1998; Revista Veja 1998a; 
Jornal do Brasil 1998b). These included the creation of a National Surveillance 
Agency and amendments in the Industrial Property Act to facilitate the use of 
intellectual property safeguards in case of a public health emergency (Brasil 1999a; 
Brasil 1999b). Also, during this period, Brazil also led important reformulations at 
international level to clarify the use of intellectual property safeguards and norms 
related to access to essential medicines (Odell and Sell 2003; Sell and Prakash 2004; 
Nunn et al. 2009a). It was under this critical context that the Minister of Health also 
proposed the introduction of a generic drug regulation. Brazil’s government activism 
in pharmaceutical regulation became a common object of study for many political 
and social science scholars (Biehl 2004; Piovesan and Labra 2007; Bastos et al. 
2008; Nunn 2008; Shadlen 2009). However, the political process of generic drug 
regulation has been under-analysed and has not attracted much interest to date. As 
such, this study intends to improve the understanding of the policy issues and process 
of this reform. By focusing on the political process and the stakeholders involved, 
this thesis explores how and why Brazil promoted such large-scale reform that 
influenced the sector as a whole and successfully introduced generic drugs into the 






The first chapter of this thesis provides a critical analysis of the literature on generic 
drug regulation and contextualises the Brazilian case. It explores the advancements 
in the study of this pharmaceutical regulatory policy and suggests that a key area of 
investigation is the political process by which this regulation is discussed and 
developed. It discusses the two prominent accounts required to study pharmaceutical 
regulation: the diffusion of international regulatory guidelines and interest group 
activity, their limitations and inadequacy to explain Brazil’s case. Chapter 2 presents 
the theoretical frame applied in this research, based on historical institutional 
analysis and constructivism. It proposes an investigation of the regulatory process 
through a longitudinal perspective, seeking to understand how policy legacies shape 
the preferences and demands of actors and interest groups. Chapter 3 describes the 
research protocol required to study the generic drug regulatory process in Brazil. It 
discusses the methodological choice for the case study and the qualitative research; it 
also translates the rationale and conceptual parameters presented in the theoretical 
chapter into a research design. This chapter also describes the research methods, data 
collection and analysis and further research practicalities (ethical concerns, 
institutional support). 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form the empirical core of this thesis. They are organised in 
order to outline the different stages of generic drug policymaking. Chapter 3 traces 
the critical period of generic drug reform and its institutional antecedents. It assesses 
the initial attempts to introduce generic drugs in the early 1990s, the enactment of the 
Intellectual Property Act in 1996 and the emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
These, together with a scandal involving fake medicines in the late 1990s, which 
occurred during a particular period of the electoral cycle, were prerequisites for the 
Generic Drug reform championed by the Minister of Health, Jose Serra, between 
1999 and 2002. Chapters 4 and 5 assess the policy effects of this regulatory 
restructuring, comprising the period between 2003 and 2009. Chapter 5 starts by 
looking at the institutional context in the 2000s, together with three actors in the 
generic drug regulation: the government, market demanders (health professionals and 
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consumers) and suppliers of generic drugs. However, this regulation has also 
generated unexpected effects on other stakeholders in this sector, such as public 
pharmaceutical factories and patient advocacy groups, which were clustered for 
heuristic purposes, and are the objects of the analysis of Chapter 6. Finally, the last 





1. Contextualising generic drug regulation 
 
This chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of the literature on generic drug 
regulation and contextualise the Brazilian case. This is important in order to explore 
the advancements in the study of this pharmaceutical regulatory policy, to identify 
key areas of investigation and in supporting the research design of this thesis.  
 
The literature that informed this chapter was collected from different sources and 
was hierarchically consulted, i.e. I started with large indexed databases to grey 
literature. The first step in reviewing what has been published about generic drug 
regulation was to look at two large indexed databases, the International Bibliography 
of the Social Sciences (IBSS) and the U.S. National Library of Medicine (PubMed). 
Articles indexed in the former tend to be related to economics and social science in 
general, while the latter usually refer to medical sciences and health policy. The time 
frame established for this literature review was from 1980 to 2009, given that generic 
drug regulation first began in the United States in mid-1980 and appeared in the 
World Health Organization documents also by this period. The key words used were 
“generic drugs”, “generic drug regulation” and “generic drug policy”. Additional 
words were included to filter the results such as “economic analysis”, “perception” or 
“acceptance”, and “pharmaceutical regulation”.  
 
A number of articles were found and all those in which the title or abstract did not 
refer to regulations of generic medicines strictu sensu were discarded. The inclusion 
criterion also referred to articles published in English, Portuguese or Spanish. An 
important selection criterion also needs to be clarified here. There are several studies 
from an intellectual property perspective that make reference to generic medicines. 
Evidently, as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, there is an 
overlapping agenda between these two. Scholars studying intellectual property, 
public health and access to medicines often mention generic drugs in their papers (cf. 
Sell and Prakash 2004). Therefore, I consulted these papers and decided to exclude 
them as their main aim was not to assess generic drug regulation. Also problematic is 
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the fact that some scholars studying IP or even HIV/AIDS policy, misleadingly 
classifies products that are not generic drug products as if they were so. For example, 
they mention Brazil’s capacity to produce medicines in local pharmaceutical firms 
and assume that, because these products are not patented, they are generic drugs (cf. 
Gomez 2009). This is not accurate, as we shall see in this thesis5
Lastly, the third part of this literature review focuses on contextualising the case of 
Brazil. As suggested in the previous chapter, Brazil has one of the most stringent 
regulatory regimes for generic drugs in Latin America and has promoted significant 
reforms in its pharmaceutical regulation. This section provides background 
information about this reform by revising previous studies on this topic. Altogether, 
.  
 
This literature review is organised into three parts. The first part refers to economic 
studies and attitudes toward generic drug substitution studies. The intention here is 
not to provide an exhaustive review of these areas but rather to identify the 
contribution of each of them to the analysis of generic drug regulation. The second 
part of this literature review refers to policy studies on generic drug regulation. Very 
few studies of the political process to implement generic drug regulation were 
identified in the literature review. This type of study is particularly important in 
clarifying how generic drug policy is discussed, approved and implemented. Because 
of the limited supporting literature, this section expands the scope of the review to 
explore broad studies on the regulatory process of the pharmaceutical sector. This is 
important as it provides an insight into how to assess the regulatory process of 
generic drugs. To do so, I selected studies from policy scholars that have approached 
pharmaceutical regulation from a health perspective rather than trade (e.g. 
intellectual property regulation). I opted for this criterion as the venue for discussing 
generic drugs is the National Regulatory Authorities/Ministries of Health and 
because the politics of pharmaceutical regulation can differ substantially when its 
content is framed as a trade affair.  
 
                                                 
5 Perhaps this happens because authors might decide to cluster off-patent medicines into one category 
(generic drugs) to facilitate the analysis. They may even be unaware of the difference between a 
similar and a generic pharmaceutical product, thus ignoring the contestation in this sector. If so, this 
study of generic drug regulation can also contribute to clarifying this and explore why this is relevant.  
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the three sections of this chapter helped in identifying the avenues of investigation 
and guided the data collection process.  
 
 
Preceding studies on generic drug regulation 
 
This section discusses the existing studies of generic drug regulation, consolidating 
the current understanding of this sector from cross-disciplinary fields and their 
contribution to understanding this pharmaceutical policy.  
 
Economic studies 
Economists have examined the effect of regulation and ask whether government 
intervention is efficient or more efficient than doing nothing (Noll 1989). Economic 
analyses are usually concerned with the effects of generic drug competition on the 
market structure, price and volume of sales. For example, in terms of market 
structure, economists have suggested that medicines with large sales attract more 
generic entrants and may have shorter market exclusivity periods than less-selling 
drugs (Bae 1997; Grabowski and Kyle 2007). In addition, drugs that treat chronic 
symptoms tend to appear on the market more quickly than those medicines primarily 
used to treat acute illnesses, and this may be related to the greater stability of their 
demand over time (Bae 1997). In addition, economists suggest that, in terms of 
competitive advantage, which ultimately leads to a significant increase in the market 
share, being the first entrant into this sector is extremely important (Hollis 2002). In 
terms of price and volume of drugs, there is a lack of consensus among economists. 
The study of Grabowski and Vernon (1992) suggests that generic producers gain a 
large market share very soon after patent expiration given the price differentials 
among original and generic drugs, which are on average much lower. If this is the 
case, we could expect that innovator drug producers would have an incentive to 
lower their prices after generic drug competition. Whilst some studies also found this 
assumption plausible by demonstrating a decline in the prices of original products 
(Caves et al. 1991), others suggest opposing findings, that the price of original drugs 
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increases after generic entry into the market and the prices of the generic drugs 
themselves tend to decline (Frank and Salkever 1997).  
 
Comparative studies of generic drug markets provide evidence of the policy mix that 
could influence the market penetration of these products. The study of Kanavos et al. 
(2008) is a cross-country assessment, using disaggregated data on price, quantity and 
sales of selected medicines from IMS (Intercontinental Marketing Services) Health. 
The authors found that the prices of innovator medicines are not affected by generic 
competition, while countries with no reimbursement mechanisms have shown greater 
competition than those that use these mechanisms. Market penetration of generic 
drugs is fostered by lower generic drug prices, pharmacy competition and higher 
reference prices (or maximum reimbursement rate). Similarly, Garattini and Tediosi 
(2000), while comparing five European countries, found that countries with more 
flexible pricing policies had more success. For example, those with free market 
mechanisms for wholesale and retail enhance their competitive market. The study of 
Hudson (2000) compared the UK, Germany and Japan and suggested that large 
markets influence the probability of generic drug entry and have an impact on 
innovator drugs sales. All of these studies highlight the relevance of local regulatory 
regimes and pharmaceutical assistance policy in influencing market penetration of 
generics (cf. Grabowski and Vernon 1992). Examples of these include the incentives 
to prescribers offered by the British National Health Service, or the early entry 
legislation (Bolar provision) that allows generic manufacturers to complete 
regulatory requirements prior to patent expiry in the US and several European 
countries (Garattini and Tediosi 2000: 160; Kanavos et al. 2008: 502).  
 
The economic assessment of generic drug regulation is particularly relevant when 
trying to understand the magnitude of this sector, the direction in which it is evolving 
(e.g. identify bottlenecks) and, perhaps, guide firms’ marketing strategy and public 
policies. However, these studies are conducted in a political vacuum; there is no 
discussion on the institutional and interests involved in regulatory activity. Thus, 
only in-depth analysis within each country could provide an understanding of how 
and why the institutional idiosyncrasies matter for the development of generic drug 
 33 
market in these countries. Explaining the political dynamics and the policymaking 
process of generic drug regulation is as important as understanding the effects of 
generic drug competition on the price of medicines.  
 
“Perception” literature  
A second strand of literature has been developed by pharmacists and health 
management scholars, who focus primarily on perception (or attitudes) of 
prescribers, pharmacists and consumers of generic drugs (Gaither et al. 2001; Mott 
and Cline 2002; Granlund 2009; Chong et al. 2010). Generic drug substitution 
requires that doctors, patients and pharmacists are informed and willing to exchange 
one product for another (King and Kanavos 2002). If they have doubts regarding the 
standards and quality of generic medicines, they are often in a position to refuse 
them. There are many factors that could influence this decision. Of particular 
importance is their beliefs about generic drugs and also how they go about 
demanding them (Kirking et al. 2001).  
 
There are a number of studies that look at these issues. Their methodology varies 
from primary data collection (surveys) and public opinion polls to meta-analysis with 
secondary sources to explore the determinants of generic drug substitution. For 
example, determinants for consumers might include income, level of education, age, 
etc; whilst for physicians some studies point to the differences between private and 
government employees (Gaither et al. 2001; Granlund 2009). It is difficult to classify 
these studies into a neat pattern. Some point to the fact that there is generally support 
from pharmacists (Chong et al. 2010), whilst other suggests that consumers are still 
concerned about the safety of these products (Iosifescu et al. 2008). Indeed, countries 
vary in the policy instruments they use to regulate generic drugs, whilst some allow 
pharmacists to substitute a prescription with a generic version (e.g. Brazil and some 
states in the US) and others do not (e.g. Portugal). The study of Al-Gedadi and 
Hassali (2008) reviewed the literature on pharmacists’ views on generic medicines 
and found factors such as the pricing and bioequivalence of medicines were taken 
into account when deciding for generic drug substitution. They suggest that there is a 
consensus that generic medicines should have the same quality as their correspondent 
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innovator products. The authors suggest that pharmacists assess this by looking at the 
government lists (such as the Orange Book in the United States, which names the 
interchangeable drugs), but they also take into account the manufacturer’s reputation 
(note: given that generic drugs do not have a commercial name, marketing strategies 
are usually directed to the producer’s status). Many studies consulted suggest that 
mass media campaigns and awareness campaigns targeted at doctors and pharmacists 




Some reflections can be drawn from this first part of the literature review. The first 
two groups of scholars are mainly concerned with the outcome of this policy. 
Generic drug policy is usually justified by these scholars as an intervention to 
overcome a market failure (neoclassical economic school) (cf. Dugger 1979). The 
State regulates the pharmaceutical sector to diminish the negative effects of this 
failure and increase the welfare of the population. As seen in the introduction of this 
thesis, the market would be inefficient as suppliers have some sort of advantage in 
deciding which produt they will manufacture (e.g. quality and volume) and define 
the price of their products in relation to the demand for these products. From this 
perspective, the role of institutions is understated, while individual and firms’ 
behaviour is explained by deducing them from basic postulates (e.g. ultility and 
profit functions) and initional conditions (e.g. income distribution and price of good) 
(ibid: 900-1). The aggregated effect of maximiser agents (consumers/firms) and their 
interactions determine equilibrium output and price. Although this approach is 
important to gain an understanding of policy outcome (price of products, effects on 
the demand and market structure), it does not take into account important institutions 
(such as regulatory regimes or health systems) that mediate an actor’s behaviour 
(firms and consumers). Nevertheless, the majority of studies on generic drug 
regulation are concerned with its economic outcome, and less is known about its 
process of deliberation and development. The following section now turns to explore 
the policy studies on generic drug regulation. 
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Generic drug regulation from a political perspective 
 
The review of the literature found a small number of studies from a political and 
historical perspective on generic drug regulation. The study of Ascione et al. (2001) 
presents a historical analysis of the American case based on an extensive secondary 
data review through indexing services. The authors assess the events that preceded 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, suggesting that generic drug regulation resulted 
from the lobbying of the generic drug industry with the assistance of consumer 
groups that had pressured Congress to enact a legislation that would simplify and 
accelerate the generic drug approval process (Ascione et al. 2001: 569). These 
authors suggest that the history of generic drugs in the US results from a conflict 
between economic actors; that is, innovator firms seeking to protect their market 
share versus a less unified coalition of consumer groups, health professionals and 
care organisations and generic manufacturers that seek to reduce health care costs in 
general, or the rising costs of a particular therapy. Another source of conflict is 
between professionals, with the pharmacists trying to expand their role in health care 
and dispensing or substituting pharmaceutical products, and those in the medical 
profession trying to limit pharmacist interference in their prescription practice. 
Finally, the authors point to the scientific debate within regulatory communities on 
the comparative efficacy of all pharmaceutical products. Note that these authors do 
not have a background in policy studies but in pharmacology. Although they provide 
a rich analysis of the evolution of generic drug policy in the States, they are less 
concerned with its underlying social and political process. 
 
Carpenter and Tobbell (2011), who have also analysed the American case, provide 
an in-depth analysis of the historical construction of the bioequivalence concept. The 
authors suggest that this is a joint scientific and regulatory concept developed within 
a network of pharmacologists, regulators, lawyers and American policymakers with a 
stake in generic drugs. They highlight the role of the state in shaping the scientific 
process, network of regulators and scientists, emphasising the regulatory concept 
formation. They point out that, during the 1970s, the FDA progressively became 
responsible for developing a methodology to access bioequivalence and facilitate the 
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entry of off-patent drugs into the market. This placed the Federal government as a 
guarantor of equivalence standards. A negotiation in Congress, through an agreement 
between both parties (democrats and republicans) and between innovators and 
generic manufacturers, led to the Hatch-Waxman Act. The nascent generic industry 
would benefit from a rationalised regulatory application process and a bonus of one 
year of exclusivity for the firm that first markets the product, while innovator firms 
would be granted a longer period of brand exclusivity. Progressively, these innovator 
firms dropped their claims against generic medicines. In another publication, 
Carperter highlights the political relevance of the FDA’s reputation, suggesting that 
its guidelines serve as a model to other countries (Carpenter 2010). This includes the 
diffusion of bioequivalence concept, which would be adopted by other countries 
taking the US as a benchmark.  
 
Both of these studies highlight two accounts of the pharmaceutical regulatory 
process. One refers to the diffusion of international regulatory guidelines and the 
other to positive theory of regulation.  
 
Global health and the diffusion of international guidelines 
There is a group of scholars of pharmaceutical regulation who claim that 
international regulatory standards formulated by developed countries inspire 
developing countries to revise their local guidelines. This seems intuitively plausible 
as organisations, such as the European Medicines Agency, the American Food and 
Drug Administration, the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), set the 
rules to enable pharmaceutical firms to access the market of developed countries. In 
addition, the scientific expertise of these agencies can encourage governments to 
emulate their guidelines.  
 
The study of Brhlikova et al. (2007) suggests that Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP) in Nepal and India could potentially harm local production of affordable 
pharmaceutical products. According to the WHO, Good Manufacturing Practices are 
regulatory aspects of the drug production process that assure that medicines are 
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produced according to the quality standards necessary to their use and according to 
the marketing authorisation rules (World Health Organization 2010d). The authors 
suggest that Good Manufacturing Practices, widely supported by developed countries 
and WHO, might represent a market barrier to entry, sustainability and perhaps 
market expansion of local pharmaceutical firms in India and Nepal. These norms 
imply costly adjustments, particularly for Nepali firms that focus mainly on the 
domestic market.  
 
Dan Carpenter (2010) studied the reputation of the FDA for its scientific expertise 
and responsibility for shaping concepts such Good Manufacturing Practices and 
bioequivalence, which are widely used in other countries. The author argues that the 
organisational image of the FDA – understood as a set of symbolic beliefs about the 
FDA, embedded in multiple audiences – explains much about its reputation that 
inspires credibility. Through an extensive historical analysis of the activities of this 
organisation and how this image was built (e.g. scientific accuracy and stringency 
that avoided such a drug crisis as the Talidomide scandal in Europe), he suggests that 
this has led to countries in Europe and India emulating much of their rules.  
 
Since the late 1980s, WHO has disseminated the idea that the introduction of generic 
drugs could foster market competition and increase access to essential medicines (cf. 
World Health Organization 1988). The scientific concept of bioequivalence, 
developed mainly in the United States, also appears in WHO guidelines. It is not 
clear how and why this international organisation decided to incorporate them into its 
best-practices guides. The 2001 document “Guidelines for Developing National Drug 
Policies” dedicated a section to informing countries of the steps to be taken should 
they decide to introduce these products (e.g. market supply and demand mechanisms) 
(World Health Organization 1988; World Health Organization 1998; World Health 
Organization 2001). The WHO also provides guidelines on the use of non-
proprietary names, bioequivalence parameters and further technical specifications of 
drug registration (e.g. World Health Organization 2005; World Health Organization 
2010b). Following the rationale from this group of studies, generic drug policy could 
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be understood as the emulation by other countries of international organisation 
guidelines, such as WHO or other respectable agencies from the North. 
 
Diffusion of normative guidelines is not new in the public health sector. For instance, 
scholars of health reforms credit the World Bank and other international agencies for 
promoting a neoliberal agenda into the social policy sector in Latin America. This 
was particularly prominent in the early 1990s, when the Bank attached to the loan 
agreements policy conditions demanding a reduction in social service spending 
(health, education and welfare) as these represented a large part of public spending 
(Buse 1993; World Bank 1993). In brief, the idea that underpinned these policy 
prescriptions was that the private sector would be more efficient in the provision and 
development of services than the public sector and that emphasis should be placed 
into prevention initiatives in spite of expensive curative interventions (World Bank 
1993). In this sense, government function in public health would be regulatory, while 
private corporations would provide medical care services. There are several studies 
of the effects of this policy transfer (cf. Armada et al. 2001) and whether it has been 
successful or not (cf. Homedes and Ugalde 2005b).  
 
In sum, two elements in this discussion are important for this thesis. The first refers 
to a practical aspect of pharmaceutical regulation as a cross border health care 
business and global health concern. Harmonisation of pharmaceutical regulation is 
important as medicines (and particularly generic drugs, which are commodity 
products) are goods that can be manufactured but commercialised in a different 
country, thus have a direct impact on trading activities of firms and health care more 
broadly. This is particularly important in the context of economic integration and 
increased number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (cf. Homedes et al. 
2005). A common regulatory environment for free circulation of pharmaceutical 
products might require a harmonisation of its members’ rules. In this sense, 
international agencies such as the Pan American Health Organization have been 
discussing strategies and norms to conciliate different regulatory norms in Latin 
American countries (Pan American Health Organization 1997). The guidelines 
proposed by the World Health Organization and the reputation of the FDA policies in 
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this segment of the pharmaceutical sector could facilitate this process of 
harmonisation, as these are legitimate and credible models. However, despite this 
increasing concern with harmonisation of regulatory rules and available models of 
regulation, little is agreed between member countries on how to formulate these 
norms to secure public health interests (Pan American Health Organization 2008).  
 
The second element observed in these studies refers to how these guidelines are 
disseminated across countries. Although the authors discussed in this section are 
more concerned with the practical implications of diffusion and harmonisation of 
regulatory rules, the theoretical aspect underpinning their analysis resembles “policy 
diffusion” arguments. A path-breaking study from this perspective is Peter Haas’ 
epistemic communities (Haas 1992). In short, Haas argues that these communities 
are networks of experts whose shared ideas underpin their efforts to influence policy. 
Because policy-makers face multiple problems with several choices and uncertain 
outcomes, they would turn to these epistemic communities for solutions and reduce 
uncertainty. In this sense, WHO’s guidelines on pharmaceutical policy and 
regulatory norms, such as bioequivalence and National Drug Policy, could represent 
a major blow to the worldwide expansion of generic drug policies.  
Within the typology of policy diffusion proposed by Simmons et al. (2006), this 
would be understood as a learning or emulation process as WHO has no enforcement 
power to force governments to adopt their best practices. On the other hand, transfer 
of the FDA guidelines to other countries could happen through learning/emulation or 
even through coercion mechanisms, such as adding as a condition clause to bilateral 
or multilateral trade agreement to pressure govenments to reform their regulatory 
norms (cf. Vivas-Eugui 2003; Kampf 2007; Krikorian 2008). Additionally, other 
scholars have gone a step further and argued that the mechanism of policy transfer is 
a learning activity, i.e. policy-makers take cognitive shortcuts to decide which policy 
they will emulate (Weyland 2007). Weyland uses case studies of pension and health 
reforms in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Peru and suggests that 
decision-makers in these countries adopted coherent, bold, cognitively available 
foreign policy models because of selective or accidental attention (Weyland 2007: 6). 
Instead of systematically culling information (e.g. cost and benefits of a policy) as 
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suggested by classic rational choice models, they tend rely on models proposed by 
international organizations for instance. In this sense, decision makers would 
purposively turn to generic drug policies as a solution to problems governments face 
in providing access to affordable medicines and reduce health costs. 
  
The international context and best practices on generic drug policy are indeed 
relevant and of unquestionable influence when decision makers come across their 
recommendations. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, there is a certain 
level of organisational isomorphism between the international recommendation and a 
country’s regulation. Thus, pharmaceutical sector is a crucial case6
cf. 
Homedes and Ugalde 2005a
 to assess 
evidences of policy diffusion. If the emulation of international guidelines affects 
government decisions, it does so in this sector. However, policy diffusion is not 
sufficient to initiate a regulatory change in pharmaceutical sector and, in reality, 
there are profound differences in generic drug regulation among countries (
). The analytical model proposed in this thesis suggests 
that it is necessary to understand primarily how domestic pharmaceutical regulatory 
regimes shape the preferences of actors engaged in the policy process in order to 
understand the extent in which these best practices/international guidelines matter for 
policy development. In other words, the institutional arrangement in place mediates 
the adoption of policies proposed by these international organisations/agencies.  
 
Access to political systems and the ability to make winning coalitions are determined 
by the domestic structure of the country adopting these ideas (cf. Risse-Kappen 
1994). Although these are well-established analytical arguments for studying 
regulation (cf. Vogel 1986; Baron 1993), apparently those health policy scholars 
concerned with pharmaceutical regulation have not explored them in depth. Although 
convergence of regulatory activity would be expected, for instance given the market 
structure of pharmaceuticals (even small regulatory differences can affect the 
demand/supply of medicines and limit a sector’s growth), there are reasons to believe 
that there are strong national variations on domestic regulatory designs. Variations 
                                                 
6 Crucial case refers to the closest a case study can get to confirm a particular hypothesis. It the case 
evidences that a hypothesis is not true, it can then be plausibily refuted (Eckstein 1975).  
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occur according to governments, institutional legacies and bureaucracies (Vogel 
1996; Levy and Spiller 1996a). These authors argue that normative aspects of 
regulatory design are deeply related to politics. “Political action shapes regulatory 
policy and influences its evolution. It is not only present when policies are 
formulated and laws enacted but later once the policies are implemented” (Baron 
1993: 21). For instance, the study of Levy and Spiller (Levy and Spiller 1996) has 
demonstrated that there is not an optimal standard model to assure regulatory 
credibility, which is an important element of regulatory governance (the capacity of 
governments to assure the integrity of contracts or arbitrary expropriation of rents).  
 
The authors argue that regulatory governance and incentives7
Levy and Spiller 1996a
 are choice variables for 
policymakers but these choices are constrained (ibid.). The former is constrained by 
specific institutional endowment of the nation (e.g. legislative, executive, judiciary, 
and the country’s administrative capabilities) that determines the form and stringency 
of the country’s regulatory problems and the options to solve them. The incentives 
are not implemented in a vacuum and are affected by a nation’s endowments, its 
distributive politics (the extent to which allocative efficiency can be achieved with 
regulation) and the nature of its regulatory governance (e.g. level of administrative 
discretion to assure credibility). In this edited book, the authors tested the framework 
in different settings to explain how and why reform of telecommunication regulation 
came about in different countries ( ). They conclude that 
regulatory credibility is higher in countries that provide strong restrictions to 
discretionary action of the legislative and executive. In this sense, complicated 
pharmaceutical reforms such as generic drug policy require the acquiescence of a 
constellation of domestic agents and institutions. Although WHO or the FDA can 
indeed inform policy-makers, by looking at domestic structures we can better 
understand why and how policies developed the way that they did. International 
models of regulation are incorporated into the analysis of this thesis as stimuli to 
which Brazil responded rather than a determinant of the reform outcome.  
                                                 
7 The authors define regulatory governance as “mechanisms a society uses to restrain the discretionary 
scope of regulators and to resolve the conflicts to which these restrains give rise” and incentive 
structure as “rules governing pricing, subsidise, competition and entry, interconnection, and the like” 
(Levy and Spiller 1996: 4).  
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Positive theories of regulation 
Positive theories of regulation are concerned with the prediction and explanation of 
regulatory behaviour, rather than regulation as to maximise efficiency as proposed by 
economists (Baron 1993: 1; Mello 2000: 16). In short, this group of scholars are 
concerned with the political causes of regulatory policy (Noll 1989). In its simplest 
form, this political economy approach to regulation explains “regulation as 
demanded and supplied as a function of interests of those who incur the distribute 
consequences of policy alternatives” (Baron 1993: 1). The seminal contribution to 
this literature was the study of Stigler on regulatory capture that assumes that 
regulation tends to favour economic actors (Stigler 1971). It states that, because 
regulation necessarily implies a redistribution of income, some groups would benefit 
while others would bear its costs. Thus, groups with low organisational costs and 
higher per capta benefits would tend to be more successful in influencing the 
regulatory process. By contrast, diffused groups, as consumers, would be less likely 
to influence the process than small and homogeneous ones. For instance, business 
groups would lobby for regulations to keep potential new entrants out of the market 
and enable them to raise the price of their own products.8




Muller 1999). The conceptual models of economists assume a 
rational, purposive behaviour by all relevant agents (consumers, firms, voters, 
politicians etc) that uses economic theoretic arguments (but not always 
mathematical) to make predictions about political behaviour, and when necessary 
apply methods for testing a hypothesis, as normally used by economists (Noll 1989). 
Thus, the theoretical scope engages disciplines of political science and law 
associated with the economic assumptions. For example, this literature examines the 
rules formulated in the regulatory process to reduce ordinary problems that happen in 
contracts established between firms, regulators, government, consumers or other 
groups. These problems include asymmetric information and uncertainty, 
                                                 
8 Other scholars have expanded this theory by taking into account the fact that politicians/regulators 
combine the interests of firms and consumers, while others combine normative elements of efficiency 
to positive emphasis on distribution of rents (Becker 1983; Peltzman et al. 1989; Mello 2000: 16-18). 
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transactional costs, problems in providing credible commitment and others (Muller 
1999).  
 
Additionally, another branch of this literature is less concerned about whether the 
aim of regulation is to maximise efficiency or transfer wealth to private agents. Their 
scholars concentrate on the principal-agent problem faced by politicians in trying to 
assure reasonable bureaucratic compliance with the aims of legislative mandates and 
regulatory agencies and regulated firms (Noll 1989; Mello 2000). Because contracts 
between them are frequently incomplete (they do not cover the range of future 
possible contingency problems), there will always be a chance for opportunistic 
exploration in this relation (e.g. moral hazard and adverse selection). For instance, 
according to these scholars, an ordinary problem of regulatory policy is that 
regulators do not have complete information on the private costs needed to provide 
services. Thus, one important element in this game is to design regulatory policies 
that compel agents to reveal their private costs (Laffont and Tirole 1994 in Mello 
2000)  
 
Overall, the literature on the positive theory of regulation is vast and has been the 
mainstream in studies of politics of regulation9 Muller 1999: 4 ( ). For the purpose of 
this thesis, it is important to understand that the core tenet underpinning these studies 
is that all agents behave strategically in order to maximise their utility (e.g. profit, 
election). It assumes that the economic world is constantly in equilibrium, that the 
economic agents are able to identify opportunities to achieve their preferences and 
would always act in a purposive manner. Although this understanding of interactive 
activity is rather simplified, it has advanced the discipline substantially in the past 
decades. Yet studies on the policy process of the pharmaceutical sector and other 
social regulation has received less attention in this field, perhaps due to the 
considerable uncertainty about the social phenomenon itself and the consequences of 
its policy alternatives (Baron 1993). Nevertheless, the existing studies on 
pharmaceutical regulation agree, to some extent, with this notion of actors’ identity. 
                                                 




Abraham has published several studies on the politics of pharmaceutical regulation in 
Britain, Europe and the US (cf. Abraham 1995; 2002; 2007; 2008). He developed the 
concept of “corporate bias” to explain the social process of regulatory development. 
In this sense, corporate bias has the meaning: “pharmaceutical industry was, and is, 
permitted to have privileged strategic access to, and involvement with, government 
regulatory policy over and above any other interest group; and more often than other 
factors, the industry was, and is, decisive in determining regulatory policy outcomes 
(or lack thereof) (Abraham 2008: 873). His studies emphasise heavily the idea that 
actors engage in the regulatory process to maximise their utilities (Abraham 2008). 
Assuming that pharmaceutical industries are interested in profit maximisation and 
patients have objective interests in “drugs having the maximum benefit-risk ratio 
possible”, the author suggests that the regulatory process in this sector tends to be 
biased towards commercial interests (Abraham 2002; 2008: 869). For example, in the 
1970s, while the FDA rejected or delayed the approval of many drugs, including beta 
blockers (to treat coronary illness), the British authority constantly approved them 
(Abraham and Davis 2006). The authors note that, during this period, British 
pharmaceutical firms contributed heavily to the national balance of trade, thus the 
government had prioritised the industry’s commercial goals and productivity over 
patient safety.  
 
Similarly, Dan Carpenter has also studied the politics of pharmaceutical regulation 
from a rational perspective, but with less emphasis on the role of the pharmaceutical 
industry as the main driver of the regulatory process. His studies focus on the 
American case but adopt a more subtle approach to the “capture concept” proposed 
by Stigler (Carpenter 2004; 2004a). He problematises the capture argument by 
asking if, in fact, governments favour larger and older producers at the expense of 
smaller and newer firms, and why regulation may produce such disparate effects 
(Carpenter 2004a). He modelled a counterfactual scenario in which capture does not 
exist and the regulatory agency is neutral in respect to different interests, but still 
regulators act to guard their own reputation for protecting consumers’ safety. 
Carpenter finds that larger and older companies have an advantageous position in 
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this hypothetical scenario. In another article, he advances this analysis (Carpenter 
2004). He posits that the FDA is interested in maximising its reputation for 
protecting consumers’ safety and public health (considering not just a selfish 
motivation but also a possible element of altruism). Looking at the pre-approval 
process of pharmaceutical regulation, he argues that health advocacy groups, more 
than pharmaceutical firms, influence drug-reviewing time. He suggests that 
pharmaceutical firms create/foster patient advocacy lobbying, or collude with these 
groups in pushing for priority status etc: “politically strategic pharmaceutical firms 
know that industry lobbying is less successful than patient advocacy, and their 
regulatory behaviour adapts to this fact” (Carpenter 2004: 56).  He provides 
empirical evidence of patient groups that used the media to demand faster approval 
for a particular product.  
 
Thus, reforms in pharmaceutical regulation represent a crucial case to study theories 
of interest groups influence. Pharmaceutical firms are reported as one of the most 
powerful groups in the world for their wealth and capacity to provide rents for 
political campaigns (Centre for Public Integrity 2008). They operate under a highly 
politicised environment and as previously mentioned, regulation affects their 
business more than any other policy (labor policy, for instance). If firms would be 
prominent to dominate a sector, it would be reasonable to expect that to happen in 
pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, a key problem with the positive theories of regulation 
is the assumption that regulation emerged in order to serve the interests of particular 
groups. Attributing the outcome of regulatory policy to rational, purposive actors 
might be incomplete for several reasons. Analysing the process of institutional 
design based on numerous empirical examples, Paul Pierson presents several 
limitations for understanding the origins of institutions (in this case, the regulatory 
norm) as a rational, functional activity (Pierson 2004: chapter 4). Regulation might 
have multiple or unexpected effects, thus its existence cannot be explained by 
observing their creator’s preference (usually these innovative changes require a 
coalition or a group of supporters that propose them for different reasons). Its 
designers might not act instrumentally, for instance they might reflect cultural 
specificity (this is discussed in detail in the following chapter). Additionally, actors 
 46 
might change their preferences over time, as institutions remain stable or politicians 
may change, or a new generation may inherit norms that reflect a predecessor’s 
preferences rather than their own. In this sense, the author suggests that a more 
promising avenue of investigation is to take a qualitative, historical approach 
(Pierson 2004: 130-1). By observing the historical circumstances that make the 
presence of these favourable (or unfavourable) conditions more or less likely, it is 
possible to better understand the creation of regulatory norm. Thus, to provide 
valuable inputs to understand why and how large-scale pharmaceutical regulatory 
norms are created (beyond the narrow assumption that they serve the interests of 
particular groups) and how these norms reshape (or not) the regulatory environment.  
 
In this sense, Vogel (1996) also questions the capture model of regulatory policy 
analysis. Particularly problematic, he argues, is its distorted view of public vs. 
private interests. Because there is no unique public interest (government officials 
might disagree on how to define this in ways that cannot be understood in terms of 
their capture by private interests), it is not possible to explain variation in regulatory 
policy until we understand how government officials in different countries define 
public interest. Additionally, the author points out that governments themselves can 
change the preference of interest groups, manipulate their demands, put one group 
against the other. The narrow models of interest group preference ignore the role of 
the state as an autonomous actor/structure in the policy process. For example, he 
found that interest group alignments were roughly similar across countries, even 
though policy outcomes were different. Looking at public institutions rather than 
private interests explained better these variations.   
 
Another limitation of the rational theory is that it assumes the policy process as a 
game where opportunists’ agents try to reap benefits out of incomplete contractual 
rules (principal-agent problem). However, there are reasons to believe that 
regulation, particularly in the high technological sector, is a collaborative process 
(Broscheid and Coen 2003; Woll and Artigas 2007; Woll 2008: 46). The authors 
point out that the changing nature of trade policy - from tariff and liberalisation of 
markets to construction and harmonisation of regulatory regimes (e.g. intellectual 
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property and service trade) - also impacts on the way interest groups and 
governments interact. According to Woll and Artigas (2007), they interact in the 
context of uncertainty and governments actively request firm participation and 
depend quite heavily on the information they provide: “Governments gain 
information and political support whereas firms gain access to the elaboration of a 
policy issue” (Woll and Artigas 2005: 126). In this context, interest groups need to 
persuade governments that they are able to collaborate, but this requires credibility, 
expertise and cooperation. Certainly, this leads to a question on how we can tell 
whether states acts autonomously or on behalf of private interests groups. According 
to Vogel (1996) states are relatively autonomous from society, in other words, the 
ambivalence within society and divisions between societal groups turns state actors 
as interpreters and referees in a neutral manner. Decision makers bring to their posts 
particular ideological bias and institutional capabilitites, at the same time trying to 
progress their agendas and satisfiying important groups simultaneously. Thus, 
according to the author it is in this context (institutional and ideological) that state 
actors interact, which powerfully shape how they interpret the “public interest” and 
how they pursue it. 
 
In this sense, studies of other regulatory sectors such as services, telecommunications 
or financial sectors, can provide important reflections to the study of pharmaceutical 
regulation. For instance, the study of Woll analyses the unexpected support of firms 
with former monopolies and large domestic markets to economic liberalisation. She 
compares the cases of telecommunication and airline services in Europe and the 
United States. Her study innovates by demonstrating that these firms adjusted their 
demands for protectionism to fit their government’s agenda on liberalisation of 
markets. Arguing against assumptions of instrumental rationality, Woll shows that 
interactions between interest groups and government affect the strategy and goals of 
lobbying on global trade. Similarly, this thesis challenges narrow assumptions of 
pharmaceutical regulatory process, such as generic drug regulation, as a function of 
the lobbying activity of self-interested corporations. Instead, an alternative model, 
developed in this study, starts by looking at the context in which this regulatory 
policy is proposed and takes the preferences of interests groups (whether firms, 
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decision makers or patient advocacy groups) as problematic instead of given. In other 
words, it supports the argument that actors’ preferences are socially constructed 
within the regulatory process.  
 
This section has reviewed the two main analytical approaches to studying 
pharmaceutical regulation and highlighted their limitations is analysing the policy 
process in this sector. The following chapter proposes an alternative theoretical 
construct that emphasises the construction of actor’s preference, domestic politics 
and institutional legacy as alternatives to explaining the reform and development of 
pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil.    
 
The Brazilian context 
 
Brazil’s relevance in the study of pharmaceutical regulation is manifold. First, the 
country has had an unusual, remarkable and widely discussed intervention in this 
sector. As part of these interventions, in 1999, the Brazilian government created a 
new independent pharmaceutical regulatory agency, began a vehement price 
negotiation of AIDS medicines with research-based pharmaceutical industries, 
shepherded an international movement to clarify the TRIPS agreement and approved 
the Generic Drug Act in 1999 (cf. Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006; Piovesan and 
Labra 2007; Nunn 2008). In addition, Brazil is one of the few countries in the world 
with state-owned pharmaceutical industries competing with local and multinational 
pharmaceutical firms (cf. Kaplan and Laing 2005). Brazil has a vibrant HIV/AIDS 
activism that has, since the 1990s, held the government accountable to its 
Constitutional commitment of providing free and universal access to medicines 
(Galvao 2000). Lastly, Brazil has one of the most stringent generic drug policies 
among Latin American countries. This is evidenced by the number of products that 
must provide bioequivalence, the mandatory use of International Non-Proprietary 
Name (INN) or the Brazilian Non-Proprietary Name (BNN) and by the fact Brazil is 
one of the few countries that has a law binding these rules10 cf. Homedes et al.  (
                                                 
10 Apart from Brazil, only Ecuador has one but it is not as stringent as the Brazilian; for example, 
there is no bioequivalence requirement. 
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2005). All these elements and remarkable policy achievements offer a complex 
setting where it is possible to test, compare and posit different explanatory variables. 
For instance, the multiplicity of actors in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil (public 
and private firms, national and multinational, government officials, AIDS advocacy) 
and the possibility of comparing their preferences in different temporal dimensions 
enrich the study design. 
 
This section places Brazil’s case within the literature discussed so far. Similar to the 
current state of the international literature on generic drugs, Brazilian scholars have 
focused extensively on the economic efficiency of this policy enacted in 1999 and 
the attitudes of health professionals and consumers to it. Several studies analysed the 
economic outcomes of generic drug competition in Brazil11
2006
. For example, the study 
of Vieira and Zucchi ( ) suggests that generic drugs enter the market in Brazil 
costing 40% less (on average) than its innovator version; in addition, this difference 
increases over time. Similar findings were reported by other economists (Sutton 
2004; Monteiro et al. 2005; Miranda et al. 2009). Other authors have found that 
generic drug competition is particularly important to lower the price of treatment for 
chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart conditions, but also noticed that the best-
selling generic drugs in Brazil are those in the antibiotics therapeutic class 
(Montrucchio et al. 2003; Vieira and Zucchi 2006; Rosenberg et al. 2008; Rosenberg 
2009).  
 
In Brazil, because a great deal of drug consumption is out-of-pocket, the perception 
of consumers in demanding, and health professionals in offering/prescribing these 
products, is crucial to fostering market penetration of these products. A survey 
conducted by Bertoldi et al. (2005) of a population-based sample of adults from a 
southern Brazilian city suggests that, although the population was aware of these 
products, there was still little consumption of generics (and also a relative 
misunderstanding of different types of pharmaceutical products, whether similar, 
generic or innovator products). In addition, the study of Rosenberg (2009), who 
surveyed nearly 550 physicians in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2008, found that 
                                                 
11 Detailed information about this will be provided in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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doctors are suspicious of the quality of generic drugs and also demonstrate concerns 
about whether the pharmacists/drug store will substitute medicines correctly.  
 
Very few studies have focused on explaining the process of the development of this 
regulatory policy. A review of the literature found two analyses (master 
dissertations) from a health policy perspective that focus on the events during the 
period of reform (1999-2002) (Dias 2003; Franca 2004). Both studies place the 
ministry of health and presidential candidate, Jose Serra, as the main protagonist of 
the generic drug reform in Brazil in 1999 and both highlight his interest in 
capitalising on the political advantages of this initiative.  
 
The study of Franca (2004) is based on an analytical framework developed by Walt 
and Gilson (1994) to analyse health policies12
The study of  Dias (
. Her intention was to map the context, 
actors and process to explain why Brazil has decided to implement generic drugs. 
Overall, Franca concludes that the introduction of generic drug regulation was 
centralised at the Ministry of Health, with direct engagement of the Minister Jose 
Serra, who took muscular decisions, ignoring the different interests of the 
pharmaceutical sector. She concludes that opposition forces were pharmaceutical 
firms (the study does not mention whether these were national or multinational) and 
medical class; whilst firms were interested in maintaining profit, the physicians were 
interested in reinforcing their alliance with these firms. Particularly problematic with 
this study is that it tends to gloss over these elements, with poor empirical evidence 
and, at times, ignoring important contextual aspects (e.g. the author does not include 
the intellectual property law or the AIDS epidemic in her “context table”). 
 
2003) is concerned with the normative rules enacted by the 
recently created National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to implement the 
generic drugs and is based on documentary research (archive investigation of two 
newspapers and official documents) and two in-depth interviews (with the former 
                                                 
12 Although Franca (2004) mentioned and used Walt and Gilson (1994) as an analytical framework, 
their article is concerned with reviewing the literature of policy analysis in the health sector. At the 
end, the authors propose a model based on actors, context and policy content to better understand 
health policy.  
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president of ANVISA and the former president of the Brazilian Generic Drug 
Manufactures Association). After the approval of the Generic Drug Act in 1999, the 
Regulatory Agency was responsible for the further expansion of the technical 
parameters to register generic drugs in Brazil but also for adopting initiatives to 
foster market competition (e.g. mass media campaigns). Her study is a 
comprehensive analysis of the several resolutions enacted by ANVISA vis-à-vis 
market reactions to obstruct the penetration of generic drugs. She highlights the 
reservations of drug store representatives and firms about this policy. For example, 
because there was a delay in the supply of generic medicines, as drug stores were not 
providing information about these products and pharmaceutical companies were not 
producing them, ANVISA enacted simultaneous resolutions to foster supply. For 
example, the mandatory display of a list of interchangeable products in drug stores 
(so the population could learn about these products and demand a substitution if they 
so wanted) and a resolution mandating generic drug producers to disclose their 
records of importation and production of these products (Dias 2003: 90).  
 
Dias’ (2003) study also compares the World Health Organization guidelines on 
National Drug Policy (the generic drug policy component) with the Brazilian norms. 
She concludes that Brazil has implemented virtually all the recommendations (e.g. 
drug prescription practices, labelling etc) apart from the reimbursement 
mechanism13
Although these two studies provide information about this reform
. Her analysis concludes that the initial success in sales of generic 
medicine is less related to the WHO diffusion of generic drug policy than to the 
media support, governmental activism (within the context of electoral campaign) and 
the flexibility of ANVISA to adapt to market reactions and induce the supply and 
demand for these products. Similar to Franca (2004), she also places great weight on 
the role of the Minister of Health, Jose Serra, as a driver of this reform.  
  
14
                                                 
13 Pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil is either subsidised or out-of-pocket. Recently there have been 
two programmes that introduced co-payment mechanisms. 
14 The study of Dias (2003) to a greater extent than the more empirically limited study of Franca 
(2004).  
, less is known 
about the process that channelled Serra’s entrepreneur activity in 1999. To ignore 
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this is to partially analyse the means by which this policy was discussed, enacted and 
implemented. By analysing the details of the crucial period of generic drug 
implementation, it is likely that the role of human agency (the political entrepreneur) 
in driving this reform will be highlighted (Pierson 2004: 136-7 and 141). These 
studies have largely ignored antecedent events that might have been a crucial 
precondition for generic drug reform. For instance, they have also disregarded the 
failed attempts to introduce these products in Brazil in the early 1990s and the 
circumstances by which this happened and how this added to the reform taken in 
1999 (Decreto 973/93) (discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis). Thus, their analysis is 
missing the elements that might have facilitated, obstructed or channelled the 
Minister of Health’s entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, social scientists have 
been silent about the subsequent political effects of this reform.  
 
Regarding the organisation of the sector, generic drug regulation prompted a 
considerable rearrangement in the governance of this sector. The study of Quental et 
al. (2008) highlights the influence of generic drugs in prompting the industrial 
development of local private pharmaceutical firms. The authors present a range of 
descriptive data to evidence the increasing participation of national firms in this 
sector (in sales and value). In this sense, the study of Abreu (2004) on the 
competitiveness of the Brazilian generic pharmaceutical industry points out the fact 
that local entrepreneurs have had access to the distribution chain, which has 
facilitated their penetration in the market but has also highlighted the fact that local 
producers were pioneers in this sector in Brazil. Table 2 presents the evolution of the 
ranking of pharmaceutical industries in Brazil according to the proportion of market 
participation. Thus, economists tell us about the vitality of generic drugs in Brazil 
and also highlight the expressive participation of local private pharmaceutical firms 








Table 2. Ranking of pharm industries in Brazil (US$), 1999 and 2005-2009 
 
Industry 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % participation 
EMS* 29 5 3 2 1 1 6,59 
Sanofi-Aventis 1 1 1 2 2 2 6,24 
Ache* 3 2 2 3 3 3 5,68 
Medley* 32 7 6 4 4 4 5,67 
Novartis 2 4 4 5 5 5 4,1 
Eurofarma* 28 9 8 6 6 6 3,90 
Pfizer 7 3 5 6 7 7 3,06 
Bayer Schering 23 6 7 7 8 8 2,86 
Astra Zeneca 19 22 20 15 12 9 2,37 
Boehringer 11 8 9 9 9 10 2,24 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
* Refers to Brazilian pharmaceutical industries. 
 
This overview of the literature on generic drugs within the Brazilian context suggests 
further avenues for investigation. Despite the political salience of Brazil’s activism in 
generic drug regulation, studies concerned with how this policy evolved and the 
cumulative effects on the politics of pharmaceutical governance are absent. The few 
studies conducted are concerned with the crucial period of policy enactment and 
suggest that the Minister of Health, Jose Serra, and the activism of the Executive 
government conditioned the reform. There is hardly any evidence that generic drug 
regulation in Brazil was a response to major interest group activity or the diffusion of 
WHO best practices, as suggested in the second part of this literature review. The 
study of Dias (2003) concludes that generic drug regulation should be a policy of 
government rather than State, suggesting that this initiative could be destined to fade 
away over time. The concluding section of this chapter discusses the aims of this 
study.  
 
Lessons from the literature review and study aim 
 
This literature review aimed to place this thesis within the broader scope of generic 
drug regulation studies and contextualise the Brazilian case. The key message is that, 
to date, the investigation of the political and social process underlying the generic 
drug policy has not engaged many scholars in this field. Furthermore, we can also 
observe from this cross-disciplinary review the complexity of assessing this sector, 
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which brings together producers, patients, health professionals and government into 
the policy process. In this sense, much has been said about the economic outcomes of 
this policy, or what countries should do to implement generic drugs. There is also 
some relative evidence on perception of health professionals of this policy in 
different contexts. However, how countries go about implementing generics, and 
what the arguments are in favour of or resisting this kind of pharmaceutical sector 
reform, is less known. Despite its evident political salience, the politics of generic 
drug regulation goes unnoticed and is unresearched. This chapter has reviewed two 
predominant explanatory approaches that seem inadequate to explain the origins and 
development of pharmaceutical regulatory policy.  
 
There is a group of scholars of pharmaceutical regulation who suggest that regulatory 
policy in this sector originates by emulating WHO best practices or the FDA’s 
estimated norms, or even that regulation originates out of the activity of interest 
groups. A review of what has been said about the case of generic drug regulation in 
Brazil does not corroborate these explanations. If pharmaceutical regulation is a 
matter of policy diffusion, then why did Brazil not implement these changes in the 
early 1990s? Similarly, if interest groups are a crucial condition to reforms, why do 
previous studies on the Brazilian case focus on political entrepreneurship of the 
Minister of Health, rather than firms or patient advocacy? Nevertheless, Brazilian 
scholars had focused on describing the crucial period of reform, rather than reflecting 
on the underlying social process that led to the reform. A longitudinal investigation, 
informed by theoretical approaches on pharmaceutical regulation (suggested in this 
chapter and the following one) will expand these previous analyses of the reform 
period. One of the specific aims of this thesis, then, is to review and expand the 
existing analysis on the leadership of the Minister of Health, Jose Serra, as a core 
condition to the generic drug reform in Brazil.  
 
The comparative reports discussed in the introduction of this thesis suggest that 
Brazil became one of the most stringent regimes in Latin America (if not the most), 
where regulation of these products require not just the mandatory use of an INN and 
exclusion of trademarks but also mandate bioequivalence tests for a range of 
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products. Scholars have also demonstrated that economic outcomes in this sector are 
notable (particularly the difference in price between an off-patent and a patent 
medicine) despite the concerns about the quality and safety of these products. 
Additionally, it is also suggested that generic drug competition has had a far-reaching 
impact on the price of some medicines (particularly those to treat chronic disease) 
and promoted an unexpected improvement in local pharmaceutical firms’ industrial 
capacity. However, we know less about how this policy evolved and influenced the 
politics of the pharmaceutical sector and, in this sense, there are different reasons 
why this should be investigated. 
 
First, although pharmaceutical regulation usually is not an object of political 
partisanship, the generic drug regulation in Brazil is strongly associated with the 
Minister of Health’s political leadership. However, a new administration came to 
power in 2003 in Brazil, with the election of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, and 
democratic elections decided on his political party’s continuity until 2015. If the 
political entrepreneur, who has been credited as the main protagonist of the generic 
drug reform, is no longer in a position to influence decision making in the 
pharmaceutical sector, how can we explain the development of generic drug 
regulation? Second, another aspect observed in the literature review of the Brazilian 
context is the successful position of local pharmaceutical firms in the ranking of the 
generic drug market (Abreu 2004; Quental et al. 2008). There is hardly any evidence 
that pharmaceutical firms wanted the government to interfere in their trademarks, or 
even that these local firms were mandating a reform in the regulatory norms to 
register off-patent medicines in Brazil. The development of pharmaceutical 
regulation as generic drug policy is a complicated process that requires the consent 
and participation of a constellation of actors in the regulatory process. Additionally, 
regulatory policies can produce losers who might try to reverse the policy for 
different reasons (cf. Patashnki 2003). This thesis, therefore, examines how and why 
Brazil adopted a generic drug policy, examining the regulatory policy process from 
its genesis in 1990 to the most recent developments in 2009. This thesis is concerned 
about the political viability and the social processes of this regulatory policy. It 
proposes an analytical framework that takes into account policy legacies and 
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understands the preferences of actors as endogenous to the regulatory process. The 
following chapters will provide the theoretical and methodological parameters to 





2. Theoretical framework: preference formation, policy 
outcome and the study of generic drug regulatory process 
 
The previous chapter identified gaps in the literature and suggested avenues for 
investigation. This chapter provides the theoretical parameters used to analyse the 
regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil. This is important to guide data 
collection and advance the research beyond initial impressions. Different from 
scholars that invoke the emulation of international regulatory guidelines and interest 
group activity to explain the pharmaceutical regulatory process, this thesis proposes 
an analytical frame based on policy legacy and preference construction - based on 
historical institutional analysis. It proposes an investigation of the regulatory process 
through a longitudinal perspective and takes into account the influence of the policy 
process on the behaviour of the stakeholders. This analytical approach is also 
informed by constructivism and studies of regulatory lobbying activity in Europe. 
This chapter presents the motivation for this analytical framework, how it interacts 
with the two other alternative explanations, and the parameters to assess the generic 




Policy shapes politics 
 
To study the regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil this thesis draws on a 
historical institutional approach.  These scholars posit that the behaviour of political 
actors is affected by the institutional context in which they interact (cf. Immergut 
1998). In this context institutions are defined as “formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986: 19). They also 
understand actors’ preferences as endogenous, i.e. the institutional arrangement 
defines where, when and how interest groups matter for the policy 
agenda/implementation process. This definition embraces the pharmaceutical 
regulation studied in this thesis. Parameters that regulate generic medicines in Brazil 
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are at the same time a formal institution (a Federal Law approved by the Brazilian 
Congress in 1999); a public policy as this law defines the role of the Ministry of 
Health in promoting its implementation; but also a regulatory regime as its technical 
standards are designed, implemented and enforced by the National Regulatory 
Agency. 
 
The choice for using a historical institutional analysis is twofold: firstly, the WHO 
has diffused generic drug policy as a best practice intervention in pharmaceutical 
regulation. It describes in economic terms (market failure motivation) how to 
diagnose problems of competition in the pharmaceutical sector and what countries 
should do to solve them. However, less is known about how countries can go about  
implementing them and the political struggles to implement such norms. This 
institutional analysis also contributes to understanding the extent to which the 
diffusion of international guidelines on pharmaceutical regulation matter for the 
development of generic drug regulation in Brazil, in other words, how domestic 
political institutions mediate the emulation of these guidelines. This is particularly 
important in Latin American countries where market competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector is already in place with the similar drug products. An in-depth 
assessment of the interest groups participating in the policy process, the evolution of 
their demands and strategies across time, and how they interpret the generic drug 
policy can help to clarify policy development. In this sense, historical 
institutionalism allows for a detailed analysis of the interaction between actors 
providing a broader and comprehensive understanding of the political process. 
Additionally, a historical institutionalist approach to preference formation provides 
an overarching analytical framework to investigate the interactions of government, 
firms, and patient advocacy groups in the making of pharmaceutical regulation in 
Brazil. Since it does not limit the analysis into particular groups or deduced interests, 
it allows me to investigate the possible different groups engaged with the regulatory 
process and whose participation might have not been predicted previously.   
 
Because the vast literature on historical institutional analysis focuses on macro-level 
phenomena, that is, mechanisms of institutional creation and development (whether 
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incremental or punctuated) (cf. Pierson 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Immergut 
and Anderson 2008), it is important to clarify for the reader that this thesis accounts 
for a micro-level analysis. It is actor-centred and concerned with the preference of 
political actors (Hall 2005; Katznelson and Weingast 2005). Naturally, this 
distinction is for heuristic purposes as in looking at the interactions between actors 
the analyst must also make reference to the institutional arrangements in place (e.g. 
stable or in process of change) (Katznelson 2003). How these two levels of analysis 
interact with each other and how this thesis approaches them are discussed later on in 
this chapter and subsequently in the methodology chapter.  
 
In addition, it is also important to clarify that I do not intend to make inferences on 
models of interest representation, to categorize interest representation or investigate 
the effectiveness of institutional arrangements (cf. Olson 1965; Cardoso 1975; 
Malloy 1977; Cardoso 1986)15. Despite the process of re-democratization and 
significant institutional changes in Brazil’s political system, scholars argue that the 
country still has a legacy of corporatist structure16
Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil is aligned with  theories of the 
informational model and regulatory lobbying. These look at the transmission of 
information between groups and decision makers in the policy process (
. Methodologically, analysts can 
aggregate sectoral corporatism to describe the state model; however, just because 
Brazil has a legacy of corporatism it is not reasonable to assume that this will be 
reflected in the organization of pharmaceutical sector. Focusing the analysis on 
actors’ preferences allows me to understand and explain the characteristics of the 
interest groups in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil.  
 
Austen-
Smith and Wright 1992; Broscheid and Coen 2003). This model would be suitable 
for understanding pharmaceutical regulation as it assumes that: (1) government 
officials need information to make decisions in high technological sectors such as 
                                                 
15 For a comprehensive analysis of interest representation in Brazil see Schneider (2004) and Power 
and Mahrukh (2002) 
16 Corporatism refers to a mechanism of interest intermediation between societal groups and 
government in the policy making process; states use mechanisms (e.g. subsidy and control) to regulate 
state-group relations (Schmitter 1974; Collier and Collier 1991). However, assuming that an overall 
state-level amount of corporatism will be reflected in the ways groups organize in a particular sector 
might not be plausible. 
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pharmaceuticals where their expertise is limited. Interest groups provide the 
knowledge needed to regulate this sector. (2) It is costly for regulators to develop 
expertise in this sector, thus private actors’ information can collaborate with them. 
(3) By shaping the information provided to policy makers, these private groups might 
be able to influence the regulatory process without spending resources (e.g. 
campaign contributions) (Broscheid 2006: 93-4). With respect to the possible false 
information provided by lobbyists, decision makers can minimize this by either 
carefully selecting representatives whose information they will rely on or rewarding 
or punishing faulty information (Broscheid and Coen 2003: 170; Broscheid 2006).  
 
However, the concern with the categories of lobbying systems used by Broscheid and 
Coen (2003) is that they rule out patient groups or other groups that might also 
participate as information providers. Interest group activity in this sector is broad and 
intense, involving patient groups, health professionals, firms, health insurances (cf. 
Baron 1993: 51). However, the authors assume that only pharmaceutical firms have 
the required expertise to inform the regulatory process, while NGOs and other groups 
usually participate in systems where the lobbying costs are low and the demand for 
legitimacy is high (too salient or ideologically/emotionally charged affairs (ibid.: 
179). This dichotomous understanding of business vs. societal participation might 
not be reasonable. In the pharmaceutical realm many NGOs have developed 
expertise in law, trade and pharmacology that might contribute to regulatory 
decisions to the same extent as pharmaceutical firms. Consider for example, 
Knowledge Ecology International, an international non-governmental organization 
that has  extensive highly skilled staff providing technical support to governments on 
different regulatory aspects (cf. Knowledge Ecology International 2010). Several 
studies in pharmaceutical regulation point to the participation of NGOs in the 
regulatory process. The study of Dan Carpenter, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, has highlighted the role of AIDS patient groups in in mid-1980’s in 
demanding fast approval process of medicines to treat AIDS (Carpenter 2004). Also 
Sell and Prakash has highlighted the role of the Access to Medicines coalition 
(formed by developing countries and NGOs) in demanding clarifications in the use 
of TRIPS safeguards during the Doha Round in 2001 (Sell and Prakash 2004). 
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Although these authors use different theoretical lens to analyse the policy process, 
both acknowledge the role of NGOs as important advocacy group in the 
pharmaceutical regulatory arena (either intellectual property or health surveillance 
regulation).  
 
Finally, several studies on AIDS policy in Brazil have pointed to the role of patient 
advocacy in participating in the policy process (at the same time designing the policy 
recommendations and demanding access to medicines to treat the disease) (Galvao 
2000; Nunn 2008). However, little is known about the role of this vibrant group in 
the formulation and development of pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil, particularly 
regarding generic drug regulation, which can have far-reaching consequences to the 
availability of antiretroviral drugs. Furthermore, Brazil has also a historical tradition 
of public production of medicines, which represent an additional actor in the policy 
process (Kaplan and Laing 2005; Flynn 2008). For this reason, I insist that only with 
an in-depth assessment of actors’ interactions in this sector is it possible to 
understand better the structure of interest representation.  
 
In sum, because this thesis acknowledges that generic drug regulation might 
influence the preferences and goals of interest groups participating in pharmaceutical 
regulation; historical institutionalism provides a better framework for this political 
inquiry. The following section expands the ontological discussion on preference 
formation vis-à-vis intentional action, and is followed by a description of the 
theoretical parameters used to operationalise the research.  
 
Studying rationality: intentional vs. constructed action 
Roughly, there are two ways in which actors’ preferences can be understood; one 
group of scholars deduce from theory or previous studies the interests for the relevant 
actors (rational choice theory), while another group of scholars understand that 
preferences result from the historical process, i.e. they are socially constructed 
(historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism17 Steinmo et al. 1992) ( ; 
                                                 
17 There is a slight variation between these two. I aligned both as they focus on comparative historical 
analysis and also both understand preference as a socially constructed phenomenon.  
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Thelen 1999). This ontological distinction makes all the difference when assessing 
the generic drug policy process as the theoretical parameters and methodological 
choices also differ according to the nature of the causal relation (cf. Hall 2003). 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that not all scholars accept this dichotomous 
approach to rationality, and efforts have been made to clarify the intersections 
between them (Hall and Taylor 1996; Katznelson 2003; Katznelson and Weingast 
2005). This section presents the arguments of how each of these theoretical lenses 
understands the identity of political actors and the role of institutions as opposing 
assumptions. Highlighting their differences helps in clarifying which aspects of the 
regulatory process this thesis is interested in investigating. 
 
This historical institutionalism suggests that the preferences of political actors are 
endogenous, that is, the institutional arrangement in place can influence the 
formation of preference by political actors (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Immergut 
1998; Hall 2005). Preference formation is then understood as the “process by which 
social actors decide what they want and how to pursue” it (Hall 2005: 129). It is 
necessary to look at the policy path before the political events/decisions taken and its 
subsequent period to trace the evolution of preferences. For example, this parameter 
would require looking at the participants of the policy process before a given reform, 
what their policy demands were and strategies they adopted to pursue them; and 
compare these with the subsequent period.  
 
This approach contrasts with scholars who suggest that actors’ preferences are 
exogenous to the policy process. That is, they have a fixed set of preferences, behave 
entirely instrumentally to maximize the accomplishment of these preferences, and do 
so in a highly strategic manner that suggests extensive calculation (cf. Shepsle 1989; 
Hall and Taylor 1996: 944-945). Rationality assumptions or thin rationality requires 
actors’ preferences to be consistent, i.e. have no contradictions in their beliefs and 
desires; take calculated decisions based on probabilities; and interact with other 
actors following the rules of game theory (Elster 1983: 5-9; Tsebelis 1990: 18). The 
point of departure in this perspective is to define the preferences of political actors, 
which is based on theoretical assumptions or previous studies in the field. For 
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example, firms interested in maximizing profit will engage in strategic interactions 
(e.g. predicting the movement of competitors) to advance their preferences. While 
the methodological point of departure for historical institutionalism (HI) scholars is 
the political context where preferences and demands are voiced, rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI) scholars assume that individuals are self-interested and their 
analysis begins by defining their preferences and strategic interactions in a given 
institutional context18 Lichbach 1997 ( ). 
 
The RCI model acknowledges that actors might have more than one preference, so it 
is necessary to define the order of preference (ordering principle). In a preference 
function individuals would favour policies close to their ‘ideal point’ rather than 
those further away; this utility maximization is at the heart of RCI (Elster 1989; 
Weingast 1998). The rank-ordered principle should respect the following: (a) the 
observer must be able to compare options available, (b) the actors’ alternatives can 
be said to be comparable if, “for any pair of them, the chooser either prefers the first 
to the second, the second to the first, or is indifferent between them” (Shepsle and 
Bonchek 1997: 25-26), (c) that transitivity implies that individuals rank these 
alternatives from the highest to the lowest preference, which must be consistent. A 
basic example is: “[…] if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then this 
consistency rule requires that A be preferred to C” (Elster 1989; Green and Shapiro 
1994: 14-15). This parsimonious approach to rationality allows the analyst to assess 
different models of interaction. The discussion in the previous section about studies 
of pharmaceutical regulation is aligned with RCI assumptions to some extent. 
Although not all scholars refer to this theoretical parameter, they understand that 
firms and patient advocacy, as rational interest groups and the regulatory policy 
process is a result, to some degree, of their aggregated political activity (cf. Abraham 
2008). For the RCI scholars, institutions matter to reduce uncertainty or coordinating 
                                                 
18 There is a slight distinction between Rational Choice Theory (RCT) and Institutionalism (RCI). The 
strict rational-choice model would, for instance between Congressmen, be just a matter of how much 
money is going to their different appropriations. The RCI would take into account subtle mechanisms 
of coalition-building with the majority buying into his game, which would still obey a maximizing 
principle, but which would also take stock of institutional constraints. Briefly, many scholars 
nowadays combine RCT with institutional analysis, not all rational choice assumptions claim that 




. At the same time the institutions serve as a frame for an 
individual’s interaction, they also constrain (or facilitate) the choices available to 
individuals (cf. ; North 1990; Green and Shapiro 1994; Shepsle and 
Bonchek 1997)20
Contrastingly, for HI actors’ preferences are not driven by strategic interactions; 
instead they evolve as events unfold (e.g. past decisions) (
.  
 
Hall 2005). Preferences are 
then dynamic and complex. Actors decide not because they calculate the utility but 
because they are constrained by the institutional context and thus, what they want is 
affected by the political structure. In this sense, “actors’ preferences are not just an 
input to the policy process but a product of it” (Crystal 2003: 429). When the 
Brazilian government decided to raise the regulatory standards for registering a 
generic drug, it insisted that no products should have a trademark and that even 
innovator drugs should present a generic name together with their trademark to 
facilitate substitution. Pharmaceutical firms could voice against, adapt or even exit 
the market if they did not like these changes. However, during a period of crisis or 
significant institutional or policy reforms, the outcomes are uncertain, thus making it 
difficult to predict or make rational calculations about which preference to chase. 
This not to say that actors are not utility maximizers but their utility is flexible (cf. 
Lusztig 1998). Historical institutionalists neither deny the possibility of intentional 
actions nor posit that preferences are created by institutions. Instead, these scholars 
argue that actors make sense of their interests through a dependence on the political 
process and regulatory context, i.e. the content of the rationality is socially 
constructed (cf. Woll 2008). 
 
As this section has demonstrated, the intention is to assess the content of actors’ 
preference, starting with an analysis of the context where the agents interact. Thus, 
                                                 
19 A classic example is the prisoner’s dilemma: when rules change (institutions), the prisoner’s choice 
(defeat, cooperate, etc) also changes because these rules structure the choices that will maximize the 
prisoner’s self-interest (Tsebelis 1990). 
20 North (1990) chapter three provides an extensive description of the rational behavior in institutional 
approach; Green and Shapiro (1994) chapter two provides a brief summary of common assumptions 
of uses of RC and points of disagreement between scholars; Shepsle and Boncheck (1997) part one 
gives an accessible description of the “rationality machinery”; finally, for the “philosophy” of rational 
behavior see the discussion of ‘thin rationality’ in Elster (1983).   
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because this thesis understands that the content of rationality is socially constructed, 
it does not start the analysis by classifying agents’ preferences. Evidently, this 
approach requires an in-depth knowledge of the case and some level of inductive 
reasoning; these methodological choices are discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Before proceeding to the theoretical parameters, it is important to define the concept 
of preference formation further. Countless studies in socio and political science 
mention interests, preferences, strategies (and at times tactics) to explain the policy 
process and interactive relations. In line with the argument of historical 
institutionalism, which states that policy can shape politics, constructivism theory 
helps in clarifying these terms. In short, socio constructivism studies the ways in 
which groups and individuals engage in the construction and interpretation of their 
perceived social reality (
Concepts: interests, preferences and strategies 
cf. Wendt 1992). As a theory of the sociology of knowledge, 
socio constructivism uses sophisticated analysis to understand an actor’s preferences.  
 
By using this theoretical framework, the studies of Woll (2005; 2008) present the 
translation path of preference formation and helps to identify which stage of strategic 
behaviour this thesis will focus on. Woll established the building blocks for studying 
the construction of business preferences. The option for this theoretical parameter is 
threefold: first, her study consolidates different literatures from political science on 
actors’ behaviour (a field that has deep overlapping concepts and definitions). 
Second, it is one of the most complete analyses on the construction of preference. 
Third, it innovates by presenting elements that allow for the study of the construction 
of preference, starting with interest to preference, then to strategy. She identified 
different levels of abstraction to study political actors’ behaviour (Woll 2005). The 
first level is interest
When thinking about these basic interests, it is useful to distinguish between the supposed 
universal base of the assumption, which I choose to call “universal” or “objective” interest, 
and its subjective translation. Subjective values apply the objective value to the individual 
situations of a given actor. For example, let us assume that the universal value is survival. A 
, which she claims to be the most basic objective an actor can 
embrace.  These can be fixed (from a minimalist perspective we could say this is 
“survival”) but are usually inaccessible to empirical observation.  
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subjective value would then describe the forms of survival for different units of analysis: the 
survival of a nation-state is equivalent to the maintenance of sovereignty, the survival of a 
politician means that he has to remain an actor in the public sphere, the survival of a firm 
means that it has to be profitable (Woll 2005: 8) 
 
 
She argues that interests then are relatively stable. However, to be able to make 
strategic decisions, political actors have to make use of beliefs as to how their desired 
ends can be pursued. Thus, the second level is preference
Woll 2005: 8
 to make strategic decisions; 
political actors need to have a set of beliefs as to how to obtain the desired outcome. 
The process of ‘adding value’ or setting a normative frame is understood here as 
preference. “Policy preferences are what actually distinguishes actors from each 
other and permits them to form coalitions or oppositions” ( ). 
Preferences can be assessed by reviewing business press releases, interviews or even 
newspaper articles, where actors state what their claims are and justify them.  
 
To illustrate the application of this concept to pharmaceutical regulation we can 
examine the study of Sell and Prakash (2004) as an example. Rational choice 
scholars that deduce the preference of political actors (whether these actors are firms, 
politicians or consumer/patient groups), while some scholars who are concerned with 
the social movement participation in the international political economy suggest that 
non-governmental organizations are driven by values rather than material interests 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998). Sell and Prakash contests this dicthotomous perception of 
actor’s preferences (“ideas” vs “interests”), where principle goals align with 
norms/ideas and instrumental objectives with interests. These authors demonstrate 
how American pharmaceutical firms successfully framed the debate on intellectual 
property rights by arguing the claim that patents would bring scientific/economic 
development and cure for many diseases. They promoted this agenda that lead to the 
WTO’s TRIPS agreement in 1994. On the other hand, a network of NGOs and 
developing countries during the Doha Development Round in 2001 re-framed the 
intellectual property debate so as to include the implications to public health (ibid.) 
and access to medicines as a human rights issue (Nunn et al. 2009a). Sell and 
Prakash do not argue that this are identical actors, but that the distinction between 
normative/instrumental is artificial. For them, firms are a group that seek to generate 
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rents and in which shareholders are the ultimate petitioners of this residual, while 
NGOs are not generating these profits and are not accountable to any single 
constituency. However, “generating residuals is not the only instrumental objective 
an institution can follow - NGOs routinely pursue instrumental objectives such as 
increasing wages and benefits for their members, increasing membership, and 
increasing rents accruing to their members […]” (Sell and Prakash 2004: 167). 
Similarly, this thesis does not make distinction betweem actor’s notmative and 
instrumental beliefs.  
 
This understanding of preferences then has implications to the strategies groups use 
in the policy process. Strategy
Lastly, according to Woll, whilst interests are normally static and inaccessible for 
empirical observation; preference and strategy are dynamic, greatly related to 
institutional interactions and accessible by using social science research methods 
(e.g. interviews, documentary research) (
 (or tactics for some) is also the final step of Woll’s 
building block of preference. She argues that this is the instrument an actor might 
chose (or favour) in a particular context. In other words, it is the concrete strategy for 
demanding a particular goal. This level is then highly dependant on the interaction 
with the institutional context (its constraints and opportunities). According to the 
analysis of Sell and Prakash, the strategies of business in the TRIPS crusade was 
defined as a demand for patent protection, which was successfully achieved during 
the political opportunity opened during the GATT-Uruguay Round in 1994 or the 
access to medicines demands in 2001 to clarify TRIPS safeguards.  
 
Woll 2005: 10; Woll 2005a: 83). This thesis 
will then focus on preferences and strategies of pharmaceutical firms and other 
interest groups participating in the generic drug regulatory process, as these are the 
two stages accessible through empirical investigation and are constitutive elements 





Understanding preference formation 
 
Peter Hall (2005) identifies four propositions that should be taken into account when 
analyzing preference formation and are suitable to explain both individual and 
collective action. This section discusses these and introduces insights from socio-
constructivism and lobbying literature that help in illustrating the concepts. The 
methodological choices to assess these abstract concepts are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
Multiple effects and multiple interests 
The first element discussed by Peter Hall (2005) is that political actors have multiple 
preferences (even for a single issue), which can result in multiple effects. Thus, it is 
likely that when forming a preference over action actors might assess the costs and 
benefits for all of them. The key point here is that the process of supporting a 
preference is intimately related to the identity of the political actor. “By choosing to 
weigh one variable more heavily than another, the actor is simultaneously choosing 
to assert one dimension of her identity more strongly than another” (ibid.: 132-3). 
This is a crucial concept for this inquiry of pharmaceutical regulation.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the regulatory agenda of intellectual 
property and generic drug are related in many instances.  For example, 
pharmaceutical firms can have a range of preferences from trade advocacy to health 
regulation (e.g. demand patent of incremental innovations or expand the list of 
medicines that might provide bioequivalence tests). Similarly, governmental officials 
can have conflicting preferences whether to favour industrial policy of the sector 
(that requires expensive investment in the sector or concession to innovator 
pharmaceutical firms) or foster public health through cost-containment mechanisms 
(cf. Vandergrift and Kanavos 1997; Kanavos 1998). By putting more emphasis on 
one of these dimensions, e.g. the intellectual property agenda, this side of their 
preference is highlighted more strongly. Thus, because regulatory agendas can be 
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related in different ways, it is crucial to access the content of the demands of each 
group participating in the policy process to understand which elements of IP matters 
for generic drug regulation and how. Note that this is not a rank of preferences or 
nested games as rational scholars propose21
Hathaway 1998
, but rather a constitutive element of who 
the group is and what they want. Multiple-interests are not just about assessing the 
costs and benefits of each action but how obtainable they are, i.e., the probability that 
a government official might respond more favourable to one demand than another 
( ; Crystal 2003). Domestic political structures filter/block policy 
preferences but also affect (determine) what groups will chose in the first place.  
 
Peter Hall also calls attention to the relevance of ‘framing’ in the process by which 
preferences are formed, that is, how to portray an issue in terms that connects it to 
other beliefs (Hall 2005). A similar concept is found in the studies of Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) (policy image) and also in socio-constructivism theories (“ideas”) 
(McNamara 1998; Crystal 2003; Sell and Prakash 2004; Woll 2008). “By framing 
issues in terms designed to evoke a specific identity, the particular position appeals 
to those who value this identity highly” (Hall 2005: 134). As Jon Elster (1983) 
presented in his discussion of “broad rationality”, actors must pay some lip service to 
the common good as it is virtually impossible to express selfish arguments in public 
debates (e.g. advocate for a policy solution simply because it favours an individual or 
a group as suggested by rational choice scholars). Elster also brings models of 
psychology into this discussion. He argues that it is unfeasible to express preference 
for the common good without acquiring them. To be convinced that these arguments 
are not fake, actors would have to ‘invoke the power of reason’: “by speaking the 
voice of reason, one also exposes oneself to reason” (Elster 1983: 36). 
 
                                                 
21 Nested games refer to Tsebelis (1990: 6-8) concept – situation where actors, confronted with 
different options, does not pick the ones that seems to be the best (or even against its own interests). 
He argues that potential suboptimal choices are related to a misunderstanding of the analyst who fails 
to take into account games that are played in multiple arenas. By introducing other arenas where this 
actor is interacting, choice then appears to be optimal. Tsebelis discussion does not take into account 
the identity of the political actors but rather the context of interaction. In addition, nested games are 
independent games, while the historical perspective sees these events as sequent and dependent on one 
another (as domino effect).  
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The concept of multiple interests and framing are crucial to study groups and 
government relations in pharmaceutical sector. Assuming that there are multiple 
groups participating in the policy process immediately leads to the question of which 
one would be more influential and powerful. The concept of framing and venue 
shopping is crucial to understanding elements of power in this context. In this sense, 
I stretch the argument of Woll (2007) about the power and political resources of 
business lobbyists to other groups in the policy process. She argues that many 
analysts rule out elements of power because of its vagueness, thus making it difficult 
to measure. However, Woll suggests that the perceived success of non-governmental 
actors’ lobbying depends on the governments’ receptiveness to their demands, which 
in turn depends on strategic advantages they see for themselves in the negotiation 
process. In other words, actors that can provide particular resources (e.g. 
information) to decision makers in a particular venue are likely to have better 
chances of influencing the regulatory process. Note that the imbalance of resources 
between wealthy pharmaceutical firms and (at times underfunded) NGOs is not the 
core limitation, as long as the latter is able to provide the required information. The 
framing process is then key to gaining access to venues that are sensitive to the 
framework provided22 Baumgartner and Jones 1993 ( ) and forming coalitions (Hall 
2005; Woll 2005: 8)23
Prevalence of uncertainty  
.  
 
The second element to study preference construction relates to a key characteristic of 
the political realm – uncertainty. When we say that an actor (individual or group) 
took a particular set of actions to maximize their interests, even if we know what 
their interests were, we need to know why they had any reason to believe these 
actions would serve their interests (Hall 2005: 135). By contrast, the formation of 
                                                 
22 Venue shopping refers to different government departments that can be more or less receptive to a 
particular policy and that is why framing the demand to graft attention is so important (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993). 
23 However, the process here is not to look at the causal role of ideas as distinct from interests (e.g. 
the WHO in diffusing ideas of generic drug policy) but rather in the constitutive role of ideas 
(McNamara 1998). While the former implies a methodological analysis of the causal 
arguments/variable testing, the latter requires process tracing. For a review on idea-oriented approach 
to political economy see Hall (1997). Ideas distinct from interests implies a methodological analysis 
of the causal arguments/variable testing, while constitutive role of ideas requires process tracing (Hall 
2003, Woll 2008). 
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preferences involves a process where actors form judgements or interpretation about 
which means (beliefs) are likely to advance their ends (demands). This involves the 
development of frames and efforts to persuade others of their soundness. 
Uncertainty, then, can create deep discrepancies from expected behaviour making it 
impossible to predict a priori of what political actors want, without knowing the 
content and structure of social relations (Woll 2008). For instance, periods of crisis in 
the pharmaceutical sector caused by contingent events (e.g. publicized cases of side 
effects of a medicine) might prompt the necessity for reformulating or even creating 
new institutional arrangements. For example, the case of thalidomide that caused 
many children to be born with malformations led several European states to create 
National Regulatory Authorities, and regulate the pre-approval of medicines (cf. 
Krapohl 2007). Introducing new elements to the regulatory regime and the 
magnitude of change creates uncertainty and actors can pursue different and at times 
conflicting interests, as it is not possible to predict the outcome. This leads to the 
third element of preference formation, interpretation. 
 
Role of interpretation to preference formation 
The third proposition discussed by Peter Hall is related to interpretation. He argues 
that any scholar with a reasonable understanding of political theory and a review of 
the literature is able to deduce what a group of actors might want in a given situation. 
However, as this chapter has argued so far, preferences are not fixed. Thus, they are 
developed through a process of interpretation of the circumstances. Interpretation 
means gradually understanding the situation and options available, using information 
- as it is discovered - to refine and expand existing beliefs and finally apply them to 
new problems (Hall 2005: 136). Actors then revise their initial beliefs as new 
information is known. The heart of interpretation is then to decide whether to 
abandon existing beliefs in the face of new information or to extend these beliefs to 
cover it. Hall argues that the changes in actors’ preferences vary according to 
“belief’s elasticity” (degree to which an actor is willing to adjust) and the persistence 
that they are supported. In turn, this is associated with the extent to which previous 
information has confirmed them, the availability of alternative beliefs, how they are 
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connected to the actor’s identity and the scope of challenge that new information 
brings.  
 
Similarly, Hathaway (1998) argues, in her dynamic preferences and strategies 
framework, that the decisions to voice or adjust preferences are related to its 
perceived chance of success. As discussed in the first postulate, perceived chance of 
success refers to the receptiveness of the government department to actors’ demands, 
past history of success and ability to frame the demand (which she calls the level of 
distress). By analyzing these elements, actors decide whether to voice their demands 
or abandon them and adjust to the proposed institutional arrangement. In sum, this 
preference formation is an interactive process of experience and (re)interpretation. 
To demonstrate, a hypothetical example: if a government decides to reduce subsidies 
to a given sector, firms might voice opposition against it, exit or adapt to it. The 
decision is taken according to the perception of the government reception to these 
claims, costs to adapt and new business opportunities, and whether other firms have 
decided to adapt to it. 
 
Preference formation 
Lastly, the final component is related to the fundamental moment of preference 
formation. In the political realm, new information comes in the form of an evolving 
series of events that can confront or corroborate existing beliefs. “New events inspire 
a double-sided revaluation in which the meanings of those events and of existing 
beliefs are interpreted in light of each other” (Hall 2005: 136). The problem is to 
specify what kinds of events are significant in modifying existing beliefs. Hall 
defines these as ‘fundamental eventfulness of preference formation’. How do large-
scale reforms contribute to the process of preference formation? The author argues 
that these events are not meaningful in themselves. Reforms inspire a revaluation of 
beliefs underpinning existing preferences, thus it depends on how they are 
interpreted (which, in turn, is conditioned by the context that they occur). If familiar 
links between beliefs and strategies are broken, it promotes and deepens uncertainty, 
opening an opportunity for innovative behaviours (Katznelson 2003). In sum, critical 
events are not the cause of shifts in the preferences of actors by themselves; by 
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contrast, the way actors interpret these events and the context in which they happen 
matters. Methodologically, we need to trace the process by which these events shift 




Figure 1. Policy effect and preference formation 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hathaway (1998). 
 
These arguments are analogous to constructivism theories, which claim that “the 
commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an 
inherently social definition of the actor grounded in theories in which actors 
collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the 
structure of social world” (Wendt 1992: 398) 24
Woll 2008
. In this sense, lobbying content and 
not just lobbying strategies evolve in the course of business-government interaction 
( ).  
 
What all these theoretical discussions tell us is that to analyse the process of 
generic drug regulation in Brazil, it is necessary to begin by looking at the 
circumstances by which this policy emerged on the policy agenda. It then 
proceeds to identify the interest groups participating in the policy process, 
understanding their multiple demands and strategies (e.g. preferences over INN, 
                                                 
24 The thin boundary between HI and constructivism is that the latter provides highly sophisticated 
conceptions of how ideas may matter but constructivists are limited in their empirical scope. On the 
other hand, HI is concerned with the impact of ideas with more empirical ground but its concepts of 
idea is, somewhat, limited (Hall 2005: 131).  
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bioequivalence tests or other alternative solution), how they perceive the Generic 
Drug Act, and where (which government departments) they voiced these claims. 
In sum, the political struggle. This provides a base line to compare the content of 
their demands in the aftermath of reform and seeks groups that support the policy 
path (how they feedback the generic drug regulation) or those who are 
dissatisfied with this regulatory arrangement (on what grounds, how and where 
they complain). Investigating these requires looking at the generic policy process 
from a longitudinal perspective. The next section discusses the role of 
temporality in the study of preference formation.   
 
The role of temporality in the process of preference formation 
 
In this section, I advance the relevance of time and context to understand the 
regulation of generic drugs in Brazil. Katznelson (2003) in the edited volume, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Science, refers to this analytical step 
as ‘periodization’. “Microbehaviour, we must continue to remember, requires 
historical macrofoundation. Yet equally, large-scale comparative analysis is 
underspecified and incomplete when its microfoundations are left implicit, ad hoc, 
undertheorized” (ibid.: 272). What this suggests is that focusing too narrowly on the 
interactive process between actors and the policy process as an outcome of this 
interaction is to present only a partial explanation. Consequently, to clarify the 
analytical direction of this thesis, the main theoretical theme is the study of the 
effects of the generic drug regulation and interaction of political actors (firms, patient 
advocacy groups, government officials or any other actors that participate in the 
policy process). The background/minor theme relates to the generic drug reform 
period and development as this is relevant to understanding preference formation. 
The methodology chapter explains how these two levels of analysis were integrated 
and investigated in this research. This section deals with the theoretical parameters 
that bond preferences and policy outcome together.  
 
HI scholars suggest that one would expect policy change to occur only under 
extraordinary circumstances, when changes in the external environment are so 
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significant that it overcomes the ‘stickiness’ of existing institutional arrangements25
[…] relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened 
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest. By “relatively short 
periods of time,” we mean that the duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the 
duration of the path-dependent process it instigates (which leads eventually to the outcome 
of interest). By “substantially heightened probability,” we mean that the probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest must be high relative to that probability 
before and after the juncture. […] (
. 
They refer to these as critical junctures: 
 
Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348 - original emphasis).  
 
In other words, there are short periods in time where institutional constraints are 
relaxed, deepening uncertainty, and that as a result actors experiment, test, learn and 
explore different policy alternatives. Once one option is chosen, it is likely to have an 
extraordinary impact on the subsequent outcomes. In other words, choices made 
during this critical juncture activate a path-dependent process that constrains future 
choices. Mahoney (2000) and Pierson (2000; 2004) suggest three elements that 
constitute a period of critical juncture: (1) contingency, that is, policy change can not 
be explained by the theory or knowledge that is used. (2) Time and sequence
Pierson 2004: 44
 is 
important as the initial part of a sequence matters much more than final parts - “an 
event that happens too late may have no effect, although it might have been of great 
consequence if the timing had been different” ( ), while the concept 
of (3) inertia
In this sense, the relevance of this concept to understand actors’ behaviour is that it is 
in these short periods that political actors can influence policy outcome. For instance, 
newcomers to the policy process, with distinctive preferences, skills and ideas of 
alternative paths emerge and redefine the situation. These entrepreneurs can provide 
policy solutions and create new policies, some of which “endure for extended periods 
to reshape boundaries, naturalize outcomes, redistribute power and provide new 
contexts for solving problems […] not just agency and preferences matter at such 
times, but particular kinds of innovative competence and patterns of discovery” 
 refers to positive feedback effects – actors adapt to the existing path – 
that may lead to a single equilibrium; which in turn will be resistant to change.  
 
                                                 
25 Recent studies on institutional development has moved away from the concept of radical periods of 
change and path dependence, focusing on the ways in which institutions change rather than remain 
stable over time (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
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(Katznelson 2003: 283). Critical junctures are then windows of opportunity to create 
policies or change institutionalized policies that for some reason have become 
undesirable.  
 
However, to be truly considered a critical juncture; political actors must legitimize 
the new rules. Their feedback stabilizes the policy and institutionalizes the new path 
(Pierson 2004). As actors adjust to the enacted policy, their identity (preferences and 
claims) change in ways that reduce the probability that they will demand the 
antecedent policy in the future. This is the heart of the path dependency concept: 
once a particular path is chosen, actors adapt to the existing policy in ways that push 
them further along that trajectory (Thelen 1999). “Public policies generate incentives 
for interest group activity, influence adaptive expectations and generate distinctive 
patterns of public support” (Immergut and Anderson 2008: 358). Looking at the 
aftermath of reform is important because one cannot assume that reforms will be 
stable. Some critical junctures produce very stable and institutionalized regimes, 
whilst others seem to contain the seeds of their own destruction (Collier & Collier 
1991).  
 
Reforms may be corrupted or reversed after their enactment for different reasons. 
The organized interests that bear the costs of policy reform do not necessarily vanish 
after a reform is enacted and they may align themselves with new clienteles who 
would also benefit if the reform were reversed (Patashnki 2003). In addition, the 
political entrepreneurs who initially supported the reform may change their minds 
about the political costs and benefits of serving diffuse interests. Alternatively, they 
may also find themselves no longer in office (ibid.). The “long-term sustainability of 
any given policy reform rests on the successful reworking of political institutions and 
on the generation of positive policy-feedback effects, especially the empowerment of 
social groups with a stake in the reform’s maintenance” (ibid.: 203). Sustainability is 
understood here in the terms of Patashnki (2003) -- the ability of public policy to 
maintain its stability, coherence and integrity over time, achieving its core goals 
along with the inevitable vicissitudes of politics.  
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The concepts of policy change and stability are relevant to this thesis for three 
reasons. Firstly, dividing the object of analysis into temporal dimensions allows for a 
comparison of the preferences of pharmaceutical firms and other actors participating 
in the policy process at different times under the same institutional context. This 
theoretical-methodological step serves as a frame to understand and compare 
preferences over generic drugs in different circumstances. Secondly, it helps to 
explain the generic drug reform, as the literature review has suggested this has been 
poorly assessed by previous studies and deserves further investigation. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, as Katznelson (2003) argued, these are interrelated 
phenomena, to better understand the policy process, the observer must acknowledge 
both aspects. Assuming that policy development is a process where actors will 
feedback the policy chosen, comparing the preferences of different groups 
participating in the regulatory process after the Generic Drug Act with the antecedent 
period allows me to assess those who are more active in upholding the path or 
dissatisfied with it. The literature review provided several reasons to believe that 
generic drug policy in Brazil could be reversed and why its remarkable economic 
outcomes are odd. Thus, this comprehensive approach can provide a better 
assessment of the politics of generic drugs in Brazil.  
 
Conclusion – the argument in brief 
 
The analytical framework proposed in this chapter suggests that it is necessary to 
understand how regulatory policy legacies shape an actor’s preference to be able to 
understand the extent to which international context and interest groups activities 
matter for policy development. This longitudinal perspective allows for an 
assessment of the actors participating in the pharmaceutical regulatory process in 
Brazil, an understanding of the content of their demands and how they behaved in the 
pursuit of these claims, and in turn, an assessment of how and why the generic drug 
reform and development came about. Theoretically, this thesis proposes an analysis 
of two different but interrelated social occurrences. The first is preference formation 
and it argues that it is in the interaction with the policy process that actors define 
what they want and how to portray their demands, in other words, their preferences 
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are socially constructed (Hall 2005; Woll 2008). The second is policy outcome and it 
argues that policy decisions taken in critical periods of reform might become path 
dependent, that is, once a policy path is chosen, actors adapt to the existing policy in 
ways that push them further along that trajectory (cf. Pierson 2004).  
 
In summary, the historical narrative proposed in this chapter is articulated as follows. 
Time 1 refers to the period antecedent to the generic drug reform, i.e. a moment 
when the status quo of pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil became dysfunctional 
requiring alternative policy solutions. Participants of the policy process (government, 
firms, patient advocacy coalition or any other relevant actor such as the World 
Health Organization) demonstrate preference for alternative solutions and these can 
range from the preservation of the policy path to other radical policy innovations. 
However, it is uncertain which option will prevail and its outcome. Previous studies 
on generic drug regulation in Brazil have explored briefly the antecedents to the 
reform, thus little is known about the antecedent events and policy options reflected 
in the reform that happened in 1999.  
 
Time 2 refers to the eventful period of generic drug reform between 1999 and 2002. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, reforms can be triggered by contingent events and 
be influenced by the sequence of events happening in the antecedent period. In this 
moment, one policy is favoured against the others – it could be with or without the 
support of interest groups – and government shows credible commitments to it. 
Because the outcome of the policy chosen is highly uncertain, actors are not sure 
whether to adjust or voice against it. As they are less likely to behave strategically, 
the crisis created an opportunity to reformulate their policy preferences. The two 
studies of the generic drug reform mentioned in the previous chapter have 
emphasised the role of the fake birth control pills scandal and the entrepreneurship of 
the Minister of Health, Jose Serra (invoking his political ambitions), as crucial 




Chapter 4 review and expand the existing analysis on the leadership of the Minister 
of Health, Jose Serra, as core condition to the generic drug reform in Brazil. It 
explains how did generic drugs became a policy alternative in 1999? According to 
the theoretical parameters proposed in this chapter, this thsis posits that the political 
leadership was channelled by past events happening in Time 1 (by creating 
opportunities to a particular policy be selected) and by the contingent events (such as 
the medicine crisis suggested by the other authors). Both happening in a particular 
moment in time can open a window of opportunity to shift the direction of 
pharmaceutical regulation. Thus, Serra’s entrepreneurship in this case would be 
circumstantial and could be better understood by looking at the historical policy 
process rather than a narrow function of his political interests. Besides that, 
government advocacy signalizes credible commitments to a given policy and this 
happening in a period of crisis can encourage opposing groups to redefine their 
preferences. Finally, ending the analysis in the process that led to the Generic Drug 
Act is to give a partial explanation to the regulatory process. Only by looking at the 
proceeding period is it possible to understand the political effects of this policy on 
the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
Lastly, Time 3 refers to the generic drug policy development, i.e. the moment when 
actors abandon the claims for the antecedent policy or alternative solutions and begin 
to adapt to the proposed reform. By comparing their preferences and demands 
against the antecedent period, it is possible to observe if there was or was not a 
change in their content. Chapter 5 and 6 aim to explain how did generic drug policy 
developed in Brazil. This thesis posits that generic drug policy development could be 
explained by the reinforcement of these actors, who might have adapted to the new 
institutional context. Besides, the generic drug policy might have also created 
unforeseen consequences that should also be the object of investigation to see how 
the actors negatively affected by this policy react to the institutionalized policy path 
(claiming another reform or adjustment to it). While the previous periods had been 
analysed to some extent by other scholars, the institutionalization of generic drug 
regulation had not received much attention to date.  
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The following chapter discusses the methodological dilemmas and choices, the 
process of data collection and analysis of this thesis.  
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3.  Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the research protocol used to study the generic drug regulatory 
process in Brazil. The first part of this chapter discusses the methodological choice 
for the case study and the qualitative research design, justifying why these were 
relevant to this political inquiry. It also translates the rationale and conceptual 
parameters presented in the previous chapter into a research design. The second part 
of this chapter describes the research methods and data collection procedures that 
were used in this research. The following section presents the data analysis rationale 
and further research practicalities (e.g. ethical concerns, institutional support). 
 
To study the pharmaceutical sector through the lens of preference formation and 
from a historical perspective, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth assessment of the 
case and use some level of inductive reasoning. Consequently, the process of 
designing the research protocol - questions, theories, methods – was not a fixed 
linear decision but was rather constantly reflected upon and adjusted as new 
information was collected (cf. Maxwell 2005). These concerns are also the subject of 
discussion in this chapter. This thesis relies on rich empirical data, including 57 in-
depth interviews with government officials, politicians, pharmaceutical firms, NGO 
activists, as well as hundreds of government documents, market intelligence 




The previous chapter indicated that this thesis explores the regulatory process of 
generic drugs by looking into the micro mechanisms within the causal process. It 
argues that preferences of actors participating in the regulatory process are socially 
constructed and by adapting their preferences pro-generic drugs, they feedback 
policy development. By approaching the social phenomena through these 
complexities, it also affects how the analysis is constructed and verified (Hall 2003). 
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If so, the problem this thesis seeks to understand can be best addressed using case 
study, historical narrative and qualitative methodology.  
 
Case study and process tracing approach 
A case study approach refers to the inquiry of a class of events happening in a single 
or small number of settings (Eisenhardt 1989). Within the Lijphart’s (1971: 691-
693)26
cf. George and Bennett 
2005: 23-24
 typology of case studies, this thesis is positioned in between two ideal types: 
hypothesis generating case studies and theory testing case studies. By looking at the 
regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil, this thesis can provide innovative 
perspectives on pharmaceutical regulation analysis. As seen in the antecedent 
chapter, scholars interested in pharmaceutical regulation have paid little attention to 
the relevance of the collaborative aspect of the rgulatory policy process, focusing too 
narrowly on the input of interest groups’ activity to the design of regulatory rules. 
The previous chapters demonstrated that there are few studies in pharmaceutical 
regulation looking at how governmental decisions in this sector affect its politics, and 
similarly, despite the political salience of the generic drug regulation, there is hardly 
any study from a policy perspective. Thus, this study could contribute to the 
literature on interest group activity in pharmaceutical sector (
). 
 
Finally, the research of the Brazilian case can also advance the studies of historical 
institutionalism on preference formation (or theory testing in Lijphart’s typology). 
Regardless of the fact that historical institutional analysis is a well-established 
theoretical approach in the social sciences, its explanatory scope has evolved over 
time (cf. Immergut and Anderson 2008). Consider for example recent studies on 
incremental institutional change and mechanisms of policy feedback (Pierson 2005; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Mahoney 2010). In this sense, although a core 
tenet of historical institutional analysis is the endogenity of actors preference (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992), there are still many obscure aspects over the process of 
preference formation. Recent studies have considered this an object of analysis (Hall 
                                                 
26 Lijphart (1971) identified six ideal types of case studies according to their position in theory 
development: atheoretical, interpretative case studies, hypothesis-generating, theory confirming, 




. Thus, studying the case of generic drug regulation can 
contribute to this state of the discipline as a plausible probe frame. According to 
George and Bennett ( ) “plausibility probe are preliminary studies on 
relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determinate whether more intensive 
and laborious testing is warranted”. It is important to clarify here that using historical 
institutional analysis as a theoretical parameter to assess the case of Brazil could be 
vulnerable to critics on the case selection bias, i.e. the selection of a case based on 
the dependent variable that is most likely to fit a theoretical approach. However, if 
the theory is in need of further assessment, picking a case that serves as a heuristic 
purpose, challenges or advances its constructs justifies the deliberated choice for a 
particular outcome (cf. George and Bennett 2005: 23). Nevertheless, there are 
methodological safeguards that can reduce this bias such as process tracing and this 
is considered in this chapter. 
 
Having considered these methodological dilemmas, I must emphasize that the use of 
theoretical approaches in this study serves as a guide to data collection and analysis. 
In this respect, different perspectives were considered, avoiding tautological logic 
and leaving the case open to other possible assessment. The ultimate weight of this 
thesis is to explain the regulatory process rather than propose sophisticated abstract 
propositions; the theoretical implications of this study are more nuanced. The 
following section expands the advantages and dilemmas of using case study research 
for this project.  
 
There are advantages and drawbacks of case studies as a method for analyzing this 
social inquiry. Overall, the use and limitations of case study and small-n research in 
the social science is an enormous debate among methodologists (cf. 
The strengths and limits of case study design 
King et al. 1994; 
Mahoney 2000; Brady and Collier 2004). Firstly, case study allows a detailed 
analysis of the historical process of generic drug regulation. This thesis proposes 
                                                 
27 Cornelia Woll does not position her work squarely on this perspective but she does mention it 
extensively as an analogous approach. She has also made important contributions to understanding the 
building blocks of preference formation within a socio-constructivist perspective, using regulatory 
lobbying as an empirical frame. 
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studying the content of interest groups’ demands and the policy outcome resulting 
from the interaction with government, which requires a significant knowledge of the 
case. Thus, case study allowed me to dissect the generic drug regulation, devote time 
to understanding the content of actor’s preference and how they evolved in the 
interaction with the regulatory process. Secondly, case studies are well-equipped to 
understand rare events (cf. Bennett and Elman 2006). It is very unlikely that the 
conditions that led Brazil to implement generic drugs and its sustainability will be 
replicated elsewhere. This is partly due to the contingent element of critical junctures 
but also because the sequence of events that led to the reform and the effects that 
unfolded afterwards are unique processes. A third advantage of case study is that it 
allows for the identification of alternative explanations that were not predicted during 
the early stage of research design. As aforementioned, there are a number of possible 
variables related to the “state of world history” and that could possibly influence the 
pharmaceutical regulation. An in-depth assessment of the case can help in clarifying 
these or abandoning others. Finally, case study and qualitative methodology are 
particularly useful when assessing interaction effects within one or few cases (cf. 
Bennett and Elman 2006). Regulation of the pharmaceutical sector is a complex 
landscape; it involves at the same time industrial, sanitary and access to medicines 
policies. Besides these different and controversial stakes, the politics of 
pharmaceutical regulation also engages a range of political actors from business and 
patient-advocacy groups to government and international agencies. A case study can 
provide temporal and in-depth information about how pharmaceutical firms and 
patient advocacy groups interact with the pharmaceutical regulatory process. By 
doing so, it allows us to trace the evolution of preferences over the indicated period, 
which is the core aim of this thesis.  
 
However, the case study of pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil does not provide 
strong inferences about how particular causes can influence the outcome of generic 
drug regulation in different settings. This limitation in the variance of the dependent 
variable in different settings makes it difficult to generalize with some degree of 
confidence the results of this thesis when compared to other countries (cf. Bennett 
and Elman 2006: 260). On the other hand, methodologists argue that because path 
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dependence processes are individualized trajectories that suggest complex events and 
interactions, case studies can be helpful to explain whether and how a particular 
variable matter to the policy outcome or social phenomena studied (e.g. preference 
formation in a given context) (cf. George and Bennett 2005: 25; Bennett and Elman 
2006: 260).  
 
With respect to methodologies of data collection, the use of qualitative methodology 
seems to provide some relative advantages in addressing the construction of 
preference and the study of path dependence. An alternative method to study the 
interaction of generic drug policy and interests groups would be to use a quantitative 
approach or regression analysis. The objective of regression analysis is to identify a 
few causal factors that have led to a particular event. The analyst is concerned with 
estimating the magnitude of the effect of each variable and the degree of confidence 
by which this effect can be assured (
Process tracing approach and qualitative research design  
Hall 2008). In the case of pharmaceutical 
regulation, the observer would model the preferences of each political actor ex-ante 
or deduce the causal explanation a priori (respecting the conditions to run this 
statistical method, for example this small set of causal variables should be 
independent from each other but powerful to explain the outcome across different 
cases) (cf. Shipan 2004). However, this methodology is inadequate to explore the 
object of this thesis for three reasons: firstly, it requires a short and limited time 
horizon; secondly, it is necessary to define in advance political actors’ interests; 
thirdly, regression analysis does not capture the interactive process between actors 
participating in the regulatory process. These three preconditions contrast starkly 
with the purpose of this thesis. In turn, qualitative methods and process tracing seem 
to be the best means to operationalize this case study.  
 
[…] systematic process analysis examines the process unfolding in the cases at hand as well 
as the outcomes in those cases. The causal theories to be tested are interrogated for the 
predictions they contain about how events will unfold. The point is to compare these 
predictions with observations drawn from data about the world. […] The point is to see if the 
multiple actions and statements of the actors at each stage of the causal process are 




In other words, process tracing refers to the analysis of histories, archival documents, 
and in-depth interviews with key informants to examine if the causal process 
outlined by a given theoretical perspective is empirically validated in the sequence 
and values of the intervening variables in the case studies. The idea is to identify the 
intervening causal process – the causal chain – between an independent variable and 
the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 6 and 206). 
Naturally, it would be unfeasible to trace all the conditions of the path but the analyst 
should focus on those that seem particularly relevant to the phenomena under 
investigation.  
 
The process tracing research design is similar to what historians use in their 
narratives to explain all sets of causal events, defining why the outcome occurred in a 
particular time and place (Hall 2008). However, in process tracing analysis the 
inquiry is guided by a theoretical construct, identifying the main determinants of a 
wide class of outcomes and is concerned in exploring the mechanisms by which 
those determinants influence the outcome (Hall 2003; 2008). It requires a balance 
between deductive thinking and analytic induction. Thus, the theoretical parameters 
discussed in the previous chapter guided the data collection, limiting the number of 
possible and relevant variables that could be related to the generic drug regulation in 
Brazil. Simultaneously, inductive reasoning allowed me to observe alternative 
explanations and reformulate the direction of the analysis (examples are provided 
throughout this chapter). Note that flexibility in data collection is not a license to be 
unsystematic; rather this flexibility is “a controlled opportunism in which researchers 
take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes 
to improve resultant theory” (Eisenhardt 1989: 539). 
 
This qualitative study of the content of actors’ preference and demands is grounded 
on empirical observation. The previous chapter has already pointed out that different 
from rational choice scholars that deduce (based on previous studies or theories) the 
goals actors aim to pursue; historical institutionalists/constructivists work with the 
revealed preferences. Cornelia Woll (
The challenge of explaining preference formation: 
2005a: 100-101) calls attention to the problem 
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of vagueness in assessing the dependent variable from this perspective. For example, 
how to define which stakes political actors give more weight to in defining their 
policy preferences? Woll suggests that vague concepts are a problem faced by many 
social scientists. For example, the definition of democracy is still a subject of debate 
in the political science field which despite its problematic definition cannot be 
ignored. This methodological drawback can be minimized by establishing the context 
in which the concept is to be used. For example, courts (or even the World Trade 
Organization) can rule in cases where intellectual property rights violate public 
interest. Public interest is indeed a subjective concept but we can infer a great deal by 
looking at the time and contexts where it is used.  Similarly, the political activities of 
business or patient advocacy groups can be a response to the policy process in which 
they are embedded.  
 
Reducing social facts to variables takes away a specific context and therefore increases the 
vagueness of a concept. For scientific purposes, this reduction is very important, because it is 
the only way to make an observed phenomenon comparable to others. Dissecting elements, 
their variation and their relation to specific outcomes not only clarifies an argument, it is the 
essence of any social science method itself (Woll 2005a: 101). 
 
For the purpose of this study, isolating the preferences of political actors (e.g. 
pharmaceutical firms, governmental officials or patient groups) into variables would 
neglect its interactive dimension. There are no reliable ways to identify political 
actors’ basic interests; however, we can infer a lot about what they want and how 
they portray their claim from qualitative interviews with the representatives of 
interest groups and documentary research. Also, preferences can be better understood 
by looking at the historical context in which they interact (among themselves and 
with government).  
 
A further challenge of studying preference formation is identifying the relevant 
players. Whose ideas matter? Evidently the policy making process can engage a 
broad range of players with different stakes. The case of Brazil is particularly 
complex as it combines public and private firms, patient advocacy (particularly those 
with chronic diseases that require long term medical care) and government officials 
across three branches (Congress, Executive and Judiciary) and levels (Federal, 
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Regional and Local). The intention of this social science inquiry was not to scrutinize 
every single actor participating in the policy process, but as discussed above process 
tracing allows the identification of those relevant for the study outcome. In addition, 
this broad possibility is beneficial to this study as it increases the changes of 
assessing the preferences of different political actors, increasing the number of 
observations. Nevertheless, to narrow down the analysis this study initially relied on 
the literature review and the documents on the governance of generic drugs (mainly 
publications from the World Health Organization, Pan-American Health 
Organization and the World Bank) to identify the major players engaged in the 
pharmaceutical policy making. This initial research protocol identified that while in 
the reform period the Minister of Health had a crucial role in enacting the reform; 
whilst local pharmaceutical firms, despite hardly any evidence that they supported 
this policy, turned out to be the main supporters of generic drugs in the following 10 
year-period following the Generic Drug Act. The following sections will expand 
these concerns and the choices taken for each time period analyzed.  
 
Studying the process of generic drug regulation in Brazil 
 
The study of preference formation starts by looking at the circumstances of political 
interaction (cf. Hall 2005). To do so, this study looks at the periods before and after 
the generic drug reform to trace the elements of preference formation. This within-
case comparative design allows me to observe the content of the demands of 
pharmaceutical firms and other actors participating in the regulatory process and how 
they justify these claims within different periods but under the same institutional 
context. The generic drug reform represented a moment of intense debate and 
controversy in Brazil, adding an element of uncertainty into the analysis. This section 
describes the analytical steps in detail. 
 
(A) Generic drug reform and its antecedent period 
The first analytical step of this study was to explore and review the period of generic 
drug reform and its antecedents. This is important to assess political actors’ 
interpretation of generic drugs during this period, which provided base-line 
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information to understand how their preferences evolved afterwards and to assess if 
there was a relevant change in the content of their demands.  
 
Because previous studies analyzed the pharmaceutical regulatory reforms in Brazil 
(cf. Dias 2003; Piovesan and Labra 2007; Nunn 2008), this study builds upon these 
antecedent analyses but focuses on the regulation of generic medicines. It had 
already been established that the entrepreneurship of Minister of Health Jose Serra 
played an important role in pushing the generic drug reform. Journalists and scholars 
of health policy in Brazil usually mention his protagonism in championing the 
reform (cf. Dias 2003; Franca 2004). However, how can the preference that emerged 
by 1999, when Congress finally enacted the contested Generic Drug Act, be 
explained? Backed by the theoretical parameters discussed in the previous chapter, 
the first analytical exercise was to identify when the generic drug regulation first 
appeared on the political agenda of Congress, Executive or Judiciary in Brazil. The 
analysis sought to identify whom were the political actors participating in the 
policymaking of the pharmaceutical sector (and generic drug regulation in 
particular); their demands and how they portrayed these claims (framing preferences 
and defining lobbying strategies). I have also considered the arguments of the 
diffusion of the WHO guidelines here, as their influence could be more prominent in 
the antecedent period of the Generic Drug Act28
Note the inductive component of the research design. Because studies in the 




cf. Carpenter 2004) and the study of Ascione, Kirking et al. 
(2001) highlighted the role of consumer groups in pressuring for the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in the US; I decided to explore their participation in regulatory process as well. 
As in Brazil HIV/AIDS activists have a long tradition of pressuring and holding the 
government accountable for the provision of antiretroviral drugs (cf. Galvao 2000; 
                                                 
28 To trace the role of the WHO and policy diffusion, I requested the interviewees to comment on this 
international agency role, observed if they promoted events and proposals in Brazil (or international 
meeting that government officials discussed this issue) that could provide evidence of policy 
diffusion. While the policy diffusion argument was likely to appear in this stage of the research 
design, the rational choice perspective was assessed throughout the thesis by observing the actors’ 
preference. 
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Nunn 2008) and diabetes patients are named as one of the main beneficiaries of 
generic drug competition (cf. Rosenberg 2009), I decided to investigate their role in 
this stage of the process too.  
 
This process tracing was particularly important in identifying two analytical elements 
(cf. Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). First, to reconstruct each step of the decision 
making process. For instance, which decisions were most influential to introduce 
generic drugs in Brazil, what were the options available/viable to actors who took 
them but also clarify both their impact and connection to other decision, and how did 
actors perceive these decisions? The second element of analysis was to look for 
contingent events, at critical junctures “decisions are taken in a situation of high 
uncertainty and unpredictability, given the relaxation of the “normal” structural and 
institutional constraints on action” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 355). In the period of 
institutional instability, different decisions are possible leading to different outcomes. 
Thus, a push for counterfactual analysis could help in identifying consequences of other 
choices. All these elements are discussed in Chapter 4. Table 3 summarizes this research 
design rationale. 
 
Table 3. Research design rationale for assessing the reform period 
 
Antecedent condition Agenda setting and reform period 
 
• Prepare a base line of actors’ preferences 
and institutional context against which 
the generic drug reform and its legacy 
are assessed 
• Identify the sequence of events that 
triggered the reform and actors’ 
perception of them. 
 
 
• Identify contingency and crisis that 
emerged out of the antecedent condition 
and led to the reform 
• Analysis of the institutional breakdown 
and opportunity for actors to influence 
the agenda setting 
• Explain why the generic drug policy was 
chosen  
Source: author’s compilation 
 
(B) The aftermath of the Generic Drug Act 
Once the mechanism that led to generic drug reform and actor’s perception during 
this period were identified, the second research step was to explore the aftermath 
landscape. This dimension of the analysis is explored in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
analytical exercise was to explore the causality that potentially runs in the opposite 
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direction, and explore how the effects of generic drug regulatory process 
(independent variable) might have influenced social-political actors and their 
preferences/strategies (dependent variables) in such a way that makes policy revision 
difficult. If there is hardly any evidence of muscular interest group activity 
demanding generic drugs in the previous period, a support favoring generic drug 
after government intervention would evidence that, to some extent, actors adjusted 
their preference in the interaction with the policy process. 
 
Here too it is important to start with the policy circumstances to understand the 
formation of preferences. The process tracing approach was important to identify 
events/policy debates that could facilitate and obstruct the development of the 
generic drug regulation. These events included for instance Congressional hearings, 
seminars, and official meetings to discuss the stakes on generic drug regulation (the 
use of INN and interchangeable tests). Additionally, the analysis also took into 
account intellectual property affairs (e.g. debates over patent extension or 
patentability criteria) as this can also influence the policy path of generic drugs. For 
each of these events (or issues) the analytical effort was to trace which actors were 
involved in the debate, what their role was, what they demanded, how they portrayed 
their demands, and if it differed from their behaviour before the reform. I was also 
attentive to reactive sequence, that is, attempts to transform or reverse the path of 
generic drug regulation (cf. Mahoney 2000). Who were the dissatisfied actors, where 
did they voice their claims, what were their demands, how did they frame their 
demands?  
 
Note that this was a moment of policy stability. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
in these periods preferences became stable and it is possible to observe some 
elements of rational behaviour (cf. Woll 2008). In addition, it is likely that 
interaction with government in periods of stability is collaborative rather than 
pressure lobbying or conflict, by engaging in information exchange actors can push 
forward their claims (Woll 2007) or even build up political advantage (Yoffie and 
Bergenstein 1985). Thus, tracing the process of generic drug development was also 
an actor-centred analytical exercise. 
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The literature review on generic drug policy and the guidelines of the World Health 
Organization and Pan American Health Organization suggest that the implementation 
of generic drugs requires the joint support of government (A), consumers (health 
professionals and patients) (B) and, pharmaceutical firms (C) (World Health 
Organization 2001; Homedes and Ugalde 2005a). The relevance of each of these 
players was mentioned in the introductory chapter. As previously justified, I have 
also included patient advocacy in this stage of the analysis. Thus, these served as a 
guide to data collection to understand this stage of the regulatory process. Table 4 
exemplifies the demands of political actors regarding the generic drug regulation. 
This list of possibilities is not exhaustive and is merely illustrative.  
 
Note that the best way to assess the support of health professionals and consumers is 
through public opinion surveys or by designing research projects focusing on their 
perception (as presented in the literature review). However, this thesis relied on 
previous studies conducted about this in Brazil, newspaper articles and ad hoc public 
opinion surveys29
Table 4. Research design rationale for assessing policy development 
 





Actors Alternative 1 Support/Adjustment demands 
Alternative 2  
Dissatisfaction/ 




1. Mass public campaigns pro-
generics 
2. Priority to generic drugs in 
governmental bids 
1. Lack of campaigns to  inform 
people about generic substitution 
2. Focus on other policies to 




1. High market demand for 
generic drugs 
2. Physicians give priority to the 
prescription of generic drugs 
1. Little awareness of generic 
drugs 
2. Lack confidence on the 
safety/quality of generic drugs 
                                                 
29 Some of these surveys are private and conducted by market intelligence companies such as the 
Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS) that collect worldwide information about pharmaceutical 
retail market. Thus, I had to either rely on executive summary of these reports, newspaper articles that 







1. Develop an extensive portfolio 
of generic drugs 
2. Support of bioequivalence tests 
1. Exit the market 
2. Repel bioequivalence tests 
D. Patient advocacy 
groups 
1. Demand that government 
should provide generic drugs 
2. Campaigns to inform their 
constituency about generic drugs 
1. Repel bioequivalence tests 
2. Lack confidence on the 
safety/quality of generic drugs 
 
Assessing the regulatory process in a longitudinal perspective and observing all these 
different stakes and actors was an ambitious project. Although this allowed a 
comprehensive understanding of the generic drug regulation in Brazil, it also 
required an in-depth and careful observation of the regulatory process. Thus, a 
considerable volume of data was collected from different sources and insiders of the 
regulatory process to inform this research design. The following section explores the 




So far I have discussed how case study and process tracing requires an in-depth 
approach to the field. This study uses three sources to inform the analysis: 
documentary research, semi-structured interviews and quantitative data. This section 
discusses how each of these sources was used and its relevance to answer the 
research questions.  
 
Documentary research 
The use of documentary sources for this study is justified for several reasons. Firstly, 
it provided important contextual information about pharmaceutical regulation in 
Brazil before and after the reform. Secondly, it helped in identifying the relevant 
political actors and their preferences and demands across the 20 year period studied. 
Political actors frequently document what they are doing, and there are sets of 
historical documents that provide rich detail that can be extracted to explain causal 
phenomena. Thirdly, it was particularly important to draw a baseline list of key-
informants to be contacted. For instance, several debates and Congressional hearings 
were organized during the Parliamentary discussions to approve the Generic Drug 
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Act. Newspaper articles documented the names of participants, their opinions on this 
matter and how they justified their demands. This information allowed me to track 
key informants to interview. Fourthly, documentary research was particularly useful 
to construct evidence of public opinion about generic drugs. This was crucial to 
understanding policy development given that a great deal of expenditure on 
medicines in Brazil is out-of-pocket; thus, consumers/doctors perception of generic 
drugs cannot be ignored. As collecting primary information would be another 
doctoral project in itself, I used extensive documentary information to assess this 
aspect of the regulatory process. This study used mainly three sources of 
documentary evidence: 
 
(A) Newspaper articles. These documents were culled mainly from the Library of 
Senate and Library of Chamber of Deputies in Brasilia. These libraries provide 
online and in-site consultations. The Library of Senate also had specific newspaper-
clippings with articles about “medicines” published in major newspapers and 
magazines in Brazil. These news-clippings were available for public consultation and 
photocopying. I collected newspaper articles published between the period of 1990 
and 2009. I have also consulted documents published previously but it was only in 
1990 that generic drugs gained media coverage. An additional source of newspaper 
articles was a direct consultation to the online archives of three popular newspapers 
in Brazil: Valor Economico, which provides similar content to the Wall Street 
Journal, assessing relevant evolution of market and business in Brazil; Folha de Sao 
Paulo and O Globo are popular newspapers that cover national and local (Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo) news. Finally, other sources of news information were 
selected in websites such as Consulta Remedios (www.consultaremedios.com.br), 
government, business association and NGOs media clippings, and Magazines (such 
as Revista Veja, Isto ‘E Dinheiro, Epoca Negocios). Although the majority of 
newspaper articles consulted were those published in Brazil, I have also used 
LexisNexis to consult information published in popular international 
news/magazines. This was important to provide evidence of the global state of 
pharmaceutical regulation and markets, and major international debates on the 
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WHO/WTO, as these represent a grid in which the regulatory process of generic 
drugs in Brazil is embedded.  
 
Relevant articles to this study included those directly related to initiatives to 
implement generic drugs in Brazil, paying particular attention to those who presented 
interviews with stakeholders and detailed explanation about government decisions. 
Additionally, articles not directly related to the research topic but that provided 
further information on the evolution of pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil were also 
used, such as news related to intellectual property and the creation of the Regulatory 
Agency (ANVISA). This was important to identify possible intervening variables. 
Nearly 1,500 articles were selected. This material will be available for consultation 
via the author’s website (www.elizemassard.com).  
 
(B) Legislation, policy statements, court decisions. These are official documents that 
provide evidence of government decisions on pharmaceutical regulation. Virtually all 
Federal legislation and regulatory decisions (norms) are available for online 
consultation (including laws that were reformulated)30
(C) Business memos and non-governmental organizations’ publications. Another 
relevant source of information was documents produced by political actors. Interest 
groups often produce a wide range of material (books, booklets, statements, web-
documents) to express their demands and why these demands matter. For example, 
an important piece of evidence about local producers’ preferences was the book 
produced by the Sao Paulo Syndicate of Pharmaceutical Industries to celebrate its 
. The Brazilian Congress also 
provides transcripts of hearings, floor discussions and votes records (when vote is 
open). For example, it was possible to access the verbatim transcription of the floor 
discussions on the day that the Generic Drug Act was passed in 1998, including the 
position of each deputy (the political party’s representatives voted in bill, not 
Congressmen individually) and why they decided to support the legislation.  
 
                                                 
30 Federal legislation is available for public consultation via www.planalto.gov.br/legislacao. These 
documents date back to the 1890’s. In addition, the Congress website provides public consultation to 
bills and legislations via www.camara.gov.br and www.senado.gov.br. Finally, ANVISA also 
provides online consultation to decisions taken since Brazil began regulating pharmaceuticals, this are 
available via www.anvisa.gov.br/legis/index_as.htm. 
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73rd anniversary (Sindusfarma: milestones and accomplishments) (Sindusfarma 
2006). This book provided detailed information about regulatory decisions in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the position of the association, and interviews with key 
businessmen (board of directors). This publication was important not just to 
understand their position in particular government decisions but also to identify 
possible interviewees. Similarly, the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association 
publishes a number of booklets with information about their perspective on 
intellectual property affairs and pharmaceutical norms. Table 5 provides a picture of 
the sources consulted. 
 
Table 5. Summary of documentary research 
 
Source City Documents 
Library of Federal Senate Brasilia Newspaper, magazine, 
journals clipping 
Library of Federal House of 
Representatives 
Brasilia Newspaper, magazine, 
journals clipping 
Library of the Ministry of Health  Brasilia Official documents 
Library of the National School of 
Public Health 
Rio de Janeiro Books, scientific journals 
and official documents 
Scielo www.scielo.br  Scientific journals 
Consulta Remedios  www.consultaremedios.com.br  Newspaper clipping 
Confederacao Nacional do 
Comercio de Bens, Servicos e 
Turismo (Diario Legislativo)  
www.portaldocomercio.org.br/dlg  Clipping of Parliamentary 
decisions culled by a trade 
association  
Grupemef Magazine http://www.grupemef.com.br/  Pharmaceutical sector 
magazine 
ComCiencia Magazine http://www.comciencia.br  Scientific journalism 
magazine 
BNDES clipping  www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bnde
s/bndes_en/Institucional/Press/  
Newspaper, magazine 
Newspapers (Valor Economico, 
Folha de Sao Paulo, Financial 
Times, The Economist, Wall Street 








Government agencies  www.brasil.gov.br  Official documents 
Pharmaceutical firms and 
associations 
www.ems.com.br  Books, booklets, business 
statements  




Total documents: ~1400 
 
(D) Scientific journals.  Scientific journals were an important source of evidence 
about consumers’ perception of generic drugs (health professionals and patients). 
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Several ad hoc studies were conducted after 2001 to assess this dimension of generic 
drug policy (cf. Montrucchio et al. 2003; Bertoldi et al. 2005). I have also consulted 
ad hoc public opinion surveys requested by the National Health Surveillance Agency 
and a market intelligence study on public opinion towards generic medicines 
(ANVISA 2001). Additionally, scientific papers also provided quantitative evidence 
about pharmaceutical products (generic, similar or original products) purchased by 
the government (cf. Miranda et al. 2009; Pinto et al. 2010). This is important as the 
Generic Drug Act demands that the public purchase of medicines must give priority 
to generic drugs, thus this information can provide a proxy of policy development. 
When possible, this information was compared against different sources to assure the 
validity of the information provided.  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
An important method to inform this social inquiry was the use of elite interviews, 
that is, key informants that are close to the policymaking process or that have 
expertise on the topic in question (Dexter 2006 [1970]). The relevance of interviews 
for this research was twofold: (1) it helped in guiding the data collection process and 
refining the arguments of the study; (2) getting insider information and the 
perspective of the representative of an interest group about a particular matter. 
 
Interviews with key informants were particularly helpful in refining the arguments of 
this research. While the literature review and theoretical concepts provided the initial 
guidelines and limits of what sort of information to look for, the interviews showed 
that it would be necessary for some adjustments in the research rationale. I knew in 
advance that policy development was associated somehow with policy feedback 
mechanisms and actors adapting to the policy path, but it was not clear how this 
happened and the extent of these feedback mechanisms to explain generic drug 
policy development. During the interview process informants highlighted the crucial 
role of local pharmaceutical firms and how they became national champions in this 
sector, leading data collection in this direction. Additionally, during interviews it 
became clear that although intellectual property affairs is apparently another field of 
investigation, an analysis of generic drug regulation cannot ignore these aspects of 
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the pharmaceutical sector. How interests groups balance these two dimensions 
became clear in the course of interviewing and data collection. This leads to the 
second relevance of interviewing to this research. 
 
Interviews were also valuable in assessing actors’ interpretations of particular events 
in the pharmaceutical sector. For instance, documentary research showed that there 
was an unsuccessful attempt to introduce generic drugs in the early 1990’s and that 
this was a highly controversial debate at that time. Many participants of that 
particular event are still active in the pharmaceutical sector nowadays and could 
provide important information on what the stakes were at that time, what their 
demands were and how they portrayed these demands. Additionally, interviews 
helped me understand how they balance their preferences and their multiple 
demands, for example on topics related to generic drugs, industrial development and 
intellectual property. For pharmaceutical firms I could learn which government 
department was more sensitive to their claims, while government officials clarified 
why the current administration places less emphasis on generic drug policy.  
 
Finally, interviews assisted in constructing the narrative and building up the analysis 
of this study. All the interviews were transcribed, allowing me to compare and 
contrast information and reconstruct the story timeline.  
 
An important step of the interviewing process was the selection of key informants. 
This study used a purposive sampling strategy to select the key-informants. The 
sample was stated during the process of investigation and by the theoretical rationale 
discussed in the previous section (cf. Mason 2002). The selection of informants was 
based on three criteria: (1) they should be in some degree participant to the making 
of generic drug regulation; (2) their expertise should be connected to pharmaceutical 
regulation to various extents; (3) they should have the ability to comment (based on 
their analytical capacity or personal involvement in a particular event) on topics 
investigated. As stated previously, some informants were identified during the 
documentary research stage, for example, participants in debates or Congressional 
The interviewing process 
 99 
hearings were contacted for interviews. Interviewees were also selected by referral 
sampling (the ‘snowball’ method); after each interview the interviewee was asked to 
give suggestions on further relevant interviewees. I knew at the beginning of data 
collection that there were three major groups to interview: business actors 
(pharmaceutical firms); governmental actors (executive, legislative and judiciary) 
and patient advocacy groups (AIDS and diabetes). Tabla 6 provides a picture of the 
57 interviews conducted by group of informants. I interviewed at least one 
participant of each group, for example, business actors included representatives of 
multinational firms (with generic drug portfolio or not), local pharmaceutical firms 
(similar and generic drug producer) and public firms.  Interviews were concluded 
when informants were not adding new information about the topic and conversations 
ended up being very repetitive. 
  
Table 6. Groups of informants according to the number of interviewees. 
 
Groups of informants Reform period and its 
antecedents 
After the reform Total 
Government  18 9 27 
Business association 4 4 8 
Local pharma firm 3 3 6 
Public pharma industry 2 2 4 
Multinational pharma firms 0* 3 3 
Patient advocacy 1 7 8 
Scholars 0 1 1 
Total  28 29 57 
*Executive posts in multinational firms are quite dynamic, thus difficult to locate the participants after 
this lengthy time. In addition, these are usually senior placements and some of the identified 
representatives have passed away. Nevertheless, representatives of business association provided 
valuable information about multinational firms’ perspectives on attempts to regulate the off-patent 
products.   
 
The majority of the interviews were conducted between March and August 2009. 
However, previous conversations with representatives of generic drug manufacturers 
assisted the design of this research project and other additional interviews with 
NGOs, government officials and business representatives which were conducted 
after field research period to clarify ambiguous points. The interviewing process 
required a significant amount of travelling between three cities in Brazil. While the 
majority of government officials are based in Brasilia, pharmaceutical industries and 
associations are located in Sao Paulo. Public pharmaceutical industries are spread 
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around Brazil, so for convenience reasons I interviewed one based in Rio de Janeiro 
and another in Sao Paulo. Finally, most patient advocacy groups (diabetics and 
AIDS) were also located in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  
 
Gaining access to informants was a heterogeneous process. Business representatives 
were open to talk about generic drug regulation and pharmaceutical regulation in 
general as much as representatives of patient advocacy groups. It was particularly 
difficult to get access to high decision makers in the Ministry of Health as field 
research for this project was conducted in the beginning of the H1N1 (swine flu) 
outbreak, which mobilized most health officials in Brazil (and also around the 
world). When getting references for further interviews I was careful to follow some 
guidelines suggested by Dexter (2006 [1970]): get introductions from trusted 
sources; avoid the intermediary to explain the project (this may cause bias and affect 
the content of the interview) and ask for favors (‘doing favors is the life-blood of 
Congress-constituency relationship’ page 39). Besides getting references from 
previous interviewees I have also participated in events and seminars where high 
level representatives of government and business associations would speak. For 
example, in the anniversary event of the 10 years of the Brazilian Generic 
Manufacturers Association, in May 2009, virtually all pharmaceutical sector 
representatives participated. Table 7 provides a summary of events that I participated 
in. These provided me with valuable opportunities to make contacts and arrange new 
interviews. Furthermore, the research institute where I was hosted during the 
fieldwork (FIOCRUZ) helped me to negotiate access to Ministry of Health 
informants. FIOCRUZ is Latin America’s major biomedical research institution, with 
a strong role in the formulation and evaluation of public policies in the broad field of 
health policy, as well in the development production, and distribution of generic 
antiretrovirals all over the country. The interviewing protocol can be found in annex 







Table 7. Events attended during field research 
 
Event Institution City Date 
International Seminar Health 
Policy and Social Protection 
National School of Public 




Seminar Public and Private 
partnerships in health policy 
Center for Health Studies 
(CEBES) 
São Paulo 23.04.09 







Public consultation 10 years of 
Generic Medicine Policy and its 
implementation 
House of Representative Brasilia 28.04.09 
Seminar 10 years of generic 
medicine 
Brazilian Association of 
Generic Drug Manufacturers 
(Pro-Genericos) 
Sao Paulo 25.05.09 




This study also used longitudinal quantitative data to understand the development of 
generic drug policy. I consulted market intelligence data (most of these reports need 
to be paid for but some provide samples or the executive summary free of charge), 
particularly information provided by the IMS Health (Espicom Business Intelligence 
2007; IMS 2009). A relevant source of information was provided by Pro-Genericos, 
which monitors the evolution of the generic drug sector since 2001 (Pro-Genericos 
2008; Pro-Genericos 2009). Because the use of Pro-Genericos data alone could be 
biased (e.g. highlight just the successful aspects of the regulation), I have also 
consulted and compared these with other references. For example, scientific papers 
(mainly produced by economists); government documents and some newspaper 
articles also provided information about the evolution of the pharmaceutical sector in 
general and the generic drug market (cf. Monteiro et al. 2005; Vieira and Zucchi 
2006; Nishijima 2008).  
 
I collected longitudinal information about the market share of generic drugs (volume 
and price); trade balance; evolution of the ranking of pharmaceutical companies in 
Brazil (volume and value). The National Health Surveillance Agency provides 
information about the number of generic drugs registered (by company, country, 
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year), which was also important to assess how this market evolved. This was 
particularly helpful to understand the evolution of the pharmaceutical sector before 
and after the generic drug reform. It was also helpful to evidence how local 





Data analysis for this project was conducted jointly to field research and during the 
writing up period. During field research, each interview was transcribed verbatim 
immediately after the conversation. I personally transcribed the majority of 
interviews as this allowed me to reflect about the information given and highlight 
key themes of each conversation31
Following Maxwell’s (
. This was also important to refine the interview 
guidelines as new information had been culled. Similarly, during documentary 
research after each day of data collection the information was organized 
chronologically, I took notes for relevant facts and events that could build up the 
research questions.  
 
2005) model of data analysis, I initially developed theoretical 
categories to organize the information. Maxwell suggests three main forms of 
organizing data collection. While organizational categories require an a priori 
definition of codes that will be assessed, substantive and theoretical categories are 
defined once the researcher is familiar with the case studies. However, substantive 
categories are descriptive codes of the phenomena studied, while theoretical 
categories places the coded data into an abstract framework (drawn either from prior 
theory or an inductive developed theory). For example, first I identified broader 
themes such as “AIDS activism” and “local pharmaceutical firms” as participants of 
the regulatory process and events such as “Presidential Decree 973/93”, “debates for 
introducing the intellectual property law 1991-1996”. Second, I identified the 
connection between them and key arguments raised. For example, “Presidential 
                                                 
31 Given the large amount of interviews, the short period in between them and the other data collection 
activities that were happening concurrently; I had to hire assistants to help with the transcriptions. 
Regardless of the time constraints, I personally transcribed nearly 70% of all the interviews.  
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decree 973/93” (event) → “local pharmaceutical industry” and “multinational 
pharmaceutical industry” (preference: opposition to use of INN because doctors 
should have the right to prescribe by the trademark) → counter proposal (demand: 
suggested a basket of medicines). The main purpose of splitting the data by source 
and structuring the analysis on main theoretical themes was to push the investigation 
beyond initial impression. By using structured, diverse sources and a comparative 
scope I sought to increase the accuracy of the analysis, i.e. a close fit between the 
theoretical construct proposed with the empirical material collected. 
 
Additionally, every two months short memos were produced about the information 
that had been collected and discussed with my supervisor (by email). This allowed 
me to investigate different perspectives to the generic drug regulation, abandon the 
ones that suggested less explanatory evidence and tailor the key elements for this 
study. A particular example is the case of public opinion support, as more data had 
been collected it was becoming clear that the population had limited awareness about 
generic substitution, lack of confidence on the safety/quality of these drugs 
(including doctors), thus public opinion assumption would explain less the path of 
generic drug sector. On the other hand, it was clear that there was a major consensus 
among virtually all interviewees that local pharmaceutical firms played a significant 
role in the sustainability of the generic drug sector, and thus deserved further 
investigation. 
 
A second step of data analysis was taken after the majority of data had been 
collected. Documentary material was separated into: newspaper articles; scientific 
articles; governmental documents, and interest groups documents. All this material 
was organized chronologically. All interviews were transcribed and organized 
according to the position of the informant in the policy process (some had 
overlapping tasks -- one informant could have been a government official at one 
point and then a private sector worker at another point). This second step was to 
reconstruct the narrative properly, writing up a pure historical description of events 
and focusing on how each participant of the policy process interpreted them - for 
example - a particular governmental decision. This allowed me to organize all the 
 104 
data collected, deepen my knowledge of the case and reorganize the 
themes/categories in order to develop the final analysis.  
 
A schematic organization of data analysis is presented here to illustrate this stage of 
the methodology but also to justify the structure of the empirical chapters. Overall, 
chapters are organized to outline the different stages of generic drug policymaking.  
The analysis of the generic drug reform period led to the emergence of the following 
pattern of events, which will be discussed in Chapter 4: 
 
Table 8. Events discussed in Chapter 4 
 
Antecedents Reform 
Sequence of events (1990’s)  Contingency (1999-2002) Reform steps (1999-2002) 
Initial attempts to introduce 
generic drugs in Brazil  
• Fake medicines 
scandals and price/cost 
of medicines 
• Particular point in the 
electoral cycle 
(Presidential election) 
Phase 1 – Parliamentary negotiations 
and the Generic Drug Act  
Enactment of the Intellectual 
Property Law Phase 2 – Governmental activism  HIV/AIDS epidemic / 
treatment 
 
The narrative of chapter 4 traces how the generic drug regulation came about. The 
qualitative analysis of these events allowed me to explore in-depth the process that 
led to the reform. It became clear that the main participants of pharmaceutical 
regulation at this point of time were pharmaceutical firms and to a lesser extent 
pharmacists association and other less organized interests (e.g. physicians 
associations). Their preferences, demands and perspectives are carefully analysed in 
chapter 4. On the other hand, there was hardly any evidence that HIV/AIDS activists 
or other disease groups engaged in any aspect of health or trade regulation of 
medicines over this period, their concerns referred largely to pharmaceutical 
assistance and claims of access to medicines. However, their demands contributed to 
put regulation of medicines at the top of the agenda of the Minister of Health, as we 
shall see. The remarkable governmental advocacy between 1999 and 2002 and the 
reactions to it are also explored in Chapter 4.  
 
Similar to the analysis of the reform and its antecedent period, the subsequent data 
analysis began by looking at events and circumstances of generic drug policy 
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development. Because this was a period of relative stability rather than major 
disruptive events, I organized the analysis based on issues discussed in the 
pharmaceutical regulatory agenda that could influence the policy path. This included 
INN, bioequivalence tests and some aspects of the intellectual property law (e.g. 
pipeline mechanism). Because these issues were presented prior to and after the 
generic drug reform, it was possible to compare how an actor’s meanings and 
understanding of them evolved in both periods. However, other concerns emerged in 
the agenda only in the subsequent period of reform (e.g. changes in the approval 
process of pharmaceutical patents) and because actors’ perception of these issues 
could evidence aspects of their identity and policy feedback, they were included in 
the analysis.  
 
For heuristic purposes and to facilitate the analysis of this period, the narratives of 
chapter 5 and 6 are organized according to actors/groups directly participating in the 
debates of these matters. Chapter 5 looks at government intervention, market 
demanders and suppliers. At first, it seemed intuitively plausible to assess how 
Serra’s successor understood and promoted the generic drug regulation. Generic drug 
policy has been marketed as as a government intervention to overcome a market 
failure, it would then be logical to expect that government would have a muscular 
role in stimulating and promoting these products to encourage demand and supply. 
Because government advocacy and public opinion/health professionals’ support 
proved to be inadequate to explain the path of generic drug regulation, this chapter 
placed more emphasis in assessing the behaviour of local pharmaceutical producers. 
The AIDS activists and public pharmaceutical industries were clustered in chapter 6 
as they have common issues at stake (e.g. the production of antiretroviral drugs) and 
carry the unforeseen policy costs, thus for clarity purposes it would be reasonable to 
dedicate a chapter to assess them. The analysis of preferences and demands are more 
complex than a dichotomous division of support vs. opposition, thus a parsimonious 
presentation of their behaviour is not pictured here but is assessed in detail 
throughout these chapters. It is relevant to note in advance that the interactions 
between actors were considered and highlighted when necessary. These interactions 
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(or the absence of them) were also assessed in the final chapter of this thesis. Figure 
2 illustrates the rationale of these chapters. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of Chapter 5 and 6 rationales 
 
Chapter 5* Chapter 6** 
 
  
  Issues*   
  INN   
Actors  Bioequivalence tests  Actors 
Local pharma firms   Pipeline mechanism  Public pharma Indus 
Business associations  Polymorphism  and second use patent  HIV/AIDS activists 
  ANVISA’s prior consent   
 
Note: *Chapter 5 begins with an analysis of government and market demand, as empirical evidence 
pointed that these explained less the policy legacy than local pharmaceutical firms, I weighted this 
chapter more on the side of local pharma firms. **Chapter 6 includes issues over compulsory license 




This research was assessed by the School of Social and Political Studies ethical 
review form for level 1, 2 and level 3 auditing and discussed with the study’s 
supervisors. Although this study presents little risk to the individuals, it dealt with 
sensitive information. Sensitive information refers less to emotional distress than the 
consequences of the disclosure confidential communication. For example, an 
informant could explain persecutory actions taken to enforce a particular perspective 
or when explaining his/her disagreement with a particular governmental decision the 
respondent could use a pejorative tone to describe other participants of the policy 
process. The intention here is not to solve disagreements or investigate interest 
groups’ tactics or personal motivations. For both examples mentioned, the interview 
process would be relevant to highlight the collective perspective of the group this 
respondent represented on a particular issue. Furthermore, the empirical data was 
indifferent with individual identities.  
 
Several actions had been taken to guarantee ethical caution. I explained the purpose 
of my research to all the interviewees and gave them a brief summary of my research 
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and a letter from my supervisor introducing the study. Before each interview, I asked 
for permission to record the conversation and cite the interview. Noteworthy, I asked 
for verbal consent but a written consent form was prepared if the interviewee 
requested (no interviewee considered a written permission) (annex 3).  
 
To ensure confidentiality, I was the only person with access to all qualitative data. 
Trained research assistants transcribed nearly 30% of the interviews but I excluded 
the name and title of the interviewee in these cases. Because some information about 
the respondent could be assessed in the transcription process, I was careful to explain 
to the assistants about the ethical implications of those conversations. All hard copy 
material was stored in my locker in the School of Social and Political Science, 
Edinburgh University, Edinburgh. Electronic material was stored on my external 
hard drive and password protected. Finally, when writing up the historical narrative, 
for the majority of interview quotes I used generic titles based on occupational and 
institutional position. However, for some it was necessary to reveal the respondents 
identity. In these cases, I made sure that the information provided was not 
confidential and could be found in other public sources such as newspaper articles 
and official documents.  
 
Finally, I have received ethical training to conduct human subject research by John 
Hopkins School of Public Health, United States (computer-based module, 2002) and 
by Brazil’s National School of Public Health in 2005. By following the 
aforementioned procedures, I tried to ensure a high level of ethical caution and 
confidentiality according to the guidelines of the University of Edinburgh Graduate 
School of Social and Political Science, the British Social Science Association (SRA) 
and the Brazilian National Commission for Ethics in Research (CONEP). 
 
Institutional support & fieldwork funding 
 
During field research, between March and August 2009, I was hosted by Dr. 
Francisco Inacio Bastos at the Center for Information on Science Technology 
(ICICT), Oswaldo Cruz Foundation / Ministry of Health in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
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Institutional support from FIOCRUZ increased this project’s legitimacy and helped 
in gaining access to key-informants and exchanging information with Brazil’s health 
policy experts. The six months of field study in Brazil was partially funded by a 
small project grant by the University of Edinburgh Development Trust (£1000), by 
the Graduate School of Social and Political Science (£260) and personal funds 
(£2000). These covered travelling expenses to three states in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, 





This chapter discussed the research protocol for this thesis, taking into account the 
theoretical parameters presented in Chapter 2. Historical institutional analysis 
requires a longitudinal approach to the policy process, which in turn is better 
assessed through process tracing analysis and qualititative research methods. This 
chapter also discussed the options for the Brazilian case study and the parameters and 
dilemmas to assess policy preference. An in-depth description of the methods used 
(documentary research, elite interviews and quantitative data) illustrated how the 
empirical material was collected and its relevance to assess the policy process of 
generic drug regulation in Brazil but also how it was organized to inform the analysis 
of this thesis. This chapter ended by providing the rationale of data analysis and the 
organization of the empirical chapters. It also explored the research practicalities 
(e.g. institutional support) and the ethical considerations.  
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4. The generic drug reform in Brazil 
 
This chapter traces the deliberation process of Brazil’s generic drug regulation, that 
is, the critical period of reform and its institutional antecedents. The first part 
provides historical background information about the local production of medicines 
and is important in order to contextualise the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. The 
second part of this chapter assesses the three antecedent events to the Generic Drug 
Act that happened to come together in the 1990s: the initial attempts to introduce a 
generic drug regulation in Brazil, the enactment of intellectual property law, and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Tracing these events helps in identifying the circumstances that 
led to this regulatory reform, the participants of the pharmaceutical sector, their 
preferences and demands. The third part of this chapter deals with the critical period 
of generic drug reform between 1999 and 2002. It presents the contingent events that 
led up to the crisis in the pharmaceutical sector and thus triggering this regulatory 
transformation, and the political entrepreneurship of the Minister of Health, who 
used the opportunity to implement his ambitious regulatory agenda. This third 
section is divided into two parts for clarity purposes. First, it deals with the 
parliamentary bargain to enact the Generic Drug Act in 1999 and, second, assesses 
the Ministry of Health and the Health Surveillance Agency efforts to put this 
legislation into practice (e.g. political activity and policy instruments to induce 
supply and demand of generic drug products).  
 
Background: local production of medicines 
 
Brazil has a long tradition of local production of medicines, both private and public 
(Saraiva 1983; Bermudez 1992). Although, during the 1940s, scientific advances 
made possible the discovery of antibacterial medicines and others chemical syntheses 
(cf. Achilladelis and Antonakis 2001), local industries in Brazil lacked the 
technology to follow the pace of pharmaceutical research and development in the US 
and Europe (Saraiva 1983).  It was only after World War II that Brazil began its 
industrialisation process, based on a model of Import-Substitution Industrialisation 
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(ISI), which involves stimulating local production by increasing  barriers to import 
products (Baer 1972)32
However, the ISI was not sufficient to contain the accelerated process of 
denationalisation in the pharmaceutical sector, that is, the increasing movement of 
multinational industries into the Brazilian market. Scholars suggest that monetary 
policies adopted during this time opened sectors of the Brazilian economy to foreign 
capital, including pharmaceuticals (
. ISI would protect the pharmaceutical market from 
international competition, whilst encouraging multinational pharmaceutical firms to 
bring their research and development activities to Brazil (as imports were forbidden 
they would have to establish subsidiaries and produce drugs locally and, arguable, 
this could in the medium-long term transfer technology to Brazil) (ibid).  
 
Caputo 2007). For instance, the Instruction 
70/1953” and “Instruction 113/1955”33
Nucleos de Estudos 
Politicos e Sociais / ENSP / Fiocruz 1991
 provided favourable exchange rates for firms 
importing capital goods to establish new factories in Brazil (
; Sindusfarma 2006; Caputo 2007). On the 
other hand, other scholars suggest this has less to do with monetary policies than 
with the technological development of the sector itself and the local firms’ incapacity 
to catch up with their foreign competitors (Evans 1979). Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this study it is important to understand that, by the end of the 1960s, 
multinationals had stepped foot in Brazil and managed to capture the majority of the 
Brazilian market by acquiring local industries and installing subsidiaries. 
 
Dissatisfied with the denationalisation of the pharmaceutical sector and with the 
limited research and development capacity of local firms, the Brazilian government 
decided to abolish patent protection for pharmaceuticals (Cassier and Correa 2003: 
92-93)34
Tachinardi 1993
. Brazil is a signatory of the 1883 Paris Convention that regulates intellectual 
property rights (revised in 1963 in Stockholm). However, in 1945 President Vargas 
decided to exclude patent protection for pharmachemicals ( ) and, in 
                                                 
32 Until then,  Brazil and other Latin American countries were basically exporting food and raw 
material to Europe and United States while exporting industrialised goods (for more detailed 
information of ISI model see Baer 1972).  
33 This was an exchange rate policy that had an impact on the industrialisation process in Brazil. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of this decision see the study of Caputo (2007). 
34 However, it is arguable that lack of patent protection could foster technological development in 
Brazil as it also reduced incentives for research and development (cf. Evans 1979: 186). 
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1969, President Costa e Silva excluded patent protection of the pharmaceutical 
process. Both decisions were reassured in 1971 with the Code of Intellectual 
Property, under the Medici administration (ibid). On the other hand, public 
investments to foster the production of fine chemicals in Brazil were very 
fragmented (Leite 2008)35
Tachinardi 1993: 73
. Despite the fact that Brazil did not have a code of 
intellectual property rights, research-based firms continued expanding their business 
in Brazil ( ).  
 
A study made by Peter Evens (1979) on the industrialisation process in Brazil 
suggests that Brazilian firms survived through this adverse period of 
denationalisation by using their commercial acumen:  
 
They [local pharmaceutical firms] make no pretence of trying to develop “original” products 
and are perfectly willing to admit that their product lines consist of “similar”, that is, 
products originally developed by other companies. To say that local entrepreneurs have 
come to rely on their commercial ability rather than on technological competition is hardly to 
condemn them. They have discovered where their “comparative advantage” lies […].That 
they continue to survive in an industry where so much militates against their survival is proof 
of their skill (Evans 1979: 128-129).   
 
In other words, Brazilian firms were not competing at the technological level, but 
there was an acute competition for market share. In 1969, foreign firms represented 
82% of the market share in sales compared to 18% for Brazilian firms (Sindusfarma 
2006). In order to survive in this unfavourable scenario, local firms began aggressive 
commercial strategies. Some common terms in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil 
are the “bonus sale”, that is, price discounts for drug retailers that ‘pushed’ similar 
pharmaceutical products to consumers – particularly those seeking medicines without 
medical prescriptions36 Saraiva 1983 ( ). Brazilian pharmaceutical firms then became 
an industry of “similar pharmaceutical products”. Note that these are not generic 
drugs, as there was no discussion about bioequivalence and this term was not on the 
                                                 
35 For example, the agency Companhia de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico (CODETC), a state 
enterprise created in 1976 that intended to replicate the manufacturing process of innovator medicines, 
serve as business incubator providing technical support to firms interested in chemical synthesis of 
pharmaceuticals etc. The study of Leite (2008) suggests that this project did not last long due to 
changes in government priorities. 
36 Self-medication has been a long public health concern in Brazil and this cultural (and market) 
aspect favoured these commercial practices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these are practices 
adopted not just by local firms but also by many multinational companies. Because these are detailed 
aspects of marketing strategies, I did not focus too much on them. 
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agenda. Similar pharmaceutical products were recognised for the first time in Brazil 
in 1979, after Congress approved a legislation regulating these products 
(Sindusfarma 2003: 55). Thus, the absence of patent protection and a similar drug 
regulatory framework allowed local pharmaceutical firms to legally replicate any 
product without payment of royalties and expand their industrial production. 
Regulatory concerns of government officials at that moment were less about the 
technical requirements to register a pharmaceutical product than bidding and 
labelling requirements introduced with this legislation37 Sindusfarma 2003 ( ). 
 
In summary, this brief contextual information suggests the pharmaceutical sector in 
Brazil was highly unregulated as there was no intellectual property protection and 
very limited and insufficient health surveillance. Additionally, the pharmaceutical 
sector was highly competitive at the final stages of the production chain; in other 
words, because local firms had limited research and development capacity, 
competition centred on marketing strategies. However, Brazil’s political context 
changed substantially by the end of the 1980s with the redemocratisation process 
after 20 years of military regime and the approval of a new Constitution in 1988. It 
was during this period that the generic drug regulation and several other important 
pharmaceutical regulatory decisions were taken. These reforms are examined in the 




This section explores three events antecedent to Brazil’s generic drug policy: 1) the 
unsuccessful attempt to introduce generic drugs in 1993; 2) the approval of a patent 
act in 1996; 3) the rise of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the legislation guaranteeing 
universal treatment to AIDS patients in 1996. Although the policy process of each of 
these events occurred relatively independently, the fact that they happened to come 
together in the 1990s had a profound relevance to the decision to introduce a generic 
                                                 
37 For example, Law 6063/76 requires that all prescription drugs commercialised in Brazil must 
provide a red tape indicating that the medication should only be sold with medical prescription. This 
norm received many complaints from the pharmaceutical firms due to the cost associated with it.  
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drug regulation in 1999. I will focus in this section on how political actors interpreted 
each of these streams, which conditioned their position in the generic reform in 1998.   
 
Early attempts to introduce Generic drugs 
A new Constitution was approved in 1988 and established the legal basis for a 
universal health care system. Under this new institutional context, the government 
was to provide universal pharmaceutical assistance to all Brazilian citizens. The 
guidelines to do so were slowly developed in the 1990s (Levcovitz et al. 2001). 
However, concerned with increasing pharmaceutical expenditure and the 
population’s deficient access to medicines, the Federal Deputy Eduardo Jorge 
presented a bill to regulate the market for medicines in Brazil in 1991 (Bill 
2022/1991). Jorge was a physician and former director of the Municipal Health 
Secretariat in 1989. It was during his tenure at the Secretariat that he became aware 
of the relevance of pharmaceuticals to the government’s health budget and the 
suggestions of the World Health Organization to introduce generic drugs (Jorge 
2009). The rationality of this project was that, by excluding the brand name of 
pharmaceutical products, it would lower its cost. It argued that:  
 
Competition in pharmaceutical sector demands high efforts to promote brand names that 
differentiate products. The promotion of these brand names takes around 20 to 30% of gross 
revenue of pharmaceutical firms. This expensive promotion aims to capture credibility of 
doctors, patients and pharmacists etc” (Bill 2022/1991).  
 
Justified by the fact that 50 million people had limited access to medicines, the bill 
proposed that all pharmaceutical products in Brazil should be commercialised using 
either the Brazilian or International Non-proprietary Name (Law Project 2022/1991). 
The use of brand names would be allowed only if presented in a lower size compared 
to the generic name; all public health service prescriptions should be done by the 
generic name (ibid). However, little attention was given to this bill, perhaps because 
the weight of the pharmaceutical sector attention was focused on another highly 
controversial debate that was taking place at the same time, namely the introduction 
of a patent system (which will be presented in the following section). 
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Discussions on generic drug gained visibility in 1993. With the deregulation of price 
control of medicines in 1992, some drugs were readjusted by more than 2.600% 
while annual inflation rates were 1.608%38 Abbas and Bermudez 1993 ( ; Bermudez 
1999). It was estimated that 50% of the population had no access to medicines 
(ALANAC 2010). The higher costs of medicines were constantly criticised by the 
media, demanding a prompt governmental response, which placed access to 
medicines at the top of the agenda (Folha de Sao Paulo 1993). After President Collor 
resigned in 1992, his substitute, Itamar Franco (1992-1995), brought Jamil Haddad 
into the Ministry of Health. Haddad, a physician with long involvement with the 
sanitary movement, was also a Federal Deputy and participated in the debates of the 
Bill 2022/1991 to regulate generic medicines in the Chamber of Deputies, Social 
Security Committee (Haddad 2009). Under Haddad’s leadership, the Ministry of 
Health first endorsed the regulation of generic medicines, following the guidelines of 
the World Health Organization:  
 
I had just received a letter from the WHO and they stated the urgent necessity to implement a 
generic medicine plan, particularly because of the low income condition of the population. 
[The Federal Deputy] Eduardo Jorge, in 1992 […] had also received this document from the 
WHO and introduced a project on generic medicine. […] When I became Minister I verified 
that project was in the Congress drawers due to laboratory’s pressure. My juridical assistant 
told me it didn’t need to be implemented by law but it could also be by presidential decree 
(Haddad 2009).  
 
This information highlights how decision-makers in Brazil first became aware of the 
necessity of a generic drug policy. In April 1993, the Ministry of Health sponsored 
an International Seminar to discuss different experiences of developing a generic 
drug policy. It invited advisors from the Pan-American Health Organization, 
academics and health policy experts from Canada and other countries that 
implemented generic drug regulation (Arango 1993; Velásquez 1993). Following this 
event, President Itamar Franco issued a presidential decree (793/1993) introducing 
generic drugs in Brazil. Although proposals presented during the seminar highlighted 
the relevance of technical requirements to implement generic drugs, for example 
bioequivalence and bioavailabilty tests that are considered by the WHO guidelines, 
the Presidential Decree did not mention these specifications. It was not possible to 
                                                 
38 Note that at that time Brazil had extremely high annual inflation rates. 
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assess exactly why Itamar Franco and Jamil Haddad decided to ignore this aspect of 
the WHO prescription. The presidential decree 793/1993 would require a complex 
reorganisation of the pharmaceutical sector as it mandated that: the brand name could 
not exceed 1/3 of the generic name; drug retailers should present a list of generic 
medicine names; every institution that manipulates medicines should have a 
pharmacist; all drugs prescribed and procured by the National Health System should 
use the generic name.  
 
The pharmaceutical industries and drug retailers promptly reacted, triggering a 
political process that was beyond the WHO decision or influence and mediated by 
domestic institutions. Alteration in labels of pharmaceutical products would bring 
economic distress to both national and multinational companies. Most ‘similar drugs’ 
in Brazil had also held a brand name. It would then require costly readjustment in 
packing and marketing strategies. A debate sponsored by the newspaper Estado de 
Sao Paulo brought together representatives of the pharmaceutical sector, government 
and health professionals. The local industry expressed its concerns: “as a Brazilian 
industrialist I felt deeply harmed. I could never expect that a product I brought to the 
market, that prescribed by doctors -- with a brand/trademark -- would be annihilated 
by a Decree” said Omilton Visconde (Visconde in Estado de Sao Paulo 1993a: A24). 
Although bioequivalence criteria was little debated at that time, the President of 
Abifarma, Jose Eduardo Bandeira de Mello, explained his disagreement: 
 
Our core objection to this Decree is that it ignores the basic requirement of generic drugs that 
was adopted by other countries and by the World Health Organization, which is quality. 
Quality can only be assured under a rigid supervision and requires that generic products must 
provide bioequivalence and bioavailabity tests. The Decree ignores this aspect […] (Mello in 
Estado de Sao Paulo 1993a: A24) 
 
According to an executive of a multinational pharmaceutical firm that participated in 
this debate, a core objection of multinationals was the absence of patent protection 
rather than generic drugs themselves: “If you create the classic generic, with 
bioequivalence and bioavailability, and do not create a patent system, then what you 
are doing is a license to copy” (Sanches 2009). Clearly, the regulation of off-patent 
pharmaceutical products was not the priority of pharmaceutical firms. For 
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multinationals, the introduction of a patent system was imperative; only after 
granting intellectual property rights would it be reasonable to debate generic 
substitution. Their counter-demand did not include bioequivalence or alteration in 
labelling; rather, they proposed a basket of medicines with price discounts for 
institutional purchase (Abifarma 1997a).  
 
Furthermore, the decree also brought opposition from drug retailers’ representatives 
as it mandated the presence of pharmacists in each pharmacy around the country, 
increasing their business costs. Drug retailers joined pharmaceutical firms in being 
discontented with this political decision (Estado de Sao Paulo 1993c). There was a 
joint initiative in the pharmaceutical sector to block the decree’s implementation. 
With the Legislative and Executive being less sensitive to their demands, the 
coalition of firms and drug retailers used judicial trials to block the decree’s 
implementation. Abifarma and Sindusfarma used courts to complain against the 
decree. Additionally, 22 pharmaceutical industries and drug retailers introduced law 
suits individually (Visconde in Estado de Sao Paulo 1993: A18; Gazeta Mercantil 
1993; Jornal de Brasilia 1993; Gazeta Mercantil 1993a; Estado de Sao Paulo 1993b). 
As the judicial battle between the executive government and Abifarma slowly 
evolved in the courts, pharmaceutical firms and drug retailers could delay the 
introduction of generic drugs.  
 
On 5 October 1993, O Globo, Brazil’s largest newspaper, reported that “without the 
support of the pharmaceutical industry, pharmacies will open, ignoring the law 
requirement to provide generic names for all medicine bids and labels” (O Globo 
1993) (see also: Jornal do Brasil 1993a). To further complicate matters, the demand 
(namely by doctors, consumers, pharmacists) was unconfident of the quality of drugs 
commercialised by the generic name or even unaware of the debate (Costa and Hojaij 
1993; Estado de Sao Paulo 1993; Rabaca 1993; Estado de Sao Paulo 1993a).    
 
Together with the tense relationship with the private sector and being faced with a 
delay to bring generic drugs to the market, the new Minister of Health, Henrique 
Santillo (1993-1995), decided to reconsider the size of INN in labels. In contrast, 
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Abifarma proposed a basket of medicines with a 50% discount in price and a 150-
day grace period for the private sector in which to adjust its products (Jornal do 
Brasil 1993; Jornal de Brasilia 1994a). As no political consensus could be reached, 
courts would have to rule on this issue (Correio Braziliense 1994; Jornal de Brasilia 
1994).  
 
Why, despite the World Health Organization’s recommendation to introduce generic 
drugs, did the Brazilian Congress and the Ministry of Health fail to persuade 
pharmaceutical firms (local and multinational) and drug stores to commercialise 
products by their International Non-proprietary Name? The failure to implement the 
Decree 793/1993 is associated with different factors. First, the lack of support by the 
pharmaceutical sector suppliers, both firms and retailers, certainly matter the most as 
a result of the failure of the Decree. But also lack of support from consumers and 
health professionals harmed the introduction of the Decree as they could not fully 
understand the discussion or were unsure of the quality/safety of generic medicines. 
Some argue that generic drugs were not safe/efficient as innovator drugs, while 
physicians had little knowledge about the INN. Second, it is also argued that the 
Ministry of Health was unable to enforce the regulation; for example, the Department 
of Sanitary Surveillance was unaware of the number of pharmaceutical industries 
established in Brazil. More importantly for this study is the fact that pharmaceutical 
firms, particularly the local producers, were eager to defend their economic stakes, 
i.e. the trademarks.  
 
Third, and perhaps mostly importantly, it highlights that local pharmaceutical firms 
were starkly opposed to the attempt to exclude their trademarks and commercialise 
their products by a BNN or INN. In this period of confrontation with government, it 
is possible to visualise the preferences and demands of the firms. Looking at this 
particular point in time it could be argued that pharmaceutical firms (national and 
multinationals) behaved strategically, making rational calculations to protect their 
economic interests. In this sense, the regulatory policy proposed by the government 
had little influence in their business. A study conducted in 1998 with a non-
representative sample demonstrated that pharmaceutical manufacturers did not 
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comply with Decree 793 requirements (Pizzol et al. 1998), particularly in relation to 
the obligation to the size of brand and generic names; for example, it was found that, 
for some drugs, brand name was 16 to 20 times larger than the INN. Thus, little has 
changed in the behaviour of these firms. 
 
Patent system reform: Bill 824/1991 and Law 9279/1996  
As seen in the background information for this chapter, since 1945 Brazil did not 
recognise pharmaceutical patents. In the late 1970s, pharmaceutical industries (and 
other high-technology sectors) in the United States began voicing the fact that their 
products were facing competition in foreign markets that did not protect intellectual 
inventions (cf. Weissman 1996; Sell 2002). In 1988, the United States 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (now Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America - PhRMA) filed a complaint with the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) about Brazil’s lack of process and patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products. In response, on 30 October 1988, the United States 
government, under the Reagan administration, imposed a punitive tariff of 100% on 
US$390 million worth of Brazilian goods (penicillin and tetracycline, paper and 
cellulose, among other products) (Revista Veja 1991; Revista Veja 1993). This was 
in retaliation for Brazil’s refusal to grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals, and 
other information-intensive technologies (ibid). 
 
These sanctions were suspended in 1990 after a visit from the American President 
George Bush, when the Brazilian government announced its intention to submit a bill 
for intellectual property rights (Feghali 1991; Forum pela liberdade do uso do 
conhecimento 1994; Pharmaceutical Business 2000). Note that these events where 
happening parallel to the discussion of generic drug regulation, but are separated here 
for clarity. The recently elected President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) 
was willing to integrate Brazil with the global economy and thus sensitive to 
intellectual property issues. On 30 April 1991, he sent a bill to Congress requesting 
its urgent appreciation (Bill 824/1991) (Forum pela liberdade do uso do 
conhecimento 1994: 11). Furthermore, in 1991, Brazil hosted the 11th International 
Seminar on Industrial Property, which placed the country at the centre of its 
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discussions (Revista Veja 1991). This brought even more media coverage and 
political attention to this issue. Debate around IP is historically divided into two 
periods: firstly in 1991, when Collor first presented the legislation in Congress, but 
discussion was suspended due to the political moment (corruption scandal that led to 
the President’s impeachment); in the second period, the debate was resumed in 1996 
under the Cardoso administration and following the General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade – the GATT agreement.  
 
Scholars of international relations have analysed the American firms’ (and, later on, 
European and Japanese firms) crusade to harmonise international IP regulation (cf. 
Sell 1995; Sell 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004). Sell and Prakash (2004) provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the agenda setting and the IP coalition that drove the 
discussions from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), leading to the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. The authors 
suggest that a coalition of developed countries and research-based firms successfully 
managed to frame the debate of patent protection as an issue of technological and 
economic development. They suggest that the coalition’s key framing strategy was 
the assertion that property rights were being illegally appropriated by pirates.  
 
An alliance of foreign firms, the executive government and the American 
government representatives represented the pro-IP coalition in Brazil. The discourse 
of Brazilian federal government and multinational firms was framed in ethical values 
and economic development. The pro-IP coalition declined any allegation of foreign 
pressure, arguing that the debate was a matter of local interests (Teixeira 1991): 
 
Of course we cannot exclude the international aspects of this issue. Any person with an 
impartial vision of this issue could not decline the rights of researcher and their sponsors to 
defend themselves from predatory action of copiers or imitators; which steal from them and 
their governments the gains of their research and investment. […] It is estimated that 20 
million dollars are invested in pharmaceutical research worldwide. Nowadays Brazil 
represents 2% of pharmaceutical market, it is reasonable to assume that we will have the 
same proportion of investments – which would lead multinationals to invest around 400 
million dollars in pharmaceutical research in Brazil. Almost half of what Brazilian 
government invest in all its research areas [The executive president of the Brazilian 




The discourse of Teixeira represented the interests of Interfarma (association of 
research-based pharmaceutical firms) and balances the arguments of foreign pressure 
to introduce patent protection in Brazil with the domestic interest of the country. In 
other words, his claim is that the government could reap similar benefits in terms of 
economic development, placing Brazil at a different stage of technological 
development. Additionally, his discourse included normative values, as the ethics of 
copying a product invented by other firms without permission. In 1991, he declared: 
“Brazil is copy-paradise. It is possible to copy anything here without paying 
[royalties to] the inventor” (Teixeira in Revista Veja 1991: 95). Interfarma was 
created in 1990 to represent the interests of research-based firms, mostly foreign 
companies. There was an agreement between pharmaceutical firms that Abifarma 
and Sindusfarma, other pharmaceutical firms’ association, would not get involved in 
IP debates given that its members were both foreign and international firms (Mello 
2000; Sindusfarma 2006). While research-based firms’ preferences were represented 
by Interfarma, local firms’ interests were represented by Alanac (ibid).  
 
Unlike the international debate where the business network did not encounter 
significant NGO mobiliaation (Sell and Prakash 2004), the domestic discussion 
around intellectual property faced strong opposition. Sell and Prakash (2004) argue 
that, during the TRIPS negotiation, there was no significant challenges from a 
competing NGO-inspired normative frame, leaving an open path for businesses to 
graft their agenda onto policy debates. In Brazil, the anti-IP coalition was formed by 
local pharmaceutical industries (represented by Alanac), different sectoral interests 
(e.g. chemical engineers, syndicate of pharmacists) the Catholic Church and leftist 
politicians [Worker’s Party (PT), a segment of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party (PMDB) and the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B)]. This coalition was 
organised in the Forum for Free Use of Knowledge (Forum pela Liberdade do Uso 
do Conhecimento (FLUC)) with more than 80 institutions (Forum pela liberdade do 
uso do conhecimento 1994: 12)39
                                                 
39 Note that the HIV/AIDS NGOs were not engaged in regulatory or trade debates in the 1990s. As we 
shall see in the following section, its demands focussed on access to medicines and they were less 
aware of the implications of intellectual property or generic regulation at that time.  
. It defended “anti-denationalisation” values, access 
to essential medicines and the protection of local biodiversity. Among these, access 
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to essential medicines was a topic supported mainly by Alanac, academics and leftist 
politicians. The local pharmaceutical industry defended the status quo of the IP code, 
arguing that absence of protection would give Brazil more time to develop its local 
industry: 
 
[…] if this law is enacted foreign laboratories won’t have to face competition. A monopoly 
will be established and we need to accept the prices they determine […] Congress is placing 
health sector in the hands of multinationals. However, in Brazil and in Latin America, there 
is Chagas disease for example. These diseases won’t be researched because the market is 
small and they won’t research such restricted segment. […] How to design a health policy 
with the whole sector driven by multinationals? They say out and loud: medicines are for 
those who can afford, and we, from Alanac, do not agree that this should be the tone of 
medicine’s issue in Brazil [Dante Alario, President of Alanac] (Alario in Forum pela 
liberdade do uso do conhecimento 1994: 22).   
 
The discourse of Alanac demonstrates local pharmaceutical firms’ preference to 
remain an industry of similar products. However, the claim in Alario’s speech is not 
to maximise the profits of his members, rather it is concerned with the future of 
neglected disease research and development and the formulation of Brazil’s health 
policy in the context of price monopoly. The coalition prepared two reports, or 
“Patent Dossier”, presenting the critical points of the patent legislation and its 
demands (Forum pela liberdade do uso do conhecimento 1994). Among the 15 
critical points presented were two particularly harmful to the local pharmaceutical 
industries: first, article 18 of the IP bill listed products exempt of patent, where the 
coalition required that all drugs presented in the National List of Essential Medicines 
(around 300 medicines) should also be listed as patent exempted; secondly, they also 
demanded the exclusion of article 241 of the bill, which misleadingly linked the issue 
of industrial protection with sanitary surveillance. This article would invalidate Law 
6063/1976 that regulates similar drugs in Brazil. This reinforces, once more, the fact 
that the preferences and demands of local pharmaceutical firms were to protect their 
rights to produce similar drug products.  
 
Because of the political climate and the impeachment of President Collor, the 
discussion on patent protection was suspended and then resumed in 1995. While 
internal debates in 1993 and 1994 in the pharmaceutical sector were turned to the 
introduction of generic drugs (presidential decree previously discussed), at the 
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international level, the pharmaceutical sector was focused on the Uruguay Trade 
Round, which concluded in December 1993. The final GATT round created the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and established minimum parameters for 
intellectual property rights under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)40
Lampreia 1995c
. Although there was an intense debate around 
the inclusion of intellectual property on trade agreements, the Brazilian delegation 
headed by Chancellor Luis Felipe Lampreia agreed to sign up TRIPS if there was a 
separate discussion for tariffs ( ). Brazil quickly ratified the Uruguay 
Trade Round agreements in that same year and its negotiations were concluded 
(Legislative Decree 30/1994 and Presidential Decree 1355/1994) and, by doing so, it 
committed to revise its intellectual property code.  
 
The election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 opened a window of 
opportunity to bring intellectual property back onto the agenda. Cardoso served as a 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Itamar Franco (1992-1993) when he 
coordinated an Interministerial Group to debate intellectual property issues. He also 
served as a Minister of Finance (1993-1994) responsible for introducing the Plano 
Real (Real Plan) that controlled hyperinflation and stabilised the economy. Had FHC 
lost the presidential election to the leftist Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, the chances of 
opening Brazil’s economy to foreign investments might have been lower. Cardoso 
was interested in boosting Brazilian credibility with foreign investors; however, in 
order to do so, he would need to introduce several reforms, including modernising 
Brazil’s patent system, and he could not ignore international trade obligations 
(Lampreia 1996a; Lampreia 1999: 286). There was a strong effort from the executive 
government to push the patent legislation in Congress: 
 
“We need to fight plagiarism. Refusing to recognize patents is consolidating the pirates” said 
the minister Jose Israel Vargas (Science and Technology). According to the ministry, in 1970 
Brazil participated with 2% in pharmaceutical sector worldwide. In the beginning of the 80s, 
it fell to 1.8% and reached 0.2% in the early 90s. “The lack of intellectual property did not 
contribute in anything to increase industry’s potential. We hope to reverse this with law’s 
enactment” said Vargas (Folha de Sao Paulo 1997).  
 
                                                 
40 All middle income country members of the WTO would have to implement TRIPS by 2005, while 
least-developed countries by 2016. 
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Together, the Minister of Science and Technology (Israel Vargas), Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (Luis Felipe Lampreia) and the Vice-President (Marco Maciel) 
lobbied Brazilian Congressmen between 1995 and 1996 to approve the legislation 
(Folha de Sao Paulo 1995; 1996; 1996b; 1997). They tried to discredit arguments of 
denationalisation by counter-arguing that, although Brazil did not have patent 
protection for so long, it was not enough to encourage local technical development. 
With the approval of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS agreement), the American government intensified its support for patent 
reform in Brazil. In March 1996, the Counsellor to the US President, Thomas 
McLarty, declared:  
 
We did discuss that with President Cardoso, who is quite optimistic and hopeful that it will 
be passed in the House [referring to the final round of debates in Congress]. It is important 
not only for the United States and interests there, but it is important from Brazil's standpoint 
in terms of attracting investment to this country. And foreign investment have been on a very 
strong pace here in recent months (McLarty in McLarty and Watson 1996). 
 
The debates in Congress were polarised between Senator Ney Lopes supporting the 
pro-IP coalition versus Senator Ney Suassuna and Senator Jose Sarney (former 
President from 1985-1990) supporting the anti-IP coalition. Essentially, there were 
four points of disagreements between them (Folha de Sao Paulo 1996c): (1) pipeline 
patents, whether or not to allow retroactive patent protection of products not 
commercialised in Brazil; (2) biotechnology, which would allow the patent of micro-
organisms used in biotechnological products or restrict those genetically modified; 
(3) production, whether or not to allow multinationals to import patent products or 
require these firms to produce patent products in Brazil; (4) grace period, whether or 
not to use the 5-year grace period allowed in TRIPS. One of the most polemic issues 
was the pipeline mechanism, which allows retroactively patent products that have 
been previously patented in other countries. This would limit the number of products 
national firms were allowed to copy and would require royalty payments if they 
decided to do so.  
 
The pipeline mechanism was an amendment proposed by Senator Fernando Bezerra 
to the intellectual property bill in 1991 (Folha de Sao Paulo 1996c). Surprisingly, 
Senator Bezerra was also president of the National Confederation of Industries 
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(CNI), which raised deep criticism from local pharmaceutical industries and other 
nationalist groups: “It is shameful that the president of CNI says he represents the 
national industry. What he defends is the sector of international firms’ members of 
CNI. We do not consider ourselves represented by him” said Dante Alario, president 
of Alanac (Alario in Folha de Sao Paulo 1996a). The anti-IP coalition argued that 
patent protection would create a “monopoly of cure”, claiming that many Brazilians 
would not be able to afford expensive patent medicines. Moreover, they supported 
that “having its own developed industry is a question of national sovereignty for any 
nation” (Alario 1995). Responsible for preparing the patent legislation in Senate, 
Senator Ney Suassuna commented on the different lobbying pressures:  
 
I was pressured by all sides. First, the left represented by nationalist syndicates, demanding 
that no patent should be recognized. And there was the Church, representatives of 
agriculture, government, embassies, foreign laboratories, anyway, around 150 institutions. 
Alanac (Brazilian Association of National Pharmaceutical Laboratories), for example, was 
one of the most active nationalist entities. (…) International laboratories wanted, for 
example, that the law, in Brazil, recognize patent of other countries but not yet 
commercialized here (called pipeline patent) (Suassuna's interview in Folha de Sao Paulo 
1995a).  
 
After the strong influence and pressure of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
Vice-President Marco Maciel, the Brazilian Congress approved the patent law in 
April 1996 (cf. Folha de Sao Paulo 1996d). Brazil's new patent law took full effect in 
May of 1997. It not only just complied with the WTO international regulation but 
also included protections beyond TRIPS requirements: the pipeline mechanism, 
which granted retroactive patent protection for medicines registered outside Brazil 
and not yet commercialised in the country, and declined the nine years grace period 
allowed under the international agreement (Law 92879/1996) (these extra provisions 
beyond the WTO requirements are known as TRIPS-Plus).  
 
The debate around IP protection is important for this study for several reasons. First, 
it is possible to observe the preferences and demands of local pharmaceutical 
companies in trying to defend their stakes on the rights to replicate innovative 
medicines. Their arguments of local production of medicines were grounded on 
nationalist sentiment and counter-reacted to the government agenda by saying 
patents would represent a “monopoly of cure”. In this sense, they argued that actors 
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behaved entirely strategically as to maximise their economic stances would rule out 
this important aspect of their preferences. The inner motivation of each of these sides 
is not accessible for empirical observation and that they were trying to maximise 
their economic interest would be inaccurate. The Brazilian government was sensitive 
to the idea that a protection of intellectual property was necessary and the arguments 
of innovator pharmaceutical firms were welcomed, as opposed to the local firms that 
were framed as “pirates”. Thus, it left less room for persuasive counter-arguments. 
Second, with the introduction of an intellectual property legislation, it was expected 
to marginalise even more the performance of local pharmaceutical firms as it banned 
them from replicating medicines developed by innovator pharmaceutical companies. 
While multinational firms would have their recent products protected by patent, local 
firms would have their production restricted to medicines produced prior to 1997. 
Immediate market competition would be restricted to relatively unfashionable 
medicines. With the introduction of the patent system for pharmaceuticals, the 
presence of foreign capital in this sector would expand significantly. For instance, 
according to Abifarma (1997), the pharmaceutical sector invested, between 1992 and 
1997, around $1.3 billion dollars in Brazil, representing one of the tenth largest 
pharma-markets worldwide. Foreign firms decided to place Brazil as an exporting 
platform to Latin America, Europe and North American. While the Europeans 
decided to establish manufacturing plants in Brazil, aiming at the Latin American 
market, the Americans believed that manufacturing products in Brazil would open 
the European market through the Mercosur and EU trade agreements (Mello 2000).  
 
The HIV/AIDS activism 
 
Finally, the third event that might have channelled the generic drug regulation is the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. The relevance of investigating this event is two-fold. The first 
is because Brazil is well-known for its remarkable AIDS advocacy, and this has been 
the object of many studies (cf. Galvao 2000; Galvão 2002b; Galvao 2005; Biehl 
2007). As the literature review for this thesis suggested, patient advocacy activity can 
provide important input to pharmaceutical regulatory policies and had been said that 
AIDS activists championed important regulatory reforms in the American FDA at 
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this period (cf. Carpenter 2004). Thus, I decided to investigate in which ways the 
AIDS activism might have contributed to the generic drug reform. Second, Brazil is 
also well-known for being the first developing country to provide free and universal 
access to antiretroviral drugs and its intense price negotiation with multinational 
pharmaceutical firms to lower the costs of medicines (cf. Cohen and Dan 2003; 
Cohen and Lybecker 2005; Nunn et al. 2007). It is also relevant to understand in 
which ways this contributed or not to the generic drug regulation. There are a number 
of in-depth studies on HIV/AIDS policy in Brazil, consequently this section relied 
mostly on literature review, cross-checking this information with original interviews 
with AIDS activists when necessary. 
 
Parallel to the debate on generic drugs and intellectual property, the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic raised much media attention in the early 1980s. The fact that the epidemic 
was initially concentrated in urban areas, upper middle class and cases among artists 
and celebrities, contributed to give visibility to the disease (cf. Parker 1987). The 
cost of the first drug to treat AIDS patients (zidovudine) was prohibitive for many 
Brazilians (around $8.000/year) and the recent established Unified Health System 
was unprepared to deal with this sudden demand (cf. Nunn 2008: 49). People living 
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) began to organise themselves into local and regional 
associations, demanding a prompt response from the government. Several studies 
reported that these AIDS activists voiced their dissatisfaction in the judiciary (Galvao 
2005; Scheffer et al. 2005; Nunn 2008)41
Galvao 2005: 1112
: “The judges often ruled favourably, citing 
Brazil's constitution, which guaranteed that every citizen had a right to health and the 
state had a duty to ensure every citizen's health” ( ). The demands 
of activists, which focused on anti-discrimination initiatives and gaining access to 
medical treatment, was framed in a discourse of human rights and to democratic 
access to health treatment (Galvão 2002b; Galvao 2005; Nunn 2008: 50-51). 
According to Nunn (2008: 50-51), human rights were an overarching frame for this 
activism, political actions and slogans. The “rights” language would not just shift the 
                                                 
41 Scheffer, Salazar et al. (2005) provides an extensive review of the story of the HIV/AIDS judicial 
cases, and analysis of the jurisprudence and its outcomes, while Nunn (2008) analyses the strategy of 
NGOs to forum shop and pressure for a governmental response.  
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stigma of “victim” away from these patients but would also legally justify their 
demands within the Constitutional right to health care to all citizens.  
 
The literature on AIDS policy in Brazil suggests that, in the early 1990s, the relation 
between activists and government was conflicted, particularly during the short 
administration of President Fernando Collor de Mello (1991-1993) (Parker 1994; 
Galvao 2000; Nunn 2008). The study of Nunn (2008) on the history and politics of 
AIDS treatment in Brazil demonstrated that it was in this period that the federal 
government formally committed to provide zidovudine to AIDS patients. However, 
there was an irregular supply of these medicines because of the fragmented health 
infrastructure and limited health sector budget. Nunn points out that the conflicting 
relation between activists and the government resulted from the fact that the 
Department of AIDS was less sensitive to the human rights discourse and had limited 
dialogue with the NGOs. During this period, its director was the physician and 
professor, Eduardo Cortes. He adopted a pragmatic approach to the epidemic and 
human rights were not the tone of his decision making. It was during Cortes’ tenure 
that Brazil initiated conversations to contract a World Bank loan to develop a 
national strategy in order to control the HIV epidemic (Nunn 2008: 54-55).  
 
Nunn suggests that confrontation between government and activists lasted for a short 
while and the dialogue was re-established in 1993, after Cortes left the government. 
The former director of the Department of HIV/AIDS, Lair Guerra, reassumed the 
post and continued the discussions with the World Bank. Besides helping to build up 
an impressive response to the epidemic, this foreign aid had sweeping effects on the 
HIV/AIDS activism by financially supporting and empowering these groups. 
Representatives of civil society and health professionals helped in the design of the 
World Bank loan agreement and later on many of these were invited to join the 
National Coordination of HIV/AIDS as staff members (Nunn 2008: 61). This gave 
them an advantageous position to participate in the development of Brazil’s 
response. The loan agreement included funding for NGO projects ranging from 
capacity building, advocacy events (e.g. the annual gay parade in Sao Paulo), to 
preventive interventions with vulnerable population (cf. Fonseca et al. 2007).  
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Although this resource might have fostered the vibrant AIDS advocacy in Brazil, it 
also received much criticism from NGOs insiders for silencing their militancy. The 
dissatisfaction of some activists with this new role of HIV/AIDS NGOs was reported 
by Joao Biehl (Biehl 2004) in his book Will to live: AIDS therapies and the politics 
of survival. In chapter two of this ethnographic analysis of the Brazilian response to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the author provides rich evidence of several activists being 
frustrated – not with the government response – but with the “industrialization of 
nongovernmental work” and “depoliticized mission of NGOs” (pages 106 and 112, 
respectively). These activists’ concerns were that the close collaboration with 
government reduced their street and juridical advocacy. They suggest, for instance, 
that there should be higher demands for more beds in university hospitals and better 
medications such as combined therapies that facilitate adherence to such complex 
treatment schemes. Paulo Teixeira, former director of the National AIDS Program, 
responded to the critique that NGOs’ dependence of public money might have 
captured the AIDS movement by arguing that they also have the right to use a 
fraction of public funds (Biehl 2007: 106). Nevertheless, collaboration between the 
NGOs and the Ministry of Health has provided fruitful results and is usually 
acknowledged as an important element of the successful Brazilian response to the 
AIDS epidemic (cf. Teixeira et al. 2004; Bastos et al. 2008; Nunn et al. 2009).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, this narrative evidences two important aspects. First, 
during this period the concern of AIDS advocacy was mainly with access to 
antiretroviral drugs, medical treatment of AIDS patients and a close collaboration 
with the National AIDS Program to design and implement the Brazilian response to 
the epidemic. There was no evidence that they were participating in the intellectual 
property debate and even less in the regulatory process of medicines, which was 
happening parallel to the AIDS campaign. When studying the AIDS treatment policy 
in Brazil, Nunn (2008: 85) found similar findings. Second, the relevance of the AIDS 
epidemic to the generic drug regulation was more nuanced. The costs of treating 
HIV/AIDS patients helped in placing access to medicines on the agenda of the 
Ministry of Health.  
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Until 1996, Brazil did not have patent protection, thus it was possible for local 
companies to produce one of the few drugs to treat AIDS patients at time, zidovudine 
(AZT). The production of antiretroviral drugs was the responsibility of private and 
public local pharmaceutical firms. For example, the local private pharmaceutical 
firm, Microbiologica, vertically produced the first batch of AZT in 1992, subsidised 
by the federal government. Microbiologica also produced two additional 
antiretroviral drugs, one of these nearly at the same time as the research-based firm 
launched its original version onto the market (Rabi 2007: 1422)42
Ho 1995
. This capacity to 
replicate medicines greatly reduced the costs of provision of AIDS treatment. 
However, the discovery of the triple therapy (or Highly Active Antiretroviral 
Therapy (HAART)) to treat AIDS patients in the mid-1990s ( ; Los Angeles 
Times 1996); the approval of the Intellectual Property Act in 1996 (Brasil 1996a); 
and a law mandating that the federal government should provide free and universal 
access to AIDS medicines in 1996 (Brasil 1996), represented additional challenges to 
the provision of antiretroviral drugs. This latter event refers to the bill sponsored by 
the former President and the President of the Senate, Jose Sarney. It received large 
support from Congressmen and did not place any restrictions on the amount of 
governmental spending (Nunn 2008: 87-91)43
In short, by analysing these three streams with reference to the theoretical parameters 
presented in the second chapter of this thesis, it is possible to draw some conclusions. 
First, the diffusion of the WHO guidelines to implement generic drugs was important 
to inform and encourage decision makers in Brazil to regulate the off-patent 
medicines sector and introduce generic medicines. However, diffusion of generic 
drug regulation was not sufficient to initiate a reform in Brazil. The reasons for this, 
. The implications of these three events 




                                                 
42 Evidently, this governmental support and entrepreneurship to replicate innovative medicines 
increased the concern of multinational pharmaceutical firms with Brazil’s absence of patent 
protection.  
43 Nunn (2008: 87-91) investigated the origins of Sarney’s law and found little connection with AIDS 
activists. Anecdotal information suggests that Sarney had personal motivations for sponsoring this 
legislation (a family member living with HIV/AIDS) or even as a personal favour to the former 
director of the National AIDS Program, Lair Guerra (1985-1990 and 1992-1996). 
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as seen, relate to the domestic political institutions mediation, ranging from the 
content of the proposal to the local interests that successfully obstructed the bill in 
Congress and the Decree in the Judiciary. Second, patient advocacy groups were not 
proficient in regulatory policy language. They were unaware of the important 
reforms that were taking place in Brazil and that would have significant impact on 
their stances latter on.  
  
A third conclusion from the antecedents of the generic drug reform refers to the 
lessons about the behaviour of participants of the policy process in Brazil. We cannot 
empirically observe that pharmaceutical firms’ inner motivation in supporting or 
opposing the intellectual property legislation or generic drug regulation aimed at 
achieving an economic interest. This is particularly evident in the discussions of the 
intellectual property where it is possible to observe normative values in their 
discourse (e.g. the ethics of replicating medicines without permission of the inventor 
versus the effects of price monopoly on pharmaceutical assistance). Additionally, by 
observing the preference of AIDS activists, it is possible to evidence that they had 
framed their claims in human rights and were engaged in advancing one of the core 
values of the Unified Health System in Brazil, which is universal access to medical 
care. However, despite this apparently normative element of their preference 
function, it is also possible to observe, to some extent, economic stimulus in their 
actions. This is mostly evident as their collaboration with government evolved and 
most NGOs became financially dependent on the Ministry of Health and the World 
Bank loans. My intention here is not to deny the distinction between them. While 
firms are a group that indeed seek to produce and exploit profit, virtually all the 
NGOs working with AIDS patients are not-for-profit institutions. However, as 
demonstrated in this section, these are not their only goal and observing the content 
of their discourse offers a more diverse preference structure. 
 
Reform period: political activism and uncertainty 
 
According to the critical juncture literature, major policy changes occur in a period 
of crisis (cf. Pierson 2004). There were three simultaneous contingent events in 1998 
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that disturbed the regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil, 
creating a moment of uncertainty. Firstly, in March 1998 the price of some medicines 
increased by more than 200% (Folha de Sao Paulo 1998). Newspaper headlines 
expressed and reinforced the dissatisfaction of public opinion against the price of 
medicines: “Price of medicine increases above inflation rate”, “Brazil has the most 
expensive medicines in the world” and “The increasing price of medicines is 
offensive” (Folha de Sao Paulo 1998).  
 
Secondly, an unexpected event turned particular attention to the pharmaceutical 
sector. On 19 June 1998, one of the most popular newspapers in Brazil reported that 
at least 14 women had become pregnant after using inactive birth control pills 
(Revista Veja 1998; Revista Veja 1998a). Microvlar, manufactured by the German 
pharmaceutical firm Schering-Plough, was at that time the third best-selling drug in 
Brazil (14 million units) and the top seller anti-contraception pill. While Schering 
argued that the inactive pills were a stolen trial batch, the media blamed the firm for 
its delay in reporting the case (Gaspari 1998). Additionally, two patients died after 
using fake cancer medicines. The outbreak of fake pills raised severe criticisms of 
the Ministry of Health and emotional negative publicity for pharmaceutical firms (O 
Globo 1998; Jornal do Brasil 1998a). Rough data estimates that, for each batch of 
100 medicines, 20 were fake (Revista Veja 1998a).  
 
The third event refers to the costs of AIDS medicine. With the introduction of 
universal access to AIDS medicines, the expenditure with antiretroviral drugs 
increased from US$ 34 million to US$ 336 million dollars from 1996 to 1999 (Nunn 
et al. 2007 - with the Ministry of Health data). This reflects both the increased 
number of patients receiving treatment (from 35.900 to 73.000) and the necessity of 
newer and patent-protected drugs to treat them (ibid). Implementation of universal 
access to AIDS treatment would require not just an effective logistic distribution and 
laboratory infrastructure, but also financial resources (Nunn 2008). While the former 
would be covered by the World Bank loan, the latter would be the sole responsibility 
of the Brazilian government. To graft the attention of the public opinion to relevance 
of this issue, and to hold the Minister of Health accountable to the legislation 
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mandating universal access to AIDS medicines, the director of National AIDS 
Program (at that time National Coordination of HIV/AIDS), Pedro Chequer (1996-
2000 and 2004-2006), began using the media to pressure: 
 
Like AIDS activists in the early 1990s, one of Chequer’s political tactics was to use the 
media to hold Congress and the Health Ministry accountable for its new legal commitments 
to financing drugs for all PLWHA under Sarney’s Law. He used media to publicly lobby the 
health minister and Congress for increased funds for public treatment and care, requesting 
increased spending for AIDS care. […] One strategy […] was to publicity announce low 
ARV drug stock before it depleted, which was most common for expensive protease 
inhibitors. Chequer immediately engaged the media and NGOs, announcing that he was 
waiting on an official government response (Nunn 2008: 98).  
 
 
This triple distress occurred in the pharmaceutical sector when President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (FHC) decided to bring the Economist Jose Serra, former Senator 
and Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (1995-1996), to the Ministry of 
Health. An experienced politician and presidential hopeful, Serra’s approach to the 
problem was aggressive. First, he determined intervention for five days of Schering’s 
manufacture unit; second, he personally visited many of the affected women, 
committing to provide them with health assistance (see figure 3); third, he 
determined the creation of regional prosecutors to investigate crimes in the 
pharmaceutical sector and drafted a proposal to create a Health Surveillance Agency; 
and fourth, he edited a Ministerial Directive (Portaria 802/1998) to regulate the 
distribution of medicines and established quality control mechanisms (O Globo 
1998; Gazeta Mercantil 1998a; Jornal do Brasil 1998b). Media attention to the price 
of medicines, the costs of AIDS treatment, and fake pill outbreaks contributed to the 
agenda setting. Jose Serra positioned the pharmaceutical sector as a flagship, 
championing many important regulatory reforms. For clarity, I have divided the 
Generic Drug reform into two periods: first, the legislative discussions and, second, 









Figure 3. Newspaper images of Microvlar incident 
 
 
Source: Jornal do Brasil (1998b). Note: “Drugs: Minister visits woman that a  took inactive pill” 
 
 




Reform phase 1: Parliamentary negotiations and the Generic Drug Act 
Although Serra had a lot of experience in politics and public management, he knew 
less about the health sector. Facing the crisis in pharmaceuticals, he focused on 
interventions to lower the price of medicines and enhance quality control, by 
suggestions of the Federal Deputy Ronaldo Cesar Coelho: 
 
There is no reference to generic medicines in my inauguration speech. To be honest, I did 
not know very well about this. Who brought me this issue for the first time was Ronaldo 
Cesar Coelho. […] He was PSDB’s federal deputy and brought me the idea [the bill of 
Eduardo Jorge on Generic Medicines]. So, Ronaldo […] linked me to the issue […] and I 
then became interested in this matter (Serra 2009).  
 
The first step to implementing a generic drug policy was taken through a ministerial 
directive that established Brazil’s first National Drug Policy in October 1998 
(Ministerio da Saude 1998). Although pharmaceutical assistance is cited in the 
complementary law that regulates the health care system in Brazil (Law 8080/1990), 
until that moment there was no formal resolution within the Ministry of Health to 
organise a medicines policy. Among others, the National Drug Policy introduced the 
guidelines for rational use of medicines and a generic medicine programme. As 
mentioned by Serra, he was advised by the Federal Deputy, Ronaldo Cesar Coelho, 
to advocate for a law to regulate the generic drug market in Brazil. He requested a 
governmental official, Gonzalo Vecina Neto, to revise all the bills that dealt with 
generic medicine regulation (in addition to the Bill 2022/91, there were two other 
proposals enclosed to it)44 Vecina-
Neto 2009
 and other international guidelines on this issue (
). Additionally, Serra travelled to Europe, the United States, India and 
Israel to better understand the context of pharmaceutical regulation (Serra 2002; 
Serra 2009). Despite the extensive field research for this project, there was hardly 
any evidence of pharmaceutical firms or any interest group pressured to implement 
                                                 
44 During field research for this project, I contacted the two former deputies that presented these bills. 
Victor Faccione informed me that he was no longer involved in politics and could not remember his 
intention in supporting this project or the debates around this topic. Alberto Goldman, who is 
currently heading the government of Sao Paulo state with Jose Serra, informed that this project 
unfolded from discussions in the Congress Commission of Intellectual Property. However, it was also 
argued that introduction of several similar bills or amendments to a bill are strategic use of the 
Congress norms to block or delay its approval.   
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the Generic Drug Act; the deliberations on Parliament to approve this bill and the 
discussions in the National Health Surveillance Agency further exemplify this. 
 
As opposed to the negotiation to vote for the patent system, when there was a clear 
division in Congress lobbying between local and foreign interests, during the Generic 
Drug legislation debate this polarisation was less evident (cf. Jornal do Brasil 1998). 
Pharmaceutical firms’ demands were Abifarma’s responsibility, which had both 
national and multinational members. It was not possible to assess precisely why 
Abifarma became responsible for representing the pharmaceutical sector and 
advocating in this matter. Although national and multinational firms opposed to the 
use of INN, there was no consensus among them on the bioequivalence affair. 
During data collection for this project, no official statement of Alanac or Interfarma 
regarding the generic drug reform was found. However, interviews with government 
officials and local entrepreneurs suggest that local firms were radically opposed to 
the introduction of bioequivalence requirements. An influent founder of a Brazilian 
pharmaceutical firm, when questioned about the position of local firms, commented:  
 
We thought this would be insane [bioequivalence tests]. Brazil did not have the structure to 
do something like this. This is so true, that the first generic drugs were developed outside the 
country or as part of doctoral thesis in USP [a prominent university in Sao Paulo] because no 
one here knew how to do this. Nobody knew how to do it! (Interview with local 
pharmaceutical businessman A 2009) 
 
By contrast, multinational firms and Abifarma were openly supporting 
bioequivalence requirements right after the enactment of the patent legislation in 
1997 (Abifarma 1997b). However, it is vital to reinstate here that I could not find any 
evidence that Jose Serra included bioequivalence into his proposal because of 
Abifarma’s pressure. In fact, as we shall see later on in this chapter, the relation 
between these two was highly conflictive during this period. Abifarma sponsored a 
Seminar on 22 October 1997, a year before Serra became Minister of Health, to 
discuss the challenges and opportunities of the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. It 
brought together ministries, pharmaceutical sector representatives, politicians and 
government officials. Among the different topics related to economic and industrial 
incentives, it also discussed the introduction of generic drugs (Abifarma 1997b):  
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The pharmaceutical industry is open to discuss, with the parliament or executive 
government, a generic drug policy to Brazil. […] It would be sad if we introduce a generic 
drug policy to the poorest and ended up creating more problems to their health; because it is 
not income class A and B that will use it. […] Build an excellent generic drug policy in 
Brazil as long as respects health surveillance parameters adopted in the United States and 
Europe, which is bioequivalence and bioavailability. There, if generic drugs do not provide 
these requirements simple it will not launch the market (Jose Eduardo Bandeira de Mello 
was executive president of Abifarma - Mello 1997).   
 
Note that the argument of the bioequivalence requirement was linked to a discourse 
of quality control. Generic products would be legitimate because they equalled 
medicines produced by Merck Sharp Dohme, Glaxo, Pfizer and other well-known 
firms. In other words, medicines that are an equal copy of their patent version would 
be more credible/safe than those that are not. Note how the content of multinational 
pharmaceutical firms’ demands differs from the period of 1993, when Brazil first 
attempted to regulate these products. After the introduction of the Patent Act, 
innovator companies knew that at some point they would face a generic drug 
competition. Whether they wanted to or not, they would have to live with this 
unpleasant substitution of their products. They could pay some lip service to it or 
resist by boycotting any attempt to encourage generic drug substitution (with a high 
probability of bringing negative media coverage to their business). Thus, an 
adjustment in their preference with respect to generic drug regulation was necessary, 
as opposing to generic drug competition and regulation was less possible. 
Consequently, they proposed a regulation that, at least, could reduce (to some extent) 
the competition in this sector. My intention is not to dismiss the relevance of the 
bioequivalence test as an important step in the pharmaceutical manufacturing 
process, but it is to call attention to the political element of this regulatory concept 
(cf. Carpenter and Tobbell 2011). This certainly reduces the number of firms 
qualified to produce generic medicines, but also has a clever frame of legitimising 
the quality of the product which, once diffused, could be difficult to reverse. On the 
other hand, local pharmaceutical manufacturers were less supportive of the off-patent 
market regulation. 
 
A former governmental official, who participated in the negotiation process of the 
Generic Drug Bill, commented that both national and multinational firms were 
opposed to the generic drug regulation to some extent. The multinational 
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pharmaceutical firms were concerned with the trademark and prescription rules. The 
government’s proposal required that all similar and innovator drugs should display 
the INN in labels, while the trademark would present a size no more than 20% of the 
generic name (Interview with government official A 2009). Note that, although this 
is an apparently meaningless aspect of regulatory policy, it matters a great deal to 
this sector as marketing strategies represent an important element of the product 
cycle (cf. Comanor 1986). Pharmaceutical firms promote their trademarks heavily 
among doctors and pharmacists and reducing or excluding their brand names would 
require a paramount effort from their business. After negotiations, it was agreed that, 
in the label of innovator products, the trademark would be displayed in a higher font 
size and the BNN or INN would come right below, with a reduction of 50% 
compared to the brand name. On the other hand, all products registered as generic 
drug could only be commercialised by its BNN or INN.  
 
Furthermore, multinationals also demanded that generic drug substitution should 
only be allowed under a doctor’s written request. However, the government did not 
agree to negotiate this aspect of the bill; thus, if doctors did not agree with generic 
substitution, they should write on the prescription “substitution not-allowed” 
(Interview with government official A 2009). This information is confirmed by a 
letter from Abifarma to the Ministry of Health in 1998, requesting that the new 
legislation: a) should not allow generic substitution in drug retail stores given that the 
retailer is not technically prepared to replace medical prescriptions; b) called 
attention to the fact that the bill did not request the presence of pharmacists in drug 
retail stores; and c) did not agree with the mandatory prescription by the generic drug 
name in contracted institutions of the Unified Health System. It suggested that this 
would harm brand-name manufacturers and, in particularly, local firms, given that 
their products were not protected by patent, were also brand named and would be 
substituted by a generic drug (Felippe and Mello 1998).  
 
By contrast to the negotiation with multinational pharmaceutical firms, the 
governmental official described the debate with national industries even harder: “The 
discussion with national industry regarding registration was more complex. The local 
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pharmaceutical industry was afraid of disappearing if they had to face a legislation 
mandating bioequivalence. They knew bioequivalence would be expensive” 
(Interview with government official A 2009; Vecina-Neto 2009). In 1998, the cost of 
producing a bioequivalence test was around U$100.000 per product (Interview with 
local pharmaceutical industry informant A 2009). Assuming that a local firm had 20 
products in its portfolio that must comply with this rule, the total cost to adjust the 
whole portfolio would be two million dollars. If the product failed in the first test, a 
new test would be required, increasing the costs even further. Although Brazil has a 
long tradition of local (private and public) production of medicines, these firms were 
medium-sized, family-owned and with limited latitude for risky adjustments. 
Consequently, the fear for local entrepreneurs was that the remarkably high costs 
involved in complying with this new regulatory regime would force them to exit the 
market (Interview with government official A 2009; Interview with local 
pharmaceutical businessman B 2009; Interview with local pharmaceutical industry 
informant A 2009). The founder of a local private pharmaceutical company 
commented on this period of uncertainty:  
 
[…] You introduce new elements to the regulatory regime in operation in Brazil until then. 
What happened was that Brazilian firms, facing a new situation and very diverse compared 
to the one in operation before… got scared because the issues involved […] It is natural that 
there was some frightening given the volume of changes that happened at the same time. 
Evidently, this produced a discomfort (Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman B 
2009).  
 
Interviews and documents consulted suggested that the Minister of Health put 
enormous effort into convincing Congressmen to introduce the generic drug 
legislation (Coelho in Camara dos Deputados 1998: 26010; Interview with 
government official A 2009). One of the governmental officials interviewed 
commented that Serra went personally to the Congress several times to pressure 
Congressmen to approve the Generic Drug Bill (Interview with government official 
A 2009). The sponsor of the generic drug bill, Federal Deputy Eduardo Jorge (left-
wing PT), was in political opposition to the Executive Government (centre-right 
PSDB), which could have been problematic given that Serra and Ronaldo Cesar 
Coelho’s proposal were significantly stricter than the ones proposed in the original 
bill of 1991. Eduardo Jorge commented on this during the Chamber of Deputies floor 
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discussion: “What we are voting on here is an agreement. I am dropping my original 
proposition […] that is, generic medicines commercialized only by its generic name 
[…]”. He then justifies his decision: “If I keep my initial proposition, somehow I 
would play the game of those who do not want a generic drug policy; I would forever 
delay its introduction” (Jorge in Camara dos Deputados 1998: 26000). The bill was 
approved unanimously by all party leaders in the Chamber of Deputies on 19 
November 1998.  
 
Records of the floor discussions highlight the relevance of Deputy Ronaldo Cesar 
Coelho and the Minister Jose Serra in championing the agreement (Camara dos 
Deputados 1998). A push for counterfactual analysis shows that, had the original 
project been accepted, regulation of off-patent medicines would have little 
adjustment in terms of technical requirements. Simply using the generic name (INN) 
in labelling would transfer the marketing strategies to the industry name, i.e. 
publicity strategies would focus on the firm’s name and in the credibility of the 
producer. Competition would remain at the final stage of product development but 
with little adjustment in terms of industrial plants or manufacturing practices, placing 
the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil on a different path than the one that has been 
chosen. Thus, the Generic Drug Act introduced a new product into the market, 
forcing a rearrangement of the pharmaceutical sector. Previously, competition was 
among two pharmaceutical products: an innovator (or reference) product versus a 
similar drug. After the 1999 Generic Drug Act, competition turned to three 
pharmaceutical products: an innovator (or reference) product, a generic drug 
(interchangeable with its reference product) and a similar drug (not-interchangeable 
with a reference product). Note that this disturbance in the pharmaceutical sector is 
not just because of the content of the reform but is also due to the Ministry of Health 
signalling a strong credible commitment to implement all the aspects of this 
regulation. To do so, the Minister of Health expanded the crisis in a different way, as 
we shall see later on in this chapter. 
 
Similarly to other studies of pharmaceutical sector reform in Brazil, this thesis also 
acknowledges the leadership of the Minister of Health in championing the 
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introduction of generic drugs in Brazil (Franca 2004; Dias and Romano-Lieber 
2006). However, this thesis suggests a more nuanced analysis by demonstrating that 
his entrepreneurship was only possible given the crisis that preconditioned the 
Generic Drug Act. Had Serra been a Health Minister in early 1990s it is very 
unlikely that this reform would have been possible. As the previous section has 
demonstrated, the sequence of three events (Congressional effort to pass bill on 
generic drugs, the enactment of the IP law and AIDS epidemic) paved the way for 
the generic drug reform in 1999. Limiting the analysis of Generic Drug reform to 
vote-seeking or political leadership misses these important aspects of the regulatory 
process. As suggested in chapter 2, by narrowing the analysis to periods of 
institutional reform it is likely that the role of particular actors will be emphasised 
(cf. Pierson 2004: 141). However, these studies ignore the conditions that facilitated, 
limited or channelled entrepreneurship activity. 
 
It is important to recall here the absence of HIV/AIDS activists in contributing to the 
discussions of the regulatory process, as their agenda focused on access to 
HIV/AIDS treatment (Galvao et al. 2011). However, the relevance of the AIDS 
epidemic was to the agenda-setting stage rather than in collaborating in the debates 
about the content of the reform. If Brazil had not enacted a Federal legislation 
mandating universal access to antiretroviral drugs, and the National AIDS Program 
had not voiced the rising costs of these medicines, there is a chance that the crisis in 
the pharmaceutical sector would be less visible. Furthermore, while the AIDS 
epidemic was crucial to the agenda-setting process, interest group activity was less. 
There is hardly any evidence to show that pharmaceutical firms’ activity influenced 
the agenda of reform. Despite the previous movement of Abifarma to debate generic 
medicines and the bioequivalence concept in 1997 (Abifarma 1997b), it is not 
possible to credit them for the outcome of the Generic Drug Act. When balancing the 
forces pro-reform, the World Health Organization and interests groups seem to have 
less influence on the policy outcome than the Executive government activism. 
Finally, had Brazil not implemented an intellectual property law in 1996 it would be 
less likely that the government would include the bioequivalence concept into the 
regulatory rules. To be considered a bioequivalent product, the generic drug 
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necessarily needs to be compared with an innovator/patented medicine. Thus, this 
exercise of counterfactual analysis highlights the relevance of these events to the 
decision taken in 1999.  
 
Reform phase 2: Governmental activism to implement generic drugs 
The Generic Drug Act was approved in February 1999. Simultaneously to the 
generic medicines debate, Serra decided to reform the sanitary surveillance 
secretariat, which was ripe with corruption, and to create an independent regulatory 
agency, the Agencia Nacional de Vigilancia Sanitaria (ANVISA) (Piovesan 2002; 
Piovesan and Labra 2007; Mello et al. 2008). The recently established National 
Health Surveillance and the Ministry of Health were responsible for establishing the 
regulatory parameters for implementing the Generic Drug Act. But how to make the 
generic drugs happen? In other words, how could they induce pharmaceutical firms 
and drug retailers to supply generic drugs? How would they encourage health 
professionals and consumers to request generic drug substitution? The discussion in 
Congress was the first part of the reform, whilst establishing the resolutions to 
regulate the market was the second part of the story and perhaps the most 
controversial. This section describes governmental activism in the three years that 
followed the bill approval and is divided between political actions taken by the 
Ministry of Health and the decisions taken by the National Health Surveillance 
Agency (ANVISA) to regulate the market. Note these events happened 
simultaneously and are divided here for clarity. This is particularly important as it 
builds up the evidence that pharmaceutical regulatory processes are not always an 
input of interest group activity and that government activism can indeed reformulate 
the preferences and demands of the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
The Minister of Health, Jose Serra, was personally engaged in helping to bring about 
the Generic Drug Act. This section describes three political strategies that caused to 
destabilise potential opposition forces to the reform: (A) tensions with the 
pharmaceutical association Abifarma, (B) incentive to create a business association 
pro-generic drug, (C) negotiation with multinational pharmaceutical firms over the 
Ministry of Health political pressure 
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price of antiretroviral drugs. Needless to say, these decisions were taken 
simultaneously and are divided here for heuristic purposes: 
 
(A) Tension between Serra and Abifarma 
In the first semester of 1999, right after the approval of the Generic Drug Act, two 
unexpected events affected the atmosphere of the pharmaceutical sector. Firstly, 
changes in the economic policy. The Minister of Finance and the President of the 
Central Bank decided to adopt a monetary policy based on a free floating currency 
and inflation target, which was previously under the control of the Central Bank. 
Devaluation of Real (Brazilian currency) brought about a significant impact on the 
annual business plan of multinational subsidiaries in Brazil. According to an 
informant that had close connections to a pharmaceutical association at that moment, 
the currency devaluation would reduce firms’ budgets by nearly 30% for that year, 
deeply jeopardising multinational annual business plans (Valor Economico 2000; 
Interview with pharmaceutical industry association informant A 2009). Because of 
this unexpected economic crisis, multinational pharmaceutical firms decided to adopt 
strategies to delay the entry of generic drugs for a few months to recover their losses 
(these are discussed below) (Interview with a pharmaceutical association informant 
A 2009). A second unexpected event was the fact that a segment of the local 
pharmaceutical sector was engaged in unfair competition, advertising similar drugs 
as if they were a generic drug product. These products were not registered with the 
ANVISA as a generic drug, thus could not be advertised as such. Figure 4 and 5 
show an example of an unauthorised ‘generic drug’ advertised in 1999. The first 











Figure 4. Illegitimate advertisements of generic medicines in July 1999 
 
 










Figure 5. Illegitimate advertisements of generic medicines in July 1999 
 
 








This was a moment of great tension between the pharmaceutical sector and the 
Ministry of Health and perhaps the peak of the crisis in the pharmaceutical sector. 
While Abifarma demanded a prompt governmental response to stop the 
advertisements of the unlicensed pharmaceutical products, the association also began 
its own public campaign to inform consumers about generic drugs. On the other 
hand, governmental officials accused Abifarma of boycotting generic drugs, delaying 
the entry of these products and generating confusion around the issue. During field 
research for this study, controversial versions were reported about this episode. This 
study did not attempt to explain or investigate this disagreement. However, the 
tension between pharmaceutical companies and Serra’s administration is important in 
understanding how this reform evolved.  
 
Apparently, because the government was slow to respond to its demands, Abifarma 
used the media to inform the population and used the judiciary to block the 
advertisements of the unlicensed generic drugs. There was an aggressive mass media 
campaign to make the population aware of the new legislation. Several informative 
notes were published in popular magazines, newspapers and advertised on TV shows 
(cf. Abifarma 1999). According to its promoters, it intended to educate the 
population about the different pharmaceutical products and suggested that the quality 
of the ‘false-generic drugs’ would be lower than their respective brand names. 
Government officials condemned this strategy, arguing that Abifarma was sowing 
doubt on the credibility of generic drugs among consumers, and delaying and 
avoiding the introduction of these products. Simultaneous with the media campaigns, 
Abifarma filed several complains at the Public Ministry (body of autonomous 
magistrates composed of public prosecutors) arguing that a segment of local firms 
were commercialising pharmaceutical products unlicensed by ANVISA (Ministerio 
Publico do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 1999; 1999a; 1999b). These two strategies had a 
profound negative impact on Abifarma’s image. Government and public opinion 
understood this as an attempt to boycott generic drugs. In an interview for this study, 
both sides commented on this episode: 
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 Multinational industry did not support generic medicine. But they could not assume this 
in public. […] their campaign said national product was crap. Basically, they spent 7 
million reais in 15 days, in all magazines, newspapers saying “National product is crap”. 
“Be careful with national product”. That didn’t help me, although Gabriel 
[representative of Abifarma] swears to God that his intention was to help me, to help 
ANVISA (Interview with government official A 2009). 
 
I can guarantee to you, I give you my word. Abifarma was informing the population that 
generic drugs did not exist at that time and when it had arrived we would communicate 
it to the population.  […] We paid a higher price for that. […] I have in my CV this 
position that seemed that I was against generic medicines. I still keep everything proving 
exactly the opposite (Interview with pharmaceutical industry association informant B 
2009). 
 
There was no generics and they advertised that there was [mentioning a group of 
national pharmaceutical industries]. […] We did a campaign on TV, radio, with doctors 
clarifying what was a generic drug. […] We went to court to denounce this but the fight 
was political not judicial. Judicial decisions take 2 or 3 years. So what happened was 
that we were marked by society as against generics, against reducing the price of 
medicines, supporters of multinationals. Terrible from a political perspective (Interview 
with pharmaceutical industry association informant C 2009) 
 
The government informant suggested that there was a campaign from firms to block 
or delay the introduction of generic drugs, while representatives from this sector 
denied this suspicion, arguing it was an attempt to inform the population about 
different pharmaceutical products available in the Brazilian market. This study did 
not attempt to investigate or clarify the different sides of this debate; the relevance is 
that these episodes fostered the crisis in this sector and the opportunity for the 
Minister of Health to push his agenda further on. To destabilise collective action and 
possibly opposing forces, Serra took two decisions. First, he refused to receive the 
executive president of Abifarma, Jose Eduardo Bandeira de Mello. All consultations 
with the sector were taken with firms individually, breaking down collective action 
(Valor Economico 2000). In an interview with a popular newspaper, Serra mentioned 
that “The Minister and the Ministry will not receive the president of Abifarma 
because he only creates misunderstandings” (Folha de Sao Paulo 2000). Second, 
Serra requested Congress to investigate the cost structure of the pharmaceutical 
sector through a Parliamentary Investigative Commission (PIC) (Serra 2009). In a 
year of sub-national elections, Federal Deputies welcomed Serra’s demand, 
particularly to investigate such a controversial sector of the economy. The fanfare 
surrounding the PIC received extensive media coverage, promoting a negative image 
of the pharmaceutical sector and reducing their leverage. It could also be argued that, 
by proposing an extensive investigation into the pharmaceutical sector, Serra fostered 
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the crisis in order to implement his ambitious agenda. During the investigation into 
pharmaceutical firms’ cost structure, it was announced to Congressmen that 
multinational firms were trying to block the implementation of generic medicines, 
turning their attention to the problem and further expanding media coverage 
(Agencia de Noticias da Camara dos Deputados 2000). Despite the many accusations 
raised in this period, none of them was confirmed after the criminal investigation 
(Ministerio Publico do Estado de Sao Paulo 2003). Nevertheless, all these episodes 
were important to give credibility to the Minister of Health, destabilise the 
pharmaceutical sector collective action and increase press coverage on this matter. 
Thus, with the sector disorganised and weakened, the government could proceed 
with its regulatory agenda.  
 
(B) Creation of policy advocacy pro-generic drug 
A decisive step, and perhaps strong evidence to show how the Brazilian government 
influenced pharmaceutical politics, is the creation of the Brazilian Association of 
Pharmaceutical Industry (Pro-Genericos). Pro-Genericos was established in 2001 to 
aggregate the interests of generic drug manufacturers. Surprisingly, the initiative of 
consolidating the lobbying group was a suggestion of the Minister of Health, Jose 
Serra (Sindicato da Industria de Produtos Farmaceuticos no Estado de Sao Paulo 
2006; Interview with local pharmaceutical industry informant A 2009). Jose Serra 
commented in an interview for this study: “I induced [generic manufactures] to 
create a national association of generic manufactures. I saw there was one in the 
United States and I thought: ‘Brazil must have one, to defend the interests of this 
sector’. And that coincides with public interest” (Serra 2009). A representative of 
pharmaceutical industries confirmed: 
 
The proposal [to create Pro-Generios] was given by Minister Jose Serra in a meeting with 
generic drug manufactures. I was there. As soon as he gave the idea, I replied: ‘Let’s create it 
within the syndicate’. All other representatives agreed at the same time. There was no reason 
to articulate separate [separate from the syndicate]. Our effort was to aggregate all of them: 
generic manufacturers; medium prescription and Over the Counter; national and foreigners; 
large and small (Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman B 2009).  
 
Pro-Genericos was located within the Sao Paulo Syndicate of Pharmaceutical 
Industries (Sindusfarma). Its role in defending the sector’s demand was enhanced 
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when the former director of the Division of Generic Drugs/ANVISA, Vera Valente, 
joined the association in 2003. Valente began an aggressive advocacy to publicise the 
generic drugs. For example, it was during her tenure that Pro-Genericos first 
advocated against patent extension. Additionally, given the negative image 
associated with Abifarma during the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission and 
regulatory process of generic medicines, its members decided to reorganise interest 
representation, creating a new Federation to represent their preferences and demands. 
This will be further elaborated in the next chapter; for now, however, it evidences 
how the pharmaceutical sector was slowly accommodating to fit the government’s 
agenda.  
 
(C) Tension between the Minister of Health and multinational firms  
Parallel to the discussions on Generic Drug Act, Serra advocated further important 
reforms in the pharmaceutical sector. These were the adjustments in the intellectual 
property law, to scale up the production of antiretroviral drugs in public 
pharmaceutical industries, and international advocacy of pro-essential medicines. 
Although these reforms were not directly related to generic drugs, they had 
implications on the pharmaceutical sector and to the path of generic drug regulation 
in the 2000s, thus it justifies exploring them in this chapter.  
 
First, Jose Serra advocated heavily for reforms in the patent system in Brazil. One 
adjustment refers to the flexibility in overriding patent protection (i.e. issue a 
compulsory licence) (law 10196/2001 amended article 71 of the patent law). Another 
refers to a reformulation in the process to register pharmaceutical patents, mandating 
that the National Patent Office (INPI) and the Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA) should both revise these requirements (this is known as prior approval 
consent). Finally, the third reformulation in the patent system refers to an 
authorisation to allow pharmaceutical firms to begin researching the manufacturing 
process of a generic medicine prior to patent expiration and prepare for market entry 
at the moment of patent expiration (i.e. early working provision) (article 43 of the IP 
law, VII). The existence of the local production of medicines (public and private) 
evidently gave Serra credibility to champion the reforms (cf. Nunn 2008 - chapter 5; 
 149 
Shadlen 2009). The study of Shadlen suggested some level of support of local 
producers to these reforms in the patent system (Shadlen 2009); however, during 
field research for this study it was not possible to trace any sort of lobbying activity 
either pressuring or proposing Serra to push these reforms. Apparently, these were 
political decisions, taken within the executive/legislative government, to restructure 
the stringent patent system approved in 1996 and to facilitate the process of price 
negotiation of antiretroviral medicines with multinational pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Second, the studies of Nunn (2008) and Nunn, Fonseca et al. (2007) provide 
extensive analysis of the decision of Jose Serra to scale up production of 
antiretroviral drugs in public pharmaceutical industries. The authors argue that local 
production would not just help overcome the rising costs of ARV but would also be 
an instrument to negotiate prices with multinational companies. The flexibilities in 
the IP law aforementioned would facilitate this negotiation. If Brazil’s public 
industries had the capacity to replicate patented antiretroviral drugs, Serra could 
consider issuing a compulsory license either to produce these drugs or to threaten to 
issue a compulsory license to bargain prices with multinational firms (Nunn 2008: 
112). Brazil is world-renowned for this innovative strategy of negotiating prices of 
antiretroviral medicines (cf. Ford et al. 2007; Nunn et al. 2007). As we shall see in 
chapter 6, medicines produced in these public pharmaceutical firms are not generic 
drugs as they are not interchangeable to an innovator product. Nevertheless, what it 
is important to understand now is that this decision also fostered the crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector and added to the negative image of the sector, increasing the 
legitimacy of the Minister of Health to move forward his ambitious agenda. 
 
Thirdly, the decision to adjust the IP legislation and price negotiation with 
multinational pharmaceutical firms led to an intense international debate between 
Brazil and the United States at the World Trade Organization (Sell 2002; Odell and 
Sell 2003; Sell and Prakash 2004). After this, Serra’s advocacy on pharmaceutical 
regulation went cross-borders. In May 2001, Jose Serra gave an enthusiastic speech 
at the opening session of the 54th World Health Assembly of the United Nations: 
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There is an urgent and imperative need for debate on the importance of increasing the supply 
of generic medicines and of accelerating their entry into national markets. […] The policy of 
encouraging production of generic medicines will continue […]. Thanks to these policies as 
well as to the national production of not-patented AIDS drugs we were able to reduce the 
purchase prices of these medicines by seventy per cent. (Serra 2001: 2).  
 
Brazil’s international advocacy activities are widely known and have been the object 
of many studies (c.f. Odell and Sell 2003; Biehl 2004; Sell and Prakash 2004; Nunn 
2008 - chapter 6; Nunn et al. 2009a). For instance, Brazil sponsored several 
resolutions at the United Nations agencies (redefining the issue of access to 
medicines as a human right); headed a coalition that led to the Doha agreement 
TRIPS and Public Health, making it easier for developing countries to use TRIPS 
safeguards; and promoted the introduction of AIDS medicines into the WHO 
Essential Medicines List (cf. Sell and Prakash 2004; Nunn et al. 2009a). This 
international activism highlights the commitment of the Brazilian government to the 
domestic reforms, but it was also during this process that Brazilian AIDS activists 
began their participation in pharmaceutical regulatory processes (elaborated in 
chapter 6). Similar to the other political decision mentioned above, there is hardly 
any evidence that Serra was pressured by patient advocacy groups or local 
pharmaceutical firms to put forward this international agenda. In a period when the 
international community was discussing compensatory interventions to the economic 
globalization (e.g. Seattle and Bangkok contestation), Serra was viewed as a “Social 
Minister”. He was ranked in 2000 as the most competent Minister of Cardoso’s 
administration according to an internal evaluation (Gazeta Mercantil 2000a). For his 
remarkable activism, Serra was quoted by the Newsweek Magazine as a “Guerrilla 
Minister”, who “went after pharmaceutical companies, slashing "abusive prices" for 
brand-name drugs and flooding the market with cheap generics”(Newsweek 2001). 
 
In conclusion, all these simultaneous controversial political decisions built up to 
destabilise the collective action in the pharmaceutical sector, creating a period of 
deep uncertainty and forcing pharmaceutical firms to redefine their preferences and 
strategies to fit the governmental regulatory agenda. Additionally, the governmental 
mobilisation had a strong social appeal, convincing public opinion to back these 
decisions and increasing its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Health Surveillance 
Agency also had the crucial role of designing the resolutions to regulate the generic 
 151 
drug sector and to implement it. This chapter now turns to analyse this step of the 
regulatory process. 
 
The responsibility to formulate the resolutions to regulate the generic drug sector was 
on the recently created Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA). After approving the 
legislation in Congress, it was necessary to have a regulatory framework, defining 
the parameters to commercialise the generic drugs in Brazil. However, as a recently 
established institution, ANVISA did not have technical expertise to formulate these 
regulatory guidelines (
National Health Surveillance: regulatory resolutions and enforcement 
Vecina-Neto interview in Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006 p29). 
Serra allocated a member of staff from the Ministry of Health, Vera Valente, in 
ANVISA to put the law into effect. A Division for Generic Medicines was created 
apart from other pharmaceutical regulatory departments with a direct connection to 
the president of the ANVISA to facilitate the formulation of these rules (Interview 
with local pharmaceutical industry informant A 2009). As director of the Generic 
Medicines Division (Gerencia Geral de Medicamentos Genericos), Vera Valente 
was responsible for personally overseeing market development and defining the 
regulatory framework for registration, testing and marketing of generic drugs.  
 
It is crucial to highlight the context of uncertainty and the lack of expertise of 
Brazilian officials in dealing with the new regulatory framework. Because Brazil did 
not have specialised centres or experts to produce bioequivalence tests, it was 
necessary to build up a technical capacity to implement them. The former president 
of ANVISA, Gonzalo Vecina Neto, commented on his limited knowledge on 
bioequivalence/bioavailability tests: 
 
We had to learn. It was very difficult to learn. There were a lot of things we didn’t know, a 
lot of things people said were done and nobody did it, or lots of things people said, nobody 
did it and everybody did it. There are still questions nowadays. But, at that time, we were in 
the dark […] we were lost. Until then, bioequivalence was done outside Brazil, but how 
would it be the national […]? (Vecina-Neto in Dias 2003: 39) 
 
Given the lack of expertise in this sector, a consultant from the University of Texas, 
Salomon Stavchansky, was hired to develop the technical parameters for generic 
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drug registration. According to Vacina-Neto, this was an important step in designing 
the Brazilian framework. However, he suggests that the final resolution became 
similar to the American one, which he now understands as too stringent (Vecina-
Neto in Dias 2003: 39). The first resolution to regulate the generic drugs was 
published in August 1999 (Resolucao 391/99, ANVISA 1999). Vecina-Neto 
speculated that, had Brazil not taken Salomon’s advice to implement a regulatory 
framework analogous to the United States, the norm might not have been so stringent 
(Vecina-Neto in Dias 2003: 40). The former president of ANVISA attributes this 
result to the constraints imposed by the political momentum (the presidential election 
and the crisis in the sector) as this required a prompt and strong governmental 
response, leaving less time to reflect about other possibilities (ibid). Note that policy 
emulation did happen, as the new version of the Generic Drug Bill was not a creation 
of Brazilian government. However, the learning process was not a sufficient 
condition to initiate a reform (also evidenced by the failure to implement the WHO 
recommendation in 1993, otherwise a likely moment for introduction of these 
products in Bazil).  
 
After this, ANVISA’s regulatory framework for generic drugs was reformulated four 
times between 1999 and 2002 to incorporate/adapt to reactions of the pharmaceutical 
sector, but also because of problems identified during public consultations (Dias and 
Romano-Lieber 2006). The study of Dias (2003) provides a comprehensive 
description of these normative directives issued by ANVISA during this period. The 
author suggests that the government could not wait for the market’s self-regulation or 
to be captured by interests against generic drug. Thus, ANVISA monitored market 
reactions, enforcing new resolutions when needed. The author concludes that the 
control was so stringent that there was no way of escaping the generic drug path 
(Dias 2003: 51). Essentially, ANVISA’s policy instruments to regulate the market 
can be divided into supply and demand mechanisms.  
 
(A) Induce generic drug demand. A key pillar to introducing generic medicines in 
Brazil was to mobilise public opinion and increase the demand for generics. Because 
mass media campaigns would require large amounts of resources, the Minister of 
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Health opted for an alternative strategy to keep the generic drug issue in the media 
(Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006). He travelled around different regions in Brazil to 
publicise generic drugs, while government officials attended medical conferences 
and consumer group meetings to spread the relevance of these products. Regardless 
of the effort to stimulate a generic drug demand, these products were still not 
appearing in retail drug stores. A newspaper article published in October 1999 
highlighted the delay in commercialising generic drugs: “[…] governmental attitude 
seems to be demoralized. The question is, ‘are generic drugs going to happen now?’ 
The constant postponing of deadlines indicates a discredit in public authorities and 
generates even more questions about this reform” (Folha de Sao Paulo 1999b). 
Newspaper articles speculated that the lack of generic medicine supply was due to: 1) 
generic medicines were still under analyses by ANVISA, which would require at 
least six months for the first product to be launched; 2) retail stores were embargoing 
these products; 3) generic manufacturers did not have the scale to cover the high 
demand for generic drugs (Folha de Sao Paulo 1999a; Folha de Sao Paulo 1999d; 
Estado de Sao Paulo 2001). To neutralise the possible objection of retail stores and 
stimulate the supply of medicines, the government introduced several normative 
directives to induce the supply.  
 
(B) Induce generic drug supply. A first strategy was to pass a resolution mandating 
that all drug retailers must display a list of generic medicines registered with 
ANVISA [Resolucao 45/00 and Resolucao 99/00] (ANVISA 2000; ANVISA 2000a). 
Consumer Groups monitored and provided a list of retailers that did not sell generic 
drugs, aiming to penalise those who were unresponsive (Jornal de Brasilia 2000a; 
Jornal de Brasilia 2000b). Another resolution mandated generic manufacturers to 
disclose their sales balances monthly [Resolucao 78 August 21st 2000] (ANVISA 
2000b). They were to include total drug production, manufacturing capacity, total 
number of products sold, to whom they were sold and information about market size 
and participation. These reports suggested that there was a problem of scale, i.e. 
firms were not able to produce and cover the increasing demand for generic drugs 
(Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006).  
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In response to the lack of scale, ANVISA took two controversial decisions: it 
adopted a fast-track procedure to accelerate drug approval45
Brasil 2000
 [Decree 3675 November 
28th 2000] ( ), and stimulated multinational generic manufacturers to 
invest in Brazil by importing drugs or through joint ventures with national industries. 
The Agency also recognised bioequivalence tests conducted in United States, Canada 
and Europe, accepting products approved in these countries to accelerate the 
introduction of generic drugs [Decree 3841 June 12th 2001] (Brasil 2001). Although 
the fast-track method had benefited national industries as much as multinational 
generic manufacturers, local producers promptly reacted to the privileges offered to 
the international manufacturers. It is suggested that the government’s intention was 
to introduce generic drugs into the market rather than to only protect local 
companies. Jose Serra commented on this mechanism: 
 
[…] And I went to the United States and England, to see how generic works there. […] 
And in Israel, I went there because of Teva and I wanted to attract Teva to Brazil. It was 
to break this invisible market barrier, the problem […] they were not producing. The 
principal president of Teva told me they had also bought raw materials from India. And 
I went to India to stimulate Indian laboratories to produce in Brazil. I was there, I saw 
the laboratories. We were successful in some things. It is not a matter that Brazil did not 
have the capacity to produce generics, but it was necessary to enter the market, and 
stimulate the others (Serra 2009). 
 
(3) Additional regulatory instruments. Additionally, ANVISA created a new visual 
identity to generic medicine labels (which should show a yellow stripe and the letter 
G) to facilitate identification of generic medicines, thus making it easier for 
consumers to differentiate between the pharmaceutical products available in Brazil 









                                                 
45 Fast-track process would allow then a grace period of 1 year to provide bioequivalence tests. 
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Figure 6. Generic drug label according to Brazilian regulatory rules 
 
 
Source: adapted from ANVISA (2010). 
 
All these resolutions signalled to the pharmaceutical sector that the government was 
alert and ready to make adjustments and commitments to fully implement the 
Generic Drug Act, despite the initial bottlenecks. The lack of expertise of the newly 
created ANVISA required a lot of learning and exchange of information about how 
to best regulate these products. This process involved a strong bargain with 
pharmaceutical industries, drug retailers and health professionals, but also the 




This chapter adds to the analysis of generic drug regulation in Brazil in several ways. 
It has demonstrated that there are records of the diffusion of the WHO and the United 
States normative guidelines. Brazil did not formulate a new paradigm in the 
regulation of generic drug products. However, the diffusion of these norms was not 
sufficient to initiate Brazil’s reform. Similarly, there is hardly any evidence of 
interest group activity in pressuring the reform or supporting government 
intervention in their trademarks and manufacturing process; this contradicts 
explanatory perspectives that suggest the regulatory process was captured by firms 
with an economic stake in the regulatory activity (cf. Stigler 1971).  
 
The findings of this chapter suggest that generic drug reform was “politically driven” 
but also resulted from a conjuncture of institutional development. Unlike previous 
studies that had credited the Minister of Health as a key condition to the reform, this 
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chapter suggested a more subtle analysis. It acknowledges his role in championing 
the regulatory process, but this was only possible thanks to the opportunity created 
by the crisis in the pharmaceutical sector (with the price of medicines and the media 
complaints about the fake drugs), the particular time in the electoral cycle and the 
creation of ANVISA. Furthermore, the three antecedent events that occurred in the 
1990s have also channelled the reform by different means.  
 
The Brazilian government had tried to implement generic drugs before, following the 
WHO recommendations but, as is seen in this chapter, the institutional context was 
not favourable. Even if Serra had been the Health Minister in 1993, it would be very 
unlikely that this reform would have been possible. Nevertheless, previous generic 
drug bills greatly legitimated and facilitated the decision taken in 1999. The 
intellectual property law enacted in 1996 made the regulation of the off-patent 
medicine imperative. How and when this would happen was less evident. Finally, the 
sequence of the AIDS epidemic, the institutional constraint to provide universal 
access to antiretroviral medicines, the diffusion of a new therapeutic consensus to 
treat this disease led to an increase in the number of patients. Thus, the cost of 
treatment was seen as a threat to the sustainability of the National AIDS Program and 
expanded and highlighted the agenda of pharmaceutical regulation. All these events 
together, happening in a particular moment in time, influenced the enactment of the 
Generic Drug Act in Brazil and influenced its content. A narrow analysis of the 
reform period (1999-2002) would rule out this important contextual information, 
putting more emphasis on the individual entrepreneurship and missing out the 
important conditions of his entrepreneur activity.  
 
Exploring these historical circumstances is also important when understanding the 
content of interest group demands and the extent to which they have influenced the 
policy change. The description of the political demands of pharmaceutical firms 
suggests that local producers were concerned with the magnitude of the 
pharmaceutical reforms taking place in the 1990s. In particular, this group was 
apprehensive about the generic drug regulation as this would require costly 
investments to exclude trademarks, to restructure their manufacturing plants and 
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processes to fit the bioequivalence norm. Thus, they were less sympathetic with the 
idea of having the government interfering in their business. In contrast, multinational 
pharmaceutical firms reaped many market advantages during this period with the 
enactment of the intellectual property and the stringent design of the generic drug 
regulation. Although this group was similarly concerned with the government 
interfering in their trademarks, the risk of this reform to their business was 
significantly lower vis-à-vis local pharmaceutical producers (public and private). 
Finally, this chapter has also demonstrated that the AIDS epidemic and its patient 
advocacy had a relevance to the reform by giving visibility to the crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector, although their demands focused squarely on provision of 
treatment.  
 
The period of uncertainty and institutional instability was important element that 
made possible the reform, against the resistance of these groups. During the 
discussions and design of the generic drug regulation, the minister of health, Jose 
Serra, took several simultaneous decisions (e.g. suggested a Parliamentary 
Investigative Commission to the pharmaceutical sector) that fostered the crisis in this 
sector, deepened the uncertainty and created an opportunity to move forward his 
ambitious and unattractive agenda. The analysis of the generic drug reform in Brazil 
resembles the theoretical propositions suggested in Chapter 2. During periods of 
crisis actor’s preferences become unstable and with the outcome uncertain, it is 
difficult for them to make rational decisions. Thus, this would lead them to rethink 
their preferences and demands and perhaps adapt to the governmental agenda. 
Unfortunately, the enactment of the Generic Drug Act and the enforcement of 
ANVISA was no guarantee that the legislation would stick. To understand its 
development it is also necessary to look at the political effects of this rule in the 
behaviour of participants in pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. The following chapters 
deal with the aftermath of the generic drug regulation, as the theoretical chapter 
discussed, only by looking at how actors behaved in the subsequent period it is 
possible to say if there was or not a crucial change in actor’s behaviour, in turn how 





5. Assessing the generic drug regulatory process in the 




Chapters five and six assess the development of the generic drug policy. While the 
previous chapter assesses a period of significant disruption and uncertainty in the 
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil, these two chapters assess a moment of institutional 
stability compared to its antecedent. We know from the literature review that generic 
drug regulation persisted even after Serra left the government, but we know less 
about how this happened. In what ways have the generic drug regulation influenced 
the governance of the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil? The theoretical approach for 
this thesis has suggested that the policy process can influence the behaviour of 
stakeholders as they interpret the new institutional context and re-evaluate their 
preferences and demands. Consequently, the analysis starts by looking at the 
institutional context in the 2000s and the three actors in the generic drug regulation, 
that is, the government, market demand and suppliers of generic drugs. The 
introductory chapter of this thesis has mentioned the relevance of these three actors 
to the policy development and, for this reason, they served as a guide to assess this 
stage of the policy process. However, this regulation has also generated unexpected 
effects on other stakeholders in this sector, such as public pharmaceutical factories 
and patient advocacy groups, which were clustered for heuristic purposes and is the 
object of the analysis of chapter six.  
 
This chapter is organised into three parts and the conclusion. The first part presents 
the economic outcomes of this regulatory policy, reviewing the vitality of these 
products in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. However, economic analysis alone is 
ill-equipped to understand how this policy evolved the way it did. The second part of 
this chapter assesses how government advocacy for generic drugs evolved after the 
Cardoso and Serra administration. The second part also discusses the market 
demands for generic drugs. Both were mentioned in the introductory chapter of this 
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thesis as core elements to the development of a generic drug policy (cf. World Health 
Organization 2001). Because assessing market demand is a relatively difficult 
concept to operationalise (public opinion polls would be a better way to do it), this 
thesis relied on academic studies, business reports and others as a proxy to 
understand how health professionals and the population perceived these products. As 
the analysis suggests, both elements are unable to explain the development of generic 
drug regulation in Brazil. Governments have been less politically active on this 
matter and there is controversial and conflicting information about how health 
professionals and the population received these products. Thus, the third part of this 
chapter discusses the role of suppliers. The literature review and the economic 
background information suggest that private local pharmaceutical producers have 
been leading the rank of the generic drug sector. Also, studies suggest a remarkable 
competitive and industrial development of these firms after the Generic Drug Act 
(Abreu 2004; Quental et al. 2008). However, we know even less about how this 
happened. Particularly puzzling is that, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, local 
pharmaceutical producers repealed this government intervention in their business. 
This chapter concludes by summarising the aggregated effect of the new institutional 
context on these three actors (government, market demand and supply), how it 
empowered local pharmaceutical producers, and reflects on the structure of the 
interest group in this sector in Brazil. 
 
Background: economic outcomes  
 
The generic drug reform had an extraordinary impact on the pharmaceutical sector 
market. Using business analysis and academic studies, this section discusses the 
economic performance of generic drugs, highlighting the vitality of this sector in 
Brazil. According to the Brazilian Association of Generic Drug Manufacturers (Pro-
Genericos (2009), the market share of generic drugs is increasing steadily and 
represented 14% of sales in 2008. Registration of generic medicines at the National 
Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) increased from 893 in 2002 to 3000 in 2006 
(Pro-Genericos 2009), which implies that more products have been entering the 
market. The demand for generic drugs has also been progressing since 2001. The 
 160 
market share for generic drugs (in volume) was ~17% in 2008, an increase of 
359.7% since 2003 (see also annex 4 for further market evolution data) suggesting 
this is a promising segment of the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil (Pro-Genericos 
2009).  
 
Looking at the retail market, where expenditure is mainly out-of-pocket, studies 
suggest that the generic drug market is segmented according to income, therapeutic 
class and geographical area. The studies of Frenkel (2008; 2008a), Valentim (2003) 
and Bertoldi, Barros et al. (2005) infer that the main beneficiaries of generic drugs 
are income class B and C in Brazil. Different income segments have different 
elasticity to price variation. While income class A are willing to pay the costs of 
sophisticated or brand name drugs, class B and C are more sensitive to price 
variation. For Class D and E, the authors suggest that generic drugs competition has 
little impact on access to treatment as this segment relies on medicines provided by 
governmental programmes. This projection was corroborated by a public opinion 
survey conducted in 2006 in eight Brazilian capitals involving 800 people, which 
demonstrated that, among generic drug consumers, 30% are class A/B. The middle 
class represented 36% of consumers and class D/E 34% (Gazeta Mercantil 2006; 
Guia da Farmacia 2006)46
In terms of the therapeutic class, the best-selling generic drugs are antibiotics and 
medicines to treat chronic illness (
.  
 
Montrucchio et al. 2003; Vieira and Zucchi 2006; 
Rosenberg et al. 2008; IMS 2009; Pro-Genericos 2009; Rosenberg 2009). For 
instance, the price of two drugs to treat diabetes (metformina) and hypertension 
(atenolol) decreased by 64% between 2004 and 2007 (Pro-Genericos 2008). Vieira 
and Zucchi (2006) compared the prices of generic and original drugs in Brazil 
between 2000 and 2004. The authors found that generic drugs entered the market 
with an average price of 40% lower than their patented version and this difference 
tended to increase over the years. Other studies suggested similar findings (Sutton 
                                                 
46 I could not have full access to this study as this was conducted by a consultancy agency 
(www.marketanalysis.com.br). Nevertheless, I thank the director of this agency, Fabian Echegaray, 
who kindly provided me with a briefing of this research. Further information was also found in press 
releases. 
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2004; Monteiro et al. 2005; Miranda et al. 2009). However, because of market 
competition and retailing commercial strategies, there is a considerable price 
variation among generic drugs. For example, a study of the Consumer Protection 
Foundation/Sao Paulo in January 2010 has shown a difference of 1.415% in the price 
of Hidantal® and its generic version Fenytoine (neuractive drug) (G1 2010; O Globo 
2010; Secretaria de Justica e Defesa da Cidadania and Fundacao de Protecao e 
Defesa do Consumidor 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, generic drug competition did not reduce the price of patent medicines 
and consumers loyal to patent drugs might face an increase in the cost of their 
treatment, as suggested by the studies of Vieira and Zucchi (2006) and Fiuza and 
Lisboa (2001). For example, the average price of Elli Lilly’s Keflex®, a best-selling 
antibacterial, increased from ~ R$15.00 in 2000 to R$ ~30.00 in 2008 (Rosenberg 
2009). Consequently, the population would have an additional incentive to shift to a 
generic drug. However, unlike these authors, the study of Nishijima (2008) using a 
different methodology found that patent drug prices decreased after generic entry and 
also that these prices were sensitive to the number of generic drugs on the market.  
 
The prescription of generic medicines is still low but is increasing over time, 
representing 20.9% of the total in 2006, compared to 11.8% in 2002 (Pro-Genericos 
2008). However, for particular substances, generic medicines have achieved high 
prescription levels, for example omeprazole (88%), cephalexin (77%) and 
fluconazole (65%) (Espicom Business Intelligence 2007; Pro-Genericos 2009 - with 
Close UP MAT and Inestra/IBOPE data). According to estimates of the Brazilian 
Association of Generic Manufacturers, generic drug competition has saved 
consumers nearly US$ 5 billion in out of pocket drug expenditure since 2000 (Pro-
Genericos 2009). Particularly important would be an assessment into the effects of 
generic drugs on health outcomes or access to medicines. However, so far it has not 
been possible to identify any study that has considered this issue. Some analysts use 
market information as a proxy for access to medicines. To sum up, all this 
information tells us is that the generic drug market is evolving in Brazil with an 
apparent re-structuring of the pharmaceutical sector. However, only a qualitative and 
 162 
in-depth assessment of the regulatory process of generic drugs in this period can 
provide information on how and why this happened. 
 
 
Government advocacy and market demand 
 
This section assesses the participation of government in the development of generic 
drug regulation and also analyses the health professionals and population demands 
and perception of these products.  
 
Governmental intervention 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the generic drug reform was conditioned by a 
political decision and an intense governmental advocacy occurring in a particular 
period of the electoral section and triggered by a crisis in the pharmaceutical sector. 
During the presidential election campaigns in 2002 and 2010, the mayor elections in 
2004 and gubernatorial elections of 2006, Jose Serra largely used the implementation 
of generic medicines as one of his foremost achievements (PSDB 2002) (see figure 
7). It is not possible to say precisely whether his inner motivation to introduce 
generic medicines was political or vote-seeking, as this is not available for empirical 
observation. In fact, Serra’s own interpretation to the decisions taken during his 
administration, and particularly to respond the AIDS epidemic, was discussed in a 
working paper presented at Princeton University in 2004 (Serra 2004). Citing 
Hirschman’s concept of latitude in performance of decision makers, Serra justified 
that the health sector, and especially the HIV/AIDS epidemic, allowed no room for 
manoeuvre, or delays and errors that were less acceptable compared to those in other 
areas (ibid: 16). Thus, the decision-maker was constrained to act, given that the 
consequences of inaction would be severely judged by public opinion and with far-
reaching consequences to the health sector in general.  
 
Nevertheless, the use of this policy in Serra’s political campaigns is evident and he is 
keen on recalling attention to this matter. He has claimed that, although generic drugs 
are not an invention of his administration, it was thanks to his political activity that 
these pharmaceutical products were introduced in Brazil. It fostered market 
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competition and lowered the price of medicines, particularly those treating chronic 
diseases. One of his campaign promises was to further expand this initiative (Folha 
de Sao Paulo 2010a). To say that Serra took political advantage of this reform is not 
to condemn him; politicians are accountable to voters, and reaping credit for their 
decisions is a fundamental aspect of the political realm. Regardless of this credit-
claiming activity, Jose Serra lost the presidential elections of 2002, which brought a 
left-wing government into power for the first time in more than 40 years. In 2004, he 
was elected mayor of the city of Sao Paulo and, in 2006, governor of Sao Paulo state 
but lost the presidential election in 2010. Thus, he is distant from pharmaceutical 
policymaking decisions in Brazil and less able to continue influencing the path of 
generic drug policy.  
 











Source: www.psdb.org.br (2010). 
 
How did the government advocacy for the generic drugs evolve after Serra’s 
administration? By comparing the policy initiatives taken by the current government 
with the ones during Serra’s administration, it is clear the governmental political 
activity in generic drug advocacy has reduced considerably. Several evidences 
suggest that there was a reduction in mass media campaigns to inform and stimulate 
a demand for generic medicines. For instance, in 2003, the Senate Sub-commission 
on Health requested a Public Consultation to investigate how to improve the 
legislation on generic medicines (Consultoria Legislativa do Senado Federal 2003; 
Estado de Sao Paulo 2003). Senator Papaleo Paes, in his plenary speech, pointed out 
that one of the findings of this consultation was that the government discontinued 
initiatives to stimulate generic drug demand (such as mass media campaigns): 
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We are not facing an issue that can be treated as an ideological bias or political party 
stamp. This is a policy [generic drugs] to the Brazilian population, focused above all on 
poor citizens. […] It can be observed that Federal Government discontinued a policy 
adopted by previous administration. Current administration withdrew, for example, 
activities to make the population aware – essential to make the population aware of the 
relevance of generic drugs […]. It is essential to reactivate public utility campaigns, 
adequately informing consumers, blocking irresponsible drug store salesmen that act as if 
they were doctors. […] It urges that Federal Government demonstrate efforts to consolidate 
our generic drug market in order to increase consumers’ achievements (Paes 2003). 
 
During field research for this project it was not possible to identify any newspaper or 
policy statement produced by the successor administration on generic drugs. In a 
newspaper article, a government official for the National Health Surveillance Agency 
commented on the government orientation regarding generic medicines: “The 
Minister Humberto Costa [2003-2005] reduced the status of this Division [generic 
drug] at ANVISA. There was no reason to emphasise generics when this was the 
political agenda of another President candidate” (Estado de Sao Paulo 2003). 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the government’s activity to inform the 
population about generic drugs. A number of interviewees commented that the 
government decided to suppress the generic drug campaign because it was strongly 
connected with the previous Health Minister: 
 
The first Minister of Health in Lula’s government [Humberto Costa], he used to say openly 
within the Ministry […] I know someone who was in a meeting with him, and it was 
forbidden to talk about generics. It was forbidden to say positive things about generics, it was 
forbidden to talk about generics. It is unfortunate, but there was sustainability already 
(Interview with local pharmaceutical industry informant A 2009).  
 
Generics were Serra’s stamp. From the point of view of awareness campaign, induction, PT 
[the incumbent political party – Workers Party] has done basically nothing. Talking about 
generics is talking about Serra. This became a stamp. Therefore, from an institutional 
perspective, governmental perspective, it is evident that nothing will be done to clarify the 
population about generic medicine, to substitute a product X by a generic […]. I think this 
was a big mistake, in the sense that transforms generics into a political discussion rather than 
a public health discussion (Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman B 2009).  
 
An analysis of the organisational structure of ANVISA reinforces these statements. 
The agency directive Nº 593/2000 established a General-Management of Generic 
Medicines (GMGM) at the same level as the General-Management of Medicines 
(GMM). Both managers were classified as chief-manager and receiving the same 
salary range, being level 2 (Cargo de Gerência Executiva II) (ANVISA 2000c). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the GMGM was responsible for coordinating the 
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generic drug regulation; its status of General-Management department not only 
suggested this policy was a priority, but also gave direct contact to ANVISA’s 
president. However, a rearrangement of departments took place in June 2003, 
immediately after the new government came to power. The agency directive Nº385 
downgraded the GMGM and its manager salary range was reduced to level 3 (Cargo 
de Gerência Executiva III) (ANVISA 2003b). Finally, a further rearrangement in 
2009 dissolved the GMGM and divided its functions into two lower-level 
departments: Coordination of Generic and Similar Drugs Registration (CRMED) and 
Coordination of pos-Registration (COPRE) (ANVISA 2009). It was not possible to 
assess exactly why ANVISA decided to rearrange the structure of medicine’s 
regulatory department, but it clearly split the responsibility of the GMGM and 
reduced the priority of generic drug regulation vis-à-vis other pharmaceutical 
products and the bargaining power within the Agency. This is not to say that Brazil 
had reduced its regulatory standards to register generic drugs, but it evidences that 
there is no priority among pharmaceutical products.  
 
Despite these observations that claim that the current government would try to 
eclipse the previous administration’s generic drug policy, it might also be possible 
that the current administration has a different understanding of how to tackle the 
problems with access to medicines. Clearly, Jose Serra’s approach to increasing 
access to medicines was to stimulate competition in the pharmaceutical market, 
lower the price of medicines and thus increase access. In this sense, the Director of 
the Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance/MoH, Norberto Rech, explained in an 
interview to a newspaper in 2003: “Generics indeed play an important role, but the 
government has responsibility to conduct broad public policies rather than policies to 
a specific sector. There is an intention to increase use of generics, but public policy 
cannot be market’s policy” (Estado de Sao Paulo 2003). The Minister of Health, 
Agenor Alvares (2006-2007), reaffirmed this position: “We believe that publicity on 
generic drugs must be the responsibility of laboratories. It would be an incoherence if 
the government promoted advertising for a fraction of the pharmaceutical sector” 
(Valor Economico 2006a). Finally, a governmental official further elaborated these 
perspectives when interviewed for this study:  
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Many times generic manufacturers came to the Ministry of Health for what? To request 
campaigns to induce generic use. This is not the role of the State. These campaigns must be 
done by producers. This is a market issue. If we had few generic medicines, maybe this 
would be reasonable. The Ministry of Health has made efforts with the creation of the 
National Committee to Promote Rational Use of Medicines. And within rational use of 
medicines policy and promotion, generics have a relevant spot (Interview with government 
official B 2009). 
 
This information was corroborated with policy statements. Indeed, in March 2007 the 
Ministry of Health created the National Committee for the Rational Use of 
Medicines. However, according to the meeting reports, little has been discussed 
about generic drugs (Ministerio da Saude 2010a). Its focus has been at best on 
disseminating general guidelines on rational use of medicines to mass public and 
health professionals. Furthermore, the current administration introduced for the first 
time in Brazil mechanisms of co-payment, which is under the responsibility of the 
Brazilian Popular Pharmacy Program (the government-managed programme was 
created in 2004, while its private sector-managed programme was established in 
2006)47
In this sense, the Ministry of Health has also shifted attention from generic drugs to 
another controversial initiative, which is the Health Industry Complex project. 
President Lula’s administration has focused strongly on developing an industrial 
policy for the pharmaceutical sector (elaborated further in the following section that 
deals with local producers). In March 2007, when Jose Gomes Temporao was 
appointed to the Ministry of Health; this initiative became also a focus of health 
policy. Temporao is a physician and an academic of the National School of Public 
Health, with extensive experience in health management and policy. His research 
team has been engaged in studies of technological innovation in the health sector 
backed by Marxist and neo-Schumpeterian theories (cf. 
 suggesting a new orientation to the pharmaceutical assistance programmes.  
 
Gadelha et al. 2003; 
Temporao et al. 2003; Guimaraes 2004; Temporao et al. 2005; Gadelha 2006; Casas 
2008)48
                                                 
47 The former is state-owned drug stores and uses mainly public produced drugs (similar drugs); the 
latter is private-owned drug stores that provide mainly private produced drugs (both similar and 
generic drugs). Tables x and x1 show the evolution of these programmes. 
. Temporao developed an ambitious project, Mais Saude (More Health), to 
48 The Marxist perspective discusses the infiltration of the capitalist production process into the health 
sector and its structural determinants on health practice (e.g. the inter-relation of pharmaceutical 
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reduce external dependency of strategic health and technological sectors (Ministerio 
da Saude 2010a). It is supported by the argument that there is an increasing deficit in 
the trade balance of health supplies, reaching US$ 6.75 billion in 2008 (the 
pharmaceutical sector alone represented a deficit of US$ 3.3 billion in the same year) 
(Moyses-Junior 2005). According to government officials, this scenario places 
Brazil’s health system in a dependent and vulnerable situation (Moyses-Junior 2005; 
Guimaraes 2009). One of Mais Saude objectives is to stimulate the local production 
of medical devices, medicines and other strategic health supplies through 
mechanisms such as government purchase power or public and private partnership.  
 
All the evidence presented so far suggests that there was a reduction of governmental 
dissemination and promotion of generic drug products. The reasons for this might be 
associated with a strategy to reduce the political leverage of generic drugs, or even a 
reorientation of the Ministry of Health pharmaceutical policies. On the other hand, 
the Health Surveillance Agency has expanded its capacity to regulate these products 
substantively. For example, as seen in the previous chapter, when Brazil decided to 
introduce bioequivalence requirements to its regulatory norm there were no experts 
or centres to conduct these studies and many had to be conducted abroad. While in 
1999 nearly 80% of bioequivalence tests processed in ANVISA were conducted 
abroad, in 2008 nearly 70% of these had already been prepared by local centres 
(Cristofoletti 2008). Today, there are 51 centres certificated to conduct 
bioequivalence studies, of which 23 are international and 28 national institutions 
(ibid). ANVISA has also constantly revised and expanded the BE guidelines (see, for 
example, resolutions 103, 134, 895 and 899 in 2003 and 34 issued in 2008). The 
design of these technical parameters for generic drug regulation in Brazil has been 
based on extensive cooperation with pharmaceutical firms (cf. ANVISA 2003b; 
ANVISA 2004a). 
                                                                                                                                          
industries within the capitalist production system and the consequences of medicines as a trade 
commodity). The neo-Schumpeterian approach discusses the configuration of production based on 
technological innovation. The health sector can be a producer of economic development 
simultaneously connected to its sanitary role. If so, this group of researchers and now policy-makers 
understand that the management of the health sector must take into account both its sanitary role and 
its capital accumulation face. It places technological and industrial development within public health 
policies by integrating production of service and industrial goods to social interests (economic growth, 
innovation and welfare enhancement) (Casas 2008).  
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To sum up, the introductory chapter of this thesis has suggested that government 
advocacy is important to stimulate a market demand for generic drugs, thus it is a 
crucial element of this policy. However, as seen so far, Serra’s succeeding 
administration has demonstrated less interest in fostering market competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector through the promotion of generic drugs. The evidence 
presented here also suggests that the government discourse has changed, 
incorporating preferences of rational use of medicines as a core agenda in 
pharmaceutical assistance, but also a concern with decreasing the external 
dependency on foreign capital in this sector. Thus, policy content also shifted to 
instruments that focus on research and development of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (raw materials) and medicines. Nevertheless, enforcement of 
bioequivalence tests and the other requirements to register generic drugs is afoot and 
the norms have been designed in collaboration with pharmaceutical firms. 
 
Market demand 
The development of the generic drug market could also be explained by the support 
of consumers, who demand these pharmaceutical products, thus contributing to 
policy sustainability. Collecting primary data on the effects of generic drug policy on 
consumers and health professionals is not the objective of this study. However, 
market demand is a core element by which to assess the development of generic drug 
regulation and cannot be ignored. Thus, this study relied on secondary data 
(dilemmas and methodological choices were already discussed in chapter 3).  
 
Despite the increasing growth of the generic drug market in Brazil, there is still low 
consumer awareness of generic drug products and slow acceptance by physicians 
(Valente 2006). Studies suggest that there is confusion on how to differentiate the 
pharmaceutical products (innovator, similar and generic) and a lack of confidence 
about the quality of generic medicines (Bertoldi et al. 2005; Folha de Pernambuco 
2007; Tribuna do Norte 2007). For example, a study conducted in 2002 using 
household samples found that, although 86% of the population interviewed 
understood that generic drugs cost less, 56% failed to differentiate between generics 
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and other medicines. Results were worse among people with low schooling and 
economic status. There are many brand-name drugs on the market (similar drugs) 
that cost less than generics, which can “indicate a possible misunderstanding 
between what consumers think and what they are actually using” (Bertoldi et al. 
2005: 1813). Similar findings were reported by Carvalho and Raffin (2006) in a 
study of social representation of generic drugs conducted between 2002 and 2003 
with drug retail consumers. The authors suggested that users usually refer to generic 
drugs as lower-priced medicines that serve an immediate demand and have 
questionable quality (ibid).  
 
In terms of generic drug prescription, academic studies, market assessments and a 
number of newspaper articles point out that health professionals are still resisting 
prescribed generic drugs (Valente 2006; Espicom Business Intelligence 2007; 
RNCOS E-Services Private 2007; Pro-Genericos 2009; Rosenberg 2009; Folha de 
São Paulo 2010). For example, a survey conducted in 2006 in eight Brazilian capitals 
assessed the opinion of 55 health professionals. While 44% of the health 
professionals believed that generic drugs were not as reliable as original drugs, 
among those who trusted generic drugs, 17% did not prescribe them (Gazeta 
Mercantil 2006). In a public hearing in the Federal Senate in 2009, the representative 
of ANVISA, Tatiana Lowande, questioned the inaction of health professionals in 
prescribing generic drugs. She suggested that doctors should inform the Agency 
about drugs they believed were not safe and urged that the general public and the 
Federal Police should monitor this behaviour (Camara dos Deputados 2009; 
Federação Nacional dos Farmacêuticos 2009; O Globo 2009a). 
 
As suggested in the first section of this chapter, market intelligence data points out 
that diabetic patients were the largest beneficiaries of generic drug competition. 
However, in an interview for a newspaper in 2003, the physician and president of the 
National Association of Diabetic Assistance, Dr Fablo Fraige Filho, reported that he 
prescribed a generic version of a drug to treat hypertensive diabetic patients and it 
did not work: “I won’t prescribe it ever again” he declared (Isto e 2003). During field 
research for this project, interviews were conducted with diabetic associations and 
 171 
government officials responsible for implementing public policy for diabetes and 
heart diseases to assess their position on generic drug policy. Similar to what has 
been described so far, there was little consensus on the safety of generic drugs. One 
interviewee suggested that generic drugs are approved by the regulatory agency 
through the influence of politicians and raised doubts over the manufacturing 
conditions of local pharmaceutical firms (Interview with Diabetes patients informant 
A 2009). The intention here is not to investigate whether these assertions are reliable 
or not; but the fact that a high level representative of diabetic patients, an opinion 
leader, raised concerns about these pharmaceutical products reinforces the argument 
that there is still a fragile confidence on generic drugs. Both representatives of 
diabetics patients interviewed agreed that it seems that people who can afford them 
prefer the original products rather than the generic version (Interview with Diabetes 
patients informant A 2009; Interview with Diabetes patients informant B 2009).  
 
Looking at institutional purchasers, such as the public health system, the demand for 
generic drugs is also problematic. Public pharmaceutical assistance programmes 
would represent an important demand for generic medicines. The Generic Drug Act 
(Law 9787/1999) mandates that all public purchases and prescription of medicines 
should be done by the generic name. However, recent studies that assessed the 
availability of medicines in Brazil has demonstrated that, in the public sector, generic 
medicines are less available than similar drugs (Miranda et al. 2009; Pinto et al. 
2010). For most medicines (71.4%), the availability of bioequivalent generic drugs 
was less than 10% (Miranda et al. 2009). The authors suggest that public purchase of 
medicines has greatly privileged similar drug medicines. If so, what these numbers 
indicate is that there is an inconsistency between what medicines physicians 
prescribe in the Unified Health System (SUS) and what medicines are provided by 
public health facilities.  
 
Why does this happen? The legislation that regulates public procurement of 
medicines (and other goods and service contracts) determines that, if all technical 
requirements are met, the provider that offers the lowest price wins (reverse bid) 
(Law 8666/1993). By contrast, the generic drug legislation determines that in this 
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case generic drugs should be given the priority (Law 9787/1999). Miranda et al. 
(2009) speculate that this might be happening because: (a) generic drug producers 
are not interested in participating in public procurement, (b) better prices offered by 
similar producers, or (c) perhaps difficulties in following the legislation 
requirements. The Director of the Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance/Ministry 
of Health, Jose Miguel, when interviewed for this thesis declared that, although 
similar and generic drugs do not have the same technical parameters, usually similar 
producers offer a lower price, which leaves the government officials with no other 
option than to buy the similar drug (Miguel 2009). He reports that, if priority is given 
to a generic drug producer that offers a higher price, then Public Accountings or 
Courts could interfere in the operation, causing delays in the supply of medicines. He 
also pondered that this could be a problem in designing public procurement, but so 




In summary, this section has demonstrated that the political engagement and 
commitment of the Ministry of Health in promoting a generic drug competition in 
Brazil has reduced considerably. On the other hand, the health professionals and the 
population demand and acceptance of these products is still fragile. The documents 
and papers reviewed suggest a conflicting perception as to whether they see these 
products as unsafe, or even a misunderstanding regarding the different 
pharmaceutical products available within the Brazilian market. While government 
and demand support are important elements of a generic drug regulation, so is the 




Local pharmaceutical manufacturers 
 
Local pharmaceutical producers were the least likely group to adapt to the reform. 
Their fear was that remarkably high costs to adjust to this new regulatory regime 
would force them to exit the market (Valente 2009; Vecina-Neto 2009; Visconde-Jr 
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2009). For example, the small pharmaceutical industry Sebadel founded in 1953 had 
a revenue of U$ 1 million per year. Half of its 200 products were required to provide 
bioequivalence tests, costing U$ 100,000 per product. This is nearly the entire 
industry’s annual revenue (Rumos 1999). The generic drug regulation established not 
just a stringent framework but also a short period for producers to adjust to the new 
rule. Responding to the complaints of the local pharmaceutical industries about the 
costs of bioequivalence tests, the former Minister of Health, Jose Serra, commented 
in a newspaper interview in 1999, “those who cannot afford this test cannot produce 
generics. More important than anything is the population’s health” (Serra in Rumos 
1999: 31). As the government made credible commitments to the reform, the fate of 
similar drug producers would then be either to adjust and convert to a generic drug 
(interchangeable with its innovator version) or provide evidence of incremental 
innovation and request a new patent at the National Patent Office (INPI).  
 
Surprisingly, local firms not only managed to adapt to the regulatory reform but also 
became market champions in the pharmaceutical sector (see figure 8 for the generic 
drug market and table 9 for the pharmaceutical sector as a whole). For those who 
managed to adapt, generic drugs became a big business opportunity. Brazilian 
pharmaceutical industries account for 88% of the domestic generic drugs market. 
Generic manufacturers estimate an investment of US$ 350 million by 2012 (G1 
2007; Estado de Sao Paulo 2007a - with IMS Health data). In 1999, the local 
pharmaceutical firm EMS was 29th in the ranking of pharmaceutical industries in 
Brazil, and in less than 10 years it became the market leader in the generic drug 
sector. Similarly, Eurofarma, Biosintetica and Medley – all family-owned – had an 
impressive market performance over the same period. The director of the Brazilian 
Association of Pharmaceutical Industries (Alanac), Sara Kanter, declared in a 
newspaper article: “the commercial battle is in progress. If similar industries do not 
adapt quickly, it is expected that they will lose all the conquered space to generics 





Table 9. Ranking of pharma. industries in Brazil (US$), 1999 and 2005-2009 
Industry 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % participation 
EMS 29 5 3 2 1 1 6,59 
Sanofi-Aventis 1 1 1 2 2 2 6,24 
Ache 3 2 2 3 3 3 5,68 
Medley 32 7 6 4 4 4 5,67 
Novartis 2 4 4 5 5 5 4,1 
Eurofarma 28 9 8 6 6 6 3,90 
Pfizer 7 3 5 6 7 7 3,06 
Bayer Schering 23 6 7 7 8 8 2,86 
Astra Zeneca 19 22 20 15 12 9 2,37 
Boehringer 11 8 9 9 9 10 2,24 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
Note: Names/numbers in blue refer to Brazilian industries. 
 
 
Figure 8. Market share (vol) of generic pharma. producers in Brazil in 2007 
 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2008 - with IMS Health data) 
 
However, the cost to adapt was high. Local industries that, until then, were based on 
a marketing and distribution business had to reformulate their industrial plants, create 
their own laboratories to provide pharmacokinetic tests and contract tests in humans 
(some bioequivalence tests require clinical trials). It was estimated that the 
infrastructure cost around U$ 1 million for each firm; added to that, expenditure in 
testing each product was between U$ 200 and 250 million per product (Exame 
2005a). For instance, Eurofarma, one of the largest local industries, from 2000 to 
2005 invested nearly U$ 45 million in pharmacokinetic tests (Exame 2005a). How 
and why did local pharmaceutical firms become highly supportive of generic drug 
policies and become market leaders in the pharmaceutical sector? To assess these 
questions, this section looks at local producers’ preferences and demands after the 
reform in different events (note that this division is for analytical purpose): 1) 
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reorganising collective action: creation of Pro-Genericos, Febrafarma and extinction 
of Abifarma; 2) adjusting similar drugs: ANVISA’s resolution 133 and 134/2003; 3) 
framing generic drugs: the industrial development and the access to affordable, safe 
and efficient medicines campaign; 4) using comparative advantage: Brazil’s 
pharmaceutical businessmen. 
 
Reorganising collective action to accommodate the new interests 
The process of accommodating the new regulatory framework is illustrated by the 
changes in the organisation of pharmaceutical sector collective action. There was a 
significant reformulation in business representation after the crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector in 1999. Additionally, given the massive negative media 
attention, it was necessary to restore communication with civil society, government 
and academia.  
 
At the suggestion of Jose Serra, generic manufacturers created a new business 
association in 2001, Pro-Genericos (Brazilian Association of Generic Drug 
Manufacturers), which was slowly taking shape. In 2003, Pro-Genericos gained an 
important staff member, the former director of ANVISA’s Department of Generic 
Drugs, Vera Valente, who joined the association as Executive President. Valente has 
a bachelor degree in law, extensive experience in public management and was 
responsible for implementing all the initial stages of generic drug regulation in 
Brazil.  
 
With the end of Fernando Henrique’s administration they [generic drug producers] invited 
[Vera] to join Pro-Genericos. [Describing her work at Pro-Genericos]: That is publicity with 
doctors, pharmacists and to keep the mood of newspapers’ interviews, disseminate [generic 
drugs] to society. Then 90% of work at Pro-Genericos was to give seminars, interviews, 
produce publicity material to drug retailers, to pharmacists so they understand their role and 
relevance in sales behaviour (Interview with local pharmaceutical industry informant A 
2009).  
 
This information was also corroborated with documentary evidence. A number of 
newspaper articles were culled citing Pro-Genericos activity in providing market 
intelligence data about the sector performance, reacting to attempts to disqualify the 
quality of generic drugs, providing information to the mass public about generic 
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drugs and among others (cf. Valentina Meyer Consultoria & Comunicação 2001; 
Gazeta Mercantil 2006a; Tribuna do Norte 2007). As the governmental campaigns to 
stimulate the generic drug demand shrank, in 2003 Pro-Genericos launched a US$ 
1.5 million dollar mass media campaign to inform health professionals and the 
population about these products (60% of this investment was financed by local 
producers) (Gazeta Mercantil 2003a). Furthermore, Valente strongly advocated for 
health insurance coverage of generic medicines. In Brazil, health insurance 
companies are not required to cover expenses with medicines. Furthermore, it was 
also under her leadership that Pro-Genericos began a strong counter-reaction to 
intellectual property extension. For instance, in a litigation between the French 
pharmaceutical manufacture Sanofi Aventis vs. the National Patent Office (INPI) for 
patent extension of Plavix, Pro-Genericos assisted the INPI, bringing elements of 
access to medicines, price reduction and the impact of generic medicines to the trial 
(Andrighi 2010). As we shall see later on in this chapter, Pro-Genericos has become 
an important player in defending the status quo of generic drug regulation, 
representing a counter-balance to innovator firms’ preferences and intellectual 
property affairs.  
 
Additionally, an important adjustment in the pharmaceutical sector post-generic drug 
reform was the extinction of Abifarma in April 2002. Abifarma had been one of the 
most influential representatives of the sector for more than 50 years. During the 
negotiations to introduce a generic drug law in 1999, Jose Serra and the president of 
Abifarma, Jose Eduardo Bandeira de Mello, had constant public disagreements, 
exposing the sector as a whole. Furthermore, because Abifarma’s members were 
both national and multinational firms, there were frequent internal conflicts to define 
the Association’s strategies on controversial issues affecting local and foreign 
capital. This internal divergence was limiting the association’s ability to negotiate 
with the government. As Abifarma was unable to represent the new interests of 
pharmaceutical industries, a new association was created in June 2002, the Brazilian 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Associations (Febrafarma). Rather than clustering 
pharmaceutical firms, Febrafarma was a group of associations with the responsibility 
of unifying the voices of pharmaceutical sector, passing the controversial topics to 
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the respective segment, e.g. generic drug, innovator or local industry interests. “The 
government had segmented the sector. For some negotiations invited one association 
and excluded the other. We noticed that it was necessary to create an institution to 
speak for all of them. So, we created Febrafarma, representing all the associations” 
explained Nelson Libbos, former associated of Abifarma (Libbos in Sindicato da 
Industria de Produtos Farmaceuticos no Estado de Sao Paulo 2006: 68). A local 
pharmaceutical businessman, who participated in this reorganisation, commented this 
decision: 
 
National and multinational firms sewed up an agreement to create Febrafarma. We, 
nationals, Alanac, knew we weren’t majority or we are not majority […]. It took two years of 
debate and we got to the point that we should make Abifarma extinct, not Alanac and not 
Interfarma. Why? In some issues there was an evident disagreement. Then, when there was a 
dissent topic each association would work by itself, while the common points Febrafarma 
would represent the sector. We knew we would not be majority within Febrafarma, we 
nationals, so we said “[…] Any negative vote is enough to define what a dissent topic is. 
Consequently, Febrafarma won’t speak about that topic and will pass on to the 
associations”(Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman A 2009).    
 
Aggregating the voices would strengthen the pharmaceutical sector, making policy 
advocacy more efficient. Although Febrafarma aggregated 15 associations of 
pharmaceutical sector (representing 267 pharmaceutical manufacturers), only three 
associations were eligible to vote: Alanac, Interfarma and Sindusfarma49. The 
common advocacy agenda refers to some regulatory affairs, price control, taxation, 
industrial policy and others50
Valor Economico 2000
. A newspaper published an article suggesting that the 
former president of Abifarma, Bandeira de Mello, be set aside as his image had 
become associated with opposing generic drug policy ( ).  
 
Adjusting similar drugs and reinforcing the path 
In 2003, ANVISA proposed a new resolution establishing that all similar producers 
should also present the same bioequivalence tests as generic drug producers when 
                                                 
49 Pro-genericos is represented within Sindusfarma 
50 It is interesting to note that the headquarters of Sindusfarma in Sao Paulo also aggregate 
Febrafarma, Pro-Genericos and Abiminp (Brazilian Association of over the Counter Drugs). It is 
argued that this arrangement reduces an office’s maintenance cost. However, when questioned 
whether the aggregation of these distinct interests in the same office would have some impact on their 
advocacy plans, only one business representative showed some discomfort, while all the others were 
pretty satisfied with this arrangement.  
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registering a product or in renewing its registration and that, by 2014, all similar 
products must be adjusted (Resolution 133 and 134 – 2003). Although there is a 
semantic distinction between the test names – similar drug resolutions mention a 
relative bioavailability test, while the generic drug resolution names a bioequivalent 
test – the pharmacological requirements are the same. Note that, as opposed to 
generic drugs that must be commercialised by an INN, similar drugs are allowed to 
present a brand name. Thus, this would put Brazil in an awkward situation, with four 
pharmaceutical products in the market: innovator product, generic product, similar 
product (not bioequivalent) and similar product (bioequivalent). Besides being 
beaten by the Intellectual Property Act and the Generic Drug Act, now local 
producers would have no other option than to adjust their products to fulfil 
bioequivalence requirements (although they would still be allowed to use a brand 
name). Relevant to this study is how the Ministry of Health and local producers 
interpreted and reacted to this proposal. 
 
A draft of these two resolutions was sent to the Ministry of Health in 2003 for 
appreciation. A working group was created to debate 35 resolutions proposed by 
ANVISA. A former Ministry of Health official who participated actively in this 
working group recalls that, after two months of debates, they decided not to approve 
the similar drug resolution in the way that it was presented (Interview with 
government official B 2009). They suggested that conversion of similar drugs into 
generics should be incremental and be in the long term, looking first for products 
with narrow therapeutic ranges to give time to producers to adapt. Besides, they 
understood that bioequivalence tests are not the sole criteria to define the quality of 
medicines and this would increase the manufacturing costs of medicines. However, 
during the period of writing up the report, there was an intervention of ANVISA’s 
president to convince the Ministry of Health that the resolution should be approved 
as it was proposed, i.e. unaltered and against the working group decision (Interview 
with government official B 2009). When questioned on the role of local 
pharmaceutical industries in this debate, this government official commented: 
 
What happened was that [local] industries adapted to this regulation. Since 2003, similar 
drug producers adapted to this definition. […] Indeed we had companies that had problems, 
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companies that are having problems. But, the segment as a whole took the political position 
to adapt. […] Alanac adapted and did not oppose. Febrafarma was sympathetic. 
[…]Certainly, I was furious with them at that time. At that time I guess the decision to adapt 
was strategic to national producers so they wouldn’t have to face questions about the quality 
of its products (Interview with government official B 2009). 
 
Note that, even after the enactment of the Generic Drug Act, there was still room for 
local industrialists to maintain their production of similar drugs. However, the 
introduction of resolutions 133 and 134 not only reinforced the decisions taken 
during Serra’s administration but expanded them, forcing all off-patent 
pharmaceutical products into providing bioequivalence tests. In December 2004, 
ANVISA suspended the registration of 130 similar medicines and cancelled the 
production of 30 similar medicines that did not comply with the new regulatory 
requirements (Gazeta Mercantil 2004). This decision affected 71 local firms 
(including 27 industries affiliated at Alanac), 10 multinational industries and 9 public 
laboratories. In 2007, a new resolution was published expanding the requirements to 
register similar drugs in Brazil (RDC 17/2207) (ANVISA 2007). The founder of a 
similar pharmaceutical industry commented: 
 
Generic drugs didn’t help me at all. By contrast, it harmed and still harms me […] It is not 
just generic drugs that are required bioequivalence. According to the Brazilian legislation, 
even similar drugs, when renewing its registration, are required to provide bioequivalence 
tests compared to a reference medicine. So, I got several products that had a higher 
bioavailability of the product, i.e. I produce this product in a way that is better absorbed in 
the human body than the reference product and I had to worsen my product just to be equal 
to its reference version. […] a generic drug is always equal to its reference version but never 
better. I cannot make my product better or it won’t be bioequivalent and, not being 
bioequivalent, I cannot renew my license. (Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman 
A 2009).  
 
Although some local producers were clearly dissatisfied with the decision that 
eliminated their products from the market, they opted not to voice their opinions 
against it (there was no record either in interviews or in newspaper articles of 
attempts to reverse or block these resolutions). As the government official 
mentioned, there was a movement of adjustment to the bioequivalence requirement. 
Furthermore, in 2003 the generic drug sector was already experiencing an 
extraordinary evolution. Market data highlighted the leadership of the national 
industry in this sector and the reductions on the price of medicines associated with it. 
For instance, in 2003 there were 37 national industries producing generic medicines, 
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with a market share of 75% in sales (Gazeta Mercantil 2003; Valor Economico 2003; 
Gazeta Mercantil 2003a).  
 
The increasing success of the generic drug market affected similar drug producers. 
Although it would still be beneficial for them to contest ANVISA’s resolution 133 
and 134/2003, their chances of success fell considerably as more industries began to 
adapt. As the 2000s progressed, Alanac and other similar drug producers provided 
several declarations that similar products were also adjusting to provide 
bioequivalence tests: “the efficacy and safety of similar medicines produced and 
commercialized in the country are assured by pharmaceutical equivalence and 
relative bioavailability tests”. It continues to: “most similar [drugs] have passed these 
tests, which are the same that generic medicines present, and until 2013 all similar 
drugs will have to be tested” (Alanac 2008). In 2006, the local pharmaceutical firm 
Ache (the only Brazilian publicly traded pharmaceutical company) bought 
Biosintetica, one of the leaders in the generic drug market. Ache has historically 
invested in similar drugs, but by acquiring Biosintetica it also reoriented its business 
plan toward the generic drug sector (Valor Economico 2006). 
 
It is important to emphasise that, by 2014, all similar drugs must be adjusted to 
provide bioequivalence tests, which will require the government authorities to 
rethink the regulatory rules for commercialising pharmaceutical products. First of all, 
if similar manufacturers fulfil the same technical requirements as generic 
manufacturers, then similar products should also be considered interchangeable with 
an innovator drug (the same as generic products). Second, technically similar drugs 
will be a generic version with a brand name. In the United States and other 
developed countries, this is currently known as branded-generic drugs. This will also 
require these similar drug producers to rethink their business strategies and adjust 
their identity to (brand name) generic drug manufacturers. To conclude, in the words 
of a former similar drug producer that adjusted to the generic drug legislation:  
 
You cannot have a first class product and a second class product. […]. With the generic drug 
legislation […] you had an enormous amount of products in the market that did not provide 
bioequivalence. Brazil will have to abandon the definition of similar drug. Because with 
bioequivalence done at the same basis, you put an end in this market (Interview with local 




Framing the generic drugs: access to safe and efficient medicines 
Particularly important for this study is how local industrialists adapted their 
preferences to fit the generic drug regulation. As the theoretical chapter of this thesis 
suggested, preferences can be assessed by looking at how actors frame their claims 
and this can be observed empirically by looking at the content of their discourse and 
demands. As presented in the previous chapter, local producers used to defend 
vehemently their rights to use a brand name and were pretty uneasy about 
introducing new technical requirements to register off-patent medicines. 
Paradoxically, nowadays local producers account for 88% of the generic drug market 
in value. They present themselves as government partners to increase market 
competition, reduce the cost of medicines, and improve the quality of drugs (cf. 
Finotti 2009a); some of the biggest challenges are being faced by electors-
consumers. These local generic manufacturers connect their demands to two policy 
domains: industrial development and production of high quality off-patent 
medicines. They have established a link between the new stringent regulatory rules, 
successful performance of national pharmaceutical firms and affordable quality of 
medicines. This suggests that local producers not only internalised the discourse that 
the bioequivalence test is a concept of quality control, but also began an aggressive 
dissemination of this normative frame, reinforcing the path of the Generic Drug Act. 
Looking at local producers’ demands after the generic drug reform helps illustrate 
how preferences are endogenous rather than fixed, i.e. adjustable to the policy 
process. One of the current demands of generic manufacturers is to assure that 
prescription of medicines must be done by the international non-proprietary name or 
the Brazilian non-proprietary name: 
 
[…] another important challenge to overcome barriers of access to medicines is related to the 
behaviour of medical class. It is essential health professionals use the generic name when 
prescribing medicines, as a way of assuring an economic feasible treatment to their patients, 
which at the same time assures its safety and efficacy (Pro-Genericos 2009a: 16).  
 
The exclusion of the use of a brand-name on generic drugs labels is perhaps one of 
the main examples of how pharmaceutical firms changed their preferences after the 
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reform period. The core element of the Presidential Decree 793/1993 was to exclude 
brand-names of similar products, which both local and multinational industrialists 
reacted vehemently against, as was discussed in the preceding chapter. The 
advertisement of a brand name product is a key component of a pharmaceutical 
business, which usually focuses on fostering the credibility of the product (cf. Booth 
1996). This quote, from the document that presents the institutional profile of Pro-
Genericos, highlights the pharmaceutical firms that opted for the generic drug 
business, adapted to the regulatory process that mandated that they should exclude 
their brand names in order to commercialise these products in Brazil.  
 
Furthermore, generic drug manufacturers have reiterated in policy relevant forums 
(such as Congressional hearings) that bioequivalent generic drugs are an important 
tool for securing access to safe and efficient medicines. One of the core demands of 
Pro-Genericos is that public purchase of medicines should respect the Generic Drug 
Act. As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, public purchase of medicines 
by the Unified Health System has privileged similar drugs instead of generic drugs, 
given the requirements of the public procurement legislation. Pro-Genericos have 
actively advocated for a reformulation in the public procurement law, which is under 
discussion in Congress.  
 
In 2004, the Federal Deputy Walter Feldman (PSDB/SP) proposed a bid, number 
3536, suggesting that public procurement should take into account – besides the 
regular requirements of Law 8666 - the certificate of Good Manufacturing Process 
and bioequivalence tests. Little is known why Deputy Walter Feldman decided to 
introduce this bid, however Pro-Genericos have been actively advocating approving 
this legislation in Congress. The president of Pro-Genericos, Odinir Finotti, 
commented in a public event, “the Law 8666 forces the public manager to purchase 
by the lowest price. But there is a limit to where the generic drug can go in terms of 
price, crossing that it would put at risk the quality of the product we defend”. In the 
document “Pro-Generics: institutional profile” (Pro-Genericos 2009a), the 
association placed public procurement of medicines as one of its core challenges. It 
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reinforced the imperative need to take into account ‘quality of medicines’ to secure 
safety and quality of medicines provided in the Unified Health System: 
 
The criterion of public purchase of medicine is also on the agenda of the challenges of 
generic industries in the Brazilian market. The sector believes that imposition of quality 
control criteria, according to the Brazilian sanitary legislation, in the public purchase of 
medicines is essential to society as a whole. Besides price requirements, it is necessary to 
also include requirements of bioequivalence tests and therapeutic equivalence in the public 
procurement, assuring safety and efficacy of medicines consumed by the users of the Unified 
Health System (SUS) (Pro-Genericos 2009a: 16).  
 
This evocative language highlights the quality value attached to bioequivalence 
drugs. However, this linkage has been challenged by some groups of society as 
unnecessary and raises the debate as to whether this regulatory requirement is not 
just a manoeuvre to reduce competition of off-patent medicines (this is elaborated in 
the next chapter). Regardless of the internal motivation, which is not possible to 
observe empirically, indeed this discourse has a clever strategy as there is no room 
for policy discussion about the merits of quality control, nor space for support in the 
direction of “poor quality drugs”. As the local industries began to adapt, they 
highlighted themselves as producing high-quality drugs as much as innovator 
companies, providing a better product to consumers and contributing to access to 
medicines. In every public event assessed by this study, Pro-Genericos emphasises 
the centrality of bioequivalent generic drugs to as a certificate that medicines are safe 
and effective, linking generic drugs as to a major societal concern (access to 
medicines) and thus building a social image. Representatives of generic 
manufacturers also linked the generic drugs to industrial success that helps Brazil’s 
economic development:  
 
The Generic Drug Act contributed significantly to local capital pharmaceutical industries, as 
they could effectively improve and develop qualitatively and qualitatively. National firms 
have done an interesting investment in know-how, technology, knowledge; such as that 
today they can compete equally in any international market. In other words, the regulation 
led firms to operate in another level, a higher level. […] In this sense, never in the history of 
the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil have you ever seen the situation we have today (Finotti 
2009a).  
 
Additionally, I challenged a Brazilian industrialist to imagine a scenario where the 
regulatory requirement of bioequivalence was reversed and, if that could be possible. 
He vehemently reacted: 
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I think this is an enormous incoherence, in the counter direction of any global wave. […] 
You have some standards that are basic in legislation of medicines. If a similar drug is not 
bioequivalent, then it should be considered a new product or a second standard product. 
Unless a similar drug has an incremental gain in pharmacotechnology […] that represents a 
new product, subjected to a patent and everything that involves a new product. I would tell 
you that change the Brazilian legislation is an utopia. I believe that ANVISA would not 
allow this because it is to play against 10 years of a discourse and against what is happening 
in the world. That means that it is very positive that Brazil follows these standards because 
there was a monumental increase in the quality of local pharmaceutical companies, which 
can now compete equally in any part of the world, can export its products. So I think that to 
return to this discussion is to return to a discussion that in my opinion is absolutely empty 
(Interview with local pharmaceutical businessman B 2009).  
 
What these two industrialists suggest is that there is a consensus that off-patent 
products must be equal to their innovation versions and according to them. This is 
not to say that the international norms diffused by WHO or the American Medicine 
Regulatory Agency (FDA) have driven Brazil’s policy, but these quotes highlight 
how the national institutional context mediates this process. Observe the shift in the 
discourse of national industrialists compared to the antecedent period, where local 
firms had demonstrated strong concern with the magnitude and the pace of the 
reforms in the pharmaceutical sector. As pointed out in the previous chapter by a 
government official that participated in the debates of the generic drug reform, this 
group was extremely opposed to virtually all aspects of the generic drug regulation. 
Consequently, the fact that these industrialists are now strong advocates of this 
regulation also highlights how their preferences have adjusted in the course of the 
policy process. In turn, the inclusion of bioequivalence tests in the Brazilian norm 
reinforces the path of international generic drug regulatory practices. Another 
relevant aspect of this discourse is that the off-patent medicines’ reputation and 
quality are bound together into the regulatory concept of bioequivalence. Thus, the 
negative image of pharmaceutical firms diffused during the period of generic drug 
reform is offset by this social image of a government partner that collaborates in the 
provision of public goods (in this case, medicines) and contributes in the industrial 
development of the country.   
 
Again, this is not to say that they are not profit seekers but their utility is adjustable. 
For instance, instead of promoting the brand name product, generic drug 
manufacturers promote the credibility of their industry name. Furthermore, because 
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the Brazilian regulation allows a period until 2014 to adapt the similar drug products 
to the generic drug norm, many companies now use the same application dossier to 
register a generic drug and a bioequivalent similar drug (with a brand name) with the 
Resolution 133 and 134, 2003 mandate (Interview with local pharmaceutical 
businessman B 2009). The brand name product will be advertised at doctors’ clinics 
with competitive prices and the generic version will go to drug retailers to be 
interchangeable. This discussion leads to the next section that deals with the 
commercial skills of Brazilian private entrepreneurs. 
 
Using comparative advantage: commercial acumen  
Peter Evans noted, during the 1970s when he was conducting his research on 
industrial development in Brazil, that Brazilian pharmaceutical entrepreneurs are 
good businessmen (Evans 1979). This section shows how local pharmaceutical 
entrepreneurs saw possibilities to adjust to the regulation and took advantage of this 
market opportunity to redefine their business in order to fit the new institutional 
context, thus redefining their policy preferences and demands to the generic drug 
norm51
The study of Abreu (
.  
 
2004) on the competitiveness of the Brazilian generic 
pharmaceutical industry suggests that access to the distribution chain was crucial to 
the success of local entrepreneurs in this sector. A large proportion of Brazil has 
access to medicines through out of pocket spending, thus drug retailers play an 
important role in the provision of medicines (Frenkel 2008; Frenkel 2008a; Pinto et 
al. 2010). Brazil has more than 60,000 pharmacies (more than twice the number 
recommended by the WHO) (cf. O Globo 2009b). To introduce a product on the 
pharmacy’s shelves and deal with the complex pharmaceutical distribution chain 
there is a business acumen in which local firms have large comparative advantage 
(Abreu 2004). This opportunity also facilitated the possibilities to adjust to the 
reform and help explain their advantage against large multinational generic drug 
corporations. Furthermore, a representative of the pharmaceutical sector mentioned 
                                                 
51 A recently published newspaper article presents an interesting profile of the founder of EMS 
pharmaceutical industry and his commercial ability to survive in the generic drug sector, declining 
several merge/acquisition proposals (Valor Economico 2011) 
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two examples of managerial failure of multinational firms attempting to enter into 
the Brazilian market, but which have also contributed to give market advantage to 
local firms. The Indian firm Rambaxy, which brought a foreign executive with little 
knowledge of the Brazilian marketplace, and the Canadian Apotex, which was run by 
an executive with experience in brand-name drugs, both had little experience with 
the particularities of the drug retail network and distribution chain in Brazil and 
failed to encounter a commercialisation channel (Interview with local pharmaceutical 
industry informant A 2009).  
 
A second explanation for the limited participation of multinational firms (vis-à-vis 
local firms) in the generic drug sector was their delay in entering the Brazilian 
market and this is also a product of the uncertain institutional setting during the 
reform. The interviewee commented that these multinational firms were flirting with 
Brazil and were unsure as to when would be the best time to enter the market. By 
deciding to observe the evolution of the market, they lost the opportunity (Interview 
with local pharmaceutical industry informant A 2009).  In other words, as 
international firms were agnostic of market penetration of generic drugs, they 
decided to observe from the outside or cautiously join local pharmaceutical firms 
through joint-ventures before entering into the generic drugs market (ibid). This 
initial behaviour of foreign firms resembles the second postulate discussed in the 
theoretical chapter that refers to uncertainty (Hall 2005: 134). The generic drug 
reform created an unstable environment. As national firms began to adapt to the new 
institutional context and succeed in the generic drug business they reinforced the 
path, thus inducing other firms to behave accordingly.  
 
Recently, there has been a movement of research-based firms into the generic 
market, particularly emerging markets such as Turkey, Russia and India (The 
Economist 2008; The Wall Street Journal 2008; Financial Times 2009; IMS 2009). 
With the consolidation of the generic drug sector in Brazil, the country also became a 
business target for these companies (O Globo 2009; Wall Street Journal 2009b). 
Furthermore, many multinational pharmaceutical firms are redirecting their 
investments from developed to emerging markets, and are keen to increase middle-
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class demand for medicines (The Economist 2008; The Wall Street Journal 2008; 
Financial Times 2009; Financial Times 2009a; Wall Street Journal 2009b; New York 
Times 2010) [this phenomena was also observed by Quental, Abreu et al. (2008: 
625) and Abreu (2004)]. The decision of research-based firms to join the generic 
drug market and the success of multinational generic drug firms (e.g. Indian and 
Israeli firms) in the global arena is an interesting phenomenon, but it is not the aim of 
this study to analyse their behaviour. What is important for this thesis is the fact that 
international firms considered Brazil as a business prospect, which may be associated 
with the opportunities created by local pharmaceutical firms. The fact that 
international firms rely on the success of local firms to enter into the Brazilian 
market (whether through merging/acquisition or joint ventures) not only stabilises 
the path of generic drug reform in the country but also illustrates how multinational 
firms have adjusted their preferences from innovation to production of copied 
medicines.  
 
There are three examples of the movement of research-based firms into the generic 
drug sector in Brazil, creating hybrid pharmaceutical industries, with both generic 
and innovator portfolio (and consequently multiple preferences and demands). First, 
Novartis was one of the first research-based companies to develop a generic division 
(Exame 2005; The Financial Express 2005). Novartis adopted an aggressive strategy 
to gain the pharmaceutical market in Brazil. By introducing Sandoz and merging 
with the German Hexal (established in Brazil since 2001), Novartis increased their 
generic drug portfolio to 170 medications. Its market increased from US$ 30 million 
in 2004 to US$ 80 million in 2005 (Exame 2005). A second example is Sanofi-
Aventis, which acquired one of the prosperous Brazilian generic drug industries, 
Medley, in May 2009 for US$662.8 million. In a note the French pharmaceutical 
group mentioned: "This acquisition will enable Sanofi-Aventis to reinforce its 
number one ranking among pharmaceutical companies in Brazil, with a total 12% 
market share. Sanofi-Aventis will become the leading player in the field of generics 
in Brazil and in Latin America" (Wall Street Journal 2009b). The third example is 
the American Merck Sharp Dohme. The Director of External Affairs in Brazil 
commented: “We don’t work with generic products worldwide and neither in Brazil. 
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Although Merck nowadays have a strategy to emerging markets, we are evaluating 
the possibility of having what we call branded generics or branded products” 
(Sanches 2009). There is an evident reorganisation of the generic drug market, 
increasing the participation of foreign capital in the Brazilian generic market (Gazeta 
Mercantil 2009; O Globo 2009). The effects of these hybrid firms are afoot and yet 
to be assessed, which is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Multiple interests: the intellectual property debate 
 
As we have seen so far, the generic drug policy brought about an extraordinary 
improvement to national industrial units, which prepared these firms for the 
expansion of their business in the research and development of new uses of known 
pharmaceutical products, for example. These are known as incremental innovations. 
Shadlen (2010), using data from the Brazilian Innovation Survey, suggests that 
investment in research and development by local firms increased significantly 
between 2000 and 2005 (344% in pharmo-chamicals and 226% in pharmaceuticals). 
Data collected in the generic drug firm’s website also reveal an interest in R/D. 
Incrementha PD&I is a joint venture arm of Biolab and Eurofarma, two leading local 
generic drug industries engaged in research and development of both incremental and 
new molecule products (Eurofarma 2011). EMS Sigma Pharma, a leader in Brazil’s 
generic drug market, has the most modern centre for research and development in 
Latin American and has invested nearly U$ 13 million in R/D since 2002 (Globo 
2011). Coinfar (Consorcio da Industria Farmaceutica) is a joint venture between 
three national generic drug industries, Biolab, Uniao Quimica e Biosintetica; founded 
in 2005, it has been engaged in the research and development of analgesic and anti-
cancer products (Rezaie et al. 2008). Shadlen (2010) also points to the evolution of 
patent application at the INPI, where Brazilian patenting activity in pharmaceuticals 
increased by 300% between 1994 and 2005 (among these 50% only in 2001-2003).   
 
Additionally, since 2003 the Brazilian government has made efforts to stimulate 
pharmaceutical research and development activity in Brazil, which largely benefits 
national producers. During the Competitiveness Forum for the Pharmaceutical Chain 
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Production, which met between 2003 and 2006, pharmaceutical sector 
representatives assisted the government in identifying the bottlenecks to the sector’s 
expansion in Brazil (Brasil 2003). As Brazil is highly dependent on the import of raw 
materials to produce medicines (active pharmaceutical ingredients), this was 
identified as one of the priority areas for investment of the Industrial, Technological 
and External Trade Policy (PITCE) (Brasil 2003). Several important political 
decisions were taken as a result of this discussion: sectoral funds, such as a credit 
line within the National Development Bank (BNDES) to pharmaceutical industries 
(Profarma) (BNDES 2009); two legislations were approved by Congress to stimulate 
innovative activities in Brazil: The Innovation Act (Law 10.973/2004) and Goodwill 
Act (Law 11.196/2005). These legislations created mechanisms for financial, 
technical and managerial support for innovative enterprises. Furthermore, they focus 
on the strategic partnership between universities or technological institutes and 
enterprises; technology-based entrepreneurship; incubators and technological parks; 
hiring of academic researchers by the private sector (cf. OECD 2010). Additionally, 
in 2007, when the Ministry of Health launched the Mais Saude (More Health 
Programme), which focused on the Health Industry Complex, the government 
pushed forward initiatives to stimulate research and development in the 
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. There was a reformulation of  the BNDES 
programme, with the expansion of the credit line to stimulate research and 
development (Capanema et al. 2008).  
 
Thus, an important dimension of local industry’s identity is their position on the 
intellectual property debate. Intellectual property regulation is relevant for this study 
as it can limit or facilitate the introduction of market competition, and thus cannot be 
ignored. However, it is important to note that this is a policy arena closely related to 
trade policy, but with overlapping agendas to generic drug regulation, as decisions in 
IP can affect the supply of off-patent medicines. So far, this chapter has presented 
arguments of technical requirements to register and market a generic drug that are 
debated normally within the Ministry of Health and National Sanitary Surveillance 
Agency. Now it turns to elements of trade policy, where the arena is broad, including 
the three branches of government (Congress, Judiciary and Executive government 
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and its departments). As discussed in the theoretical chapter, this thesis supports the 
argument that political actors have multiple interests (at times conflicting interests); 
as they weigh up one side of their preferences, this also asserts one dimension of 
their identity more strongly than the other. In other words, a gain in intellectual 
property capabilities would suggest conflicting interests of local producers at the 
same time as having to secure policies that benefit their generic drug business, while 
advocating for revisions in the patent system to accommodate their new innovative 
capabilities. For example, the study by Shadlen (2010) suggests that, as the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical sector gains new capabilities, it could alter their policy preference: 
from advocating for policies to facilitate the use of, and access to, knowledge, to 
advocating revisions in the patent system to accommodate incremental innovations. 
As a consequence, Shadlen argues, this could possibly erode Brazil’s celebrated 
health-oriented intellectual property coalition. Similarly, the study by Kunisawa 
(2009) suggests that prohibitions against the patent of incremental innovation could 
harm local industry as this is an area where national industry may have a chance to 
generate new technology.  
 
Nevertheless, my intention here is not to analyse the contestation over intellectual 
property per se as this could be a topic for another study (cf. Hasenclever et al. 2008; 
Kunisawa 2009; Shadlen 2009; Shadlen 2009a; Shadlen 2010). The analytical effort 
is to assess how, when and on which issues the intellectual property debate affects 
the generic drug regulation, which is not an easy task given the fuzzy line between 
these two arenas. During field research for this study there were three major issues 
on the intellectual property agenda in Brazil in which generic drugs appeared in the 
debates. The first is related to patent extension, or the pipeline mechanism; the 
second relates to the criteria for patent protection (e.g. second medical use); and the 
third relates to the procedure for registering a patent in Brazil. The position of local 
pharmaceutical producers on these three controversial issues shows how they 
embraced the identity of generic drug manufacturers, but also illustrates how their 
advocacy activities reinforce the path of generic drug policy. Similarly to Shadlen 
and Kunisawa, I also acknowledge that local producers have acquired new 
capabilities in research and development, which has added a new aspect to their 
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“preference function”. However, there as we shall see, there are several reasons to 
believe that their new skill has not been sufficient (yet) to alter their policy 




Some research-based pharmaceutical firms have claimed the rights to extend their 
products patent protection based on Articles 230 and 231 of Brazil’s Law 9.279/96 
(Brasil 1996a), which is known as the “pipeline patent”. This mechanism refers to a 
“validation in Brazil of a patent issued abroad, ratifying the examination conducted 
by the foreign patent office, provided that the product covered by the patent 
application was not made commercially available” (Kunisawa 2009: 300). This 
means that, for one year only (in 1997), the INPI revalidated pharmaceutical patents 
granted in foreign countries52
Folha de Sao Paulo 2007
. For example, a patent issued for the first time in 1990 
in the UK and recognised in Brazil in 1996 (date of IP law) will expire in 2010 in 
both countries, i.e. 14 years in Brazil and 20 years in the UK. Innovator companies 
argue that some pipeline patents lasted less than 20 years in Brazil; if this was so, 
they would have the legal right to extend it. Between 1996 and 1997, approximately 
1,182 pipeline patents had been requested in Brazil; among these four were 
HIV/AIDS medicines ( ; Estado de Sao Paulo 2008; Jurberg 
2008). However, until 2000 only half of these were granted, while the others were 
still under review (Jurberg 2008). Consequently, and arguably, because of this delay 
in granting the patent, innovator companies could then request a patent extension to 
cover this backlog.  
 
While in 1999 there was only one patent extension request in the Brazilian judiciary, 
in 2008 the Federal Regional Court, 2nd Region (where 90% of similar trials are 
decided) ruled 25 cases of innovator industries against the National Patent Office 
requesting patent extension (Folha de Sao Paulo 2007). The first patent extension 
contest in Brazil took place in 2006, when the French industry Sanofi requested a 
                                                 
52 It is argued that this mechanism was included in the Patent Act because Brazil had little expertise in 
analysing pharmaceutical patent applications. It is important to remember that, from 1945 to 1996, 
Brazil did not recognise pharmaceutical patents, thus it would have to build up expertise in this area. 
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patent extension for Plavix up to 2013. Plavix is a heart disease medication and the 
second leading drug sold in the world (Folha de Sao Paulo 2006). While Sanofi 
argued that there was a delay by the INPI in granting the Plavix patent, which could 
justify an extension of their patent rights, the Judiciary understood that the Plavix 
patent extension was granted in France in 2000 and Sanofi only proposed the law suit 
in Brazil in 2005 (Valor Economico 2006b; Barros 2007). The court understood that 
the problem resulted from the company’s own delay in requesting the patent 
extension. The relevance of the Plavix case is two-fold: first, this was the first time 
that courts ruled against patent extension in Brazil, which established a precedent for 
further judicial decisions. Second, it was also the first time that Pro-Genericos 




briefs are when someone volunteers to assist a court decision [for more information 
about interest group involvement in courts see Baumgartner and Leech (
)]. Similar to the INPI, which had to build up its expertise in pharmaceutical 
patent analysis, so also had the Brazilian judiciary. Courts were ill-equipped to deal 
with the overflow of intellectual property litigations. Abifina then created a study 
programme in 2003 and 2004 to diffuse this issue. It organised four international 
seminars with experts from different countries to educate not only the judiciary but 
other business associations. As a result of this exchange of information, Business 
Associations got on track of amicus curia, following the American and European 
experience in this strategy. Brazilian firms also began using amicus as a tactic to 
influence the government (Oliveira 2010).  
 
In the case of Plavix, where Pro-Genericos filed an amicus, they brought elements of 
access to medicines, price reduction and impact of generic drugs to the trial. Pro-
Genericos presented a study demonstrating that 14 pills of Plavix cost R$ 135.00 
(maximum price), and that the governmental purchase of Plavix represented an 
expenditure of R$ 720,000 in 2005 and 2006. The association argued that generic 
                                                 
53 Although Sanofi questioned the participation of Pro-Genericos, as it could have economic interests 
involved, the Superior Court of Justice understood the association’s interest was juridical besides the 
economic advantages that might be associated with it. According to the Court Ministry, Nancy 
Andrighi, the discussion that this trial referred to was the right to freely produce medicines, an issue 
that is above all juridical and by which the contestation is exclusively related to (World Health 
Organization 2010d). 
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drug competition would reduce the price by at least 35%, meaning that 
governmental resources would be better spent elsewhere and would also increase the 
population’s access to this medicine (Valor Economico 2006b). Vera Valente, 
former president of Pro-Genericos, declared in a newspaper interview: “The 
decision of the Rio de Janeiro court is a watershed in patent extension affairs. Pro-
Genericos does not question the validity of patent but the generosity of extending it, 
which is an absurdity”. She declared that the relevance of this decision goes beyond 
patent rights: “the referee mentioned other relevant topics such as access to 
medicines, lower prices, monopoly of industries and public budget” (Valor 
Economico 2006b). Besides the case of Plavix, in 2006 alone there were a further 11 
judicial trials where the local pharmaceutical industry or its associations were 
assisting the INPI (Valor Economico 2006c). 
 
Since then, Pro-Genericos has been advocating heavily against patent extensions. 
These court decisions have been ruled favouring the INPI and local industries, 
which is slowly building precedents in refusing patent extensions (Valor Economico 
2007)54. The association estimates that, if all research-based firms are successful in 
expanding their patents, the Brazilian population would spend around US$ 367.65 
million between 2007 and 201355 Folha de Sao Paulo 2008 ( ). According to Pro-
Genericos, in less than two years after the Plavix patent expiration the market for 
Clopidogrel (its generic version) more than doubled from 777.240 units sold in 2007 
to nearly 1.500.000 units in 2009 (Pro-Genericos 2009). The generic drug version 
represents more than 60% of the market share in volume, with a price reduction of 
57% (ibid). This reinforces the path of generic medicines in Brazil and the role of 
the generic drug association in keeping the government accountable to it.  
                                                 
54 To contrast these decisions, multinational firms have moved its judicial requests to Brasilia, instead 
of Rio de Janeiro, where these cases are usually decided. INPI’s headquarters are in Rio, traditionally 
the TRE-RJ, the locus of the debate. With the regional tribunal less sensitive, lawyers have argued 
that legally Brasilia should be the locus of INPI. In Brasilia, INPI is represented by the General 
Prosecutors that have less experience in these cases than the ones in Rio de Janeiro, thus they might 
be more sympathetic to multinational firms’ arguments (Valor Economico 2007). 
55 This estimate is based on the projections of sales volume of each product under contest until 2013 
(excludes the inflation and currency variations) multiplied by the average/pill price and reducing 35% 
(according to the legislation, generic drug price must be at least 35% lower then its reference version). 
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TRIPS Plus agenda: polymorphs and second use 
In 2007, the National Patent Office (INPI) launched a series of meetings with 
representatives of the pharmaceutical sector to discuss a revision in their patent 
standards. The INPI officials decided to revise the technical requirements for patent 
granting after participating in an international Congress where several controversial 
topics were raised. Furthermore, representatives of the pharmaceutical sector also 
requested a revision in Brazil’s rules (Interview with government official C 2009). 
The three revision meetings were organised with representatives of industrial 
segments of the pharmaceutical sector - generic, innovator, similar and public 
producers56 INPI 2010 - and took place between June and July 2007 ( ). 
Representatives of HIV/AIDS patients have expressed an interest in participating in 
these events, but at first the INPI demonstrated concern about the extent to which this 
group could contribute to the technical meetings. This controversy and the perception 
of AIDS advocacy on this matter is assessed in the next chapter.  
 
There were two contentious topics on the agenda: patent of polymorphs and, second, 
medical use. Polymorphs relate to the ability of a solid material to exist in more than 
one form or crystal structure. This is important in the manufacturing of 
pharmaceutical ingredients as it may affect the bioavailability, manufacturing, and 
stability of the drug product (cf. Raw and Yu 2004). The second medical use refers to 
innovative therapeutic use of medicines already patented. Arguably, both could be 
classified as incremental innovation of existing products, thus subject to patent 
protection. Because these are provisions beyond the TRIPS requirements, they are 
usually referred to as TRIPS-Plus (which also includes the pipeline mechanism). The 
international agreement on intellectual property set minimum standards that each 
member country would need to implement to secure the rights of inventors; however, 
the expansion (or not) of this norm would be at the discretion of each government. 
For instance, much has been discussed about the US pressure to expand the IP rights 
through bilateral trade agreements with developing countries, for example Nicaragua, 
Jordan, and Mexico (Drahos 2001). However, up until the writing-up process of this 
                                                 
56 Detailed records of these meetings are available on the INPI website www.inpi.org.br.  
 195 
thesis, Brazil had not been engaged in any bilateral or regional trade agreement that 
could encourage a reformulation in the patent system (cf. Vivas-Eugui 2003; Mayne 
2005). As noted, the decision to revise the scientific guidelines to assess patent 
requests was taken after the INPI officials learnt in an International Congress, 
through the experience of other countries, of the controversies associated with it. 
However, how and the extent to which this would be possible in Brazil would depend 
on the policy legacies and commitments in place in Brazil.  
 
Defining the extent of innovation in these cases has proved to be a difficult task and 
a challenge for policy-makers at the INPI and ANVISA, thus this debate migrated to 
Congress. In late 2007, the Federal Deputy, Fernando Coruja, introduced a bill to 
eliminate patents for second medical use and polymorphs (Bill 2.511/2007) (a year 
later, another similar bill was introduced by Deputy Paulo Teixeira and Deputy Dr 
Rosinha – Bill 3.995/2008 and attached to the previous bill). Given the high level of 
disagreement around this topic, several public hearings were held in Congress to give 
an opportunity to all sides to express their views on the matter (Soares and Correa 
2010).  
 
One side of the debate, supported by the representatives of research-based firms 
(Interfarma and ABPI), understands that the patent of incremental innovation is 
important as it could stimulate industrial development in Brazil and give opportunity 
to local firms to recover the costs of their investment, thus creating an incentive to 
research and development. In contrast, critics such as national industry 
representatives (Pro-Genericos and Alanac) and AIDS activists, argue that these 
slight alterations are simply a way to extend patent protection of medicines and delay 
market competition. In the polymorphism debate, for example, Marcos Oliveira, 
Vice-President of Abifina, declared “Nobody invents polymorphs. What you 
discover is that under certain conditions of production you can have different 
polymorphs. This is a discovery […] it has nothing to do with invention”. He 
concludes, “Today this is absolutely trivial. You get a molecule and send it to a 
laboratory and it will produce 10, 12, 15 or 20 different polymorphs out of the same 
molecule. So, there is no inventive activity” (Oliveira 2010). Furthermore, 
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representatives of local firms suggest that Brazilian firms would still need more time 
to expand their R/D activities to be able to benefit from these regulations. The 
Brazilian Association of National Pharmaceutical Industries (ALANAC) expressed 
their position against the patent of second medical use and polymorphs and 
supported Deputy Fernando Coruja’s bill: 
This matter [second medical use and polymorph patents] does not favour the development of 
national industry. By opposite, its permission would represent a huge drawback vis-à-vis the 
accomplishment that national industries have gotten, Brazil’s development and the 
pharmaceutical industry [Alanac’s position, represented by Carlos Alexandre Geyer, at the 
Commission of Social Security and Family of the Deputy Chambers] (Alanac 2009).  
Finally, this position is also corroborated by Pro-Genericos. “Pro-Genericos and 
other institutions argue that if this product [resulted from a polymorphic alteration] 
has the same efficacy than the other, given that is the same product, then it should 
not be patented. […] From our perspective it is not a new product”, said a 
representative of Pro-Genericos in an interview for this project (Lobo 2009). He 
explained, “what is new is the process of production, and then you need to patent the 
process but it can not patent the product” (ibid). 
 
The contestation around these topics involves not just segments of the 
pharmaceutical industry and patient advocacy, but also highlights a divergence 
between government departments (cf. Kunisawa 2009). Registration of 
pharmaceutical patents in Brazil requires a revision from the Patent Office, but also 
permission of a National Sanitary Surveillance Agency (ANVISA). Since 2001, 
ANVISA has also been involved in granting patents for pharmaceuticals in Brazil, a 
mechanism named “prior approval”. The divergence between these two government 
departments is discussed in the following section. For now it is important to point out 
that, while ANVISA has adopted a strict interpretation of the patent legislation, the 
INPI has been more sympathetic of incremental innovation patents. ANVISA argues 
that “patent of polymorphs could led to monopolies that inhibit competition and also 
limit the universe of local inventors” (Soares and Correa 2010: 46). Contrastingly, 
the INPI is aligned with the arguments that patent of polymorphs could integrate 
Brazil with the global technology network (Soares and Correa 2010).  
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Finally, the Minister of Health, Jose Gomes Temporao, declared in an interview to a 
newspaper in 2008 that he was reluctant in accepting the introduction of the new 
patent mechanisms in the current patent system in Brazil (Valor Economico 2008). 
During the public hearing at the Chamber of Deputies in November 2008, it became 
clear that the Ministry of Health and Foreign Affairs was concerned that patent of 
incremental innovations could go against international debates in which Brazil has 
been leading, such as the Development Agenda of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and WHO’s Global Strategy in Innovation, Public Health and 
Intellectual Property (WHA 61.21) (Abia 2008). In other words, it was calling 
coherence from Congress, in that the government’s orientation on this matter should 
be aligned with its international advocacy agenda. Nevertheless, in Brazil’s 
democratic context, different groups engaged on the intellectual property reform 
have had the opportunity in Congress to express their perspectives57
Abia 2008
. The result of 
this deliberation is yet to be seen. Evidently, this discussion would also spill over 
into the Ministry of Industry, Development and Commerce that also sent a 
representative to this Congressional hearing. However, the meeting record suggests 
that the Minister of Health, Temporao, did not expand the position of his cabinet, but 
suggested that just the National Patent Office could not determine resolutions on 
patent of incremental innovation. It had to be discussed within an inter-governmental 
forum ( ).  
 
In this sense, following the discussions in Congress, the Executive government also 
debated this topic within the Inter-Governmental Group for Intellectual Property 
meeting in December 2008 (Ministerio do desenvolvimento Industria e Comercio 
Exterior 2008). The executive government officials reached a consensus that Brazil 
would not support second medical use and polymorph patents as these revisions did 
not benefit the national industries, given the level of development that they encounter 
(Revista Facto 2009). Although this decision is not enforceable, it is a signal to 
                                                 
57 Less is known about how the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) deliberates on which direction to 
support on international debates (Montero 2005). For example, there are no frequent public hearings 
and much of the decisions are taken though ad hoc consultations with other Ministries and interests 
groups. Despite Brazil’s international visibility on international heath diplomacy, much this overseas 
agenda did not appear in the field research for this case study. In an attempt to understand the linkage 
between both, I have interviewed decision makers at the MoFA. When questioned about the debates 
presented in this section, they referred me to other ministries/government departments. 
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Congress and to societal actors that the Brazilian government is not sympathetic to 
patents for incremental innovation. During the writing-up of this thesis, the Brazilian 
Congress was still debating this matter. 
 
This debate highlights important aspects of preference of pharmaceutical firms. 
While research-based pharmaceutical association (formed mainly by multinational 
corporations) frame their support to patent incremental innovations, arguing that this 
would foster the research and development capacity of local firms, the genuine 
representatives of local pharmaceutical firms (Alanac, Abifina and Pro-Genericos as 
the majority of their members are local producers) do not. They argue that some of 
these products that would require patent protection have no inventive novelty. 
Different government departments are more or less receptive towards each of these 
claims, while the INPI is sensitive to the necessity of clarifying the patent criteria in 
these cases. The other government department responsible for judging patent 
application, ANVISA, does not support these revisions. Given the controversy 
associated with this debate, Congress is now deliberating on which direction to take. 
Nevertheless, the preferences and demands of local producers in the polymorphism 
and second medical use suggest that these firms are still strong supporters of the right 
to replicate off-patent pharmaceutical products. In this sense, little has changed in 
this dimension of their preferences compared to the debates to implement the Patent 
Act in the early 1990s. However, advocating for a stringent patent protection system 
highlights a strong identity of local producers as generic drug manufacturers. 
 
Procedure to register pharmaceutical patents in Brazil 
The previous chapter mentioned that one of the reforms in the patent system was the 
procedure to grant patent protection in Brazil, giving authority to the National Health 
Surveillance Agency to review patent applications. This arrangement is called “prior 
consent” (anuencia previa). Note that this is again a topic from the territory of 
intellectual property. However, “prior consent” could facilitate or limit generic drug 
competition by defining whether a patent could be granted or not. Consequently, it 
can also determine the timing for generic drug competition and, as a result, it is 
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important to assess the interpretation of the pharmaceutical sector actors to this 
arrangement. 
 
In Brazil, every pharmaceutical patent request must be assessed by both the Patent 
Office and the Health Surveillance Agency. After the analysis by the INPI, which 
assesses the three patentability requirements (industrial application, new and 
inventive step), the application is forwarded to ANVISA, who revises the 
patentability requirements and assesses the relevant aspects of public health (e.g. the 
implications for public health). This means that the health surveillance agency has 
the power to veto the granting of patents in Brazil58
Basso 2006
. The role of ANVISA in the 
process of patent granting is arguable. In case-conflicting reports, a technical meeting 
is organised to resolve their analysis. If there is no consensus, patent applicants can 
fill an administrative or judicial appeal against the decision ( ). ANVISA 
has disagreed starkly with the INPI on issues regarding the procedures to approve 
pharmaceutical patents (Rodrigues-Junior and Murphy 2006; Guimaraes 2008; 
Kunisawa 2009; Shadlen 2010).  
 
Since September 2001, and immediately after the reform, the Brazilian Intellectual 
Property Association (ABPI) has been advocating against ANVISA’s prior consent 
on the grounds that the health surveillance agency does not have the technical 
expertise to assess patentability requirements, that its intervention duplicates the 
administrative procedure to examine patent application, and even questions the 
constitutionality of this procedure (given that, to be granted a patent, the product 
should present elements of invention, novelty and use, thus having less to do with its 
implications to public health) (Guimaraes 2008; Teixeira 2009). According to these 
advocates, all these requirements delay the examination process. Furthermore, 
because ANVISA has starkly disagreed with patent of second use and polymorphs, 
both ABPI and Interfarma argued that prior consent is harmful to the local 
                                                 
58 Alternatively, Cardoso’s administration could have adopted a different strategy to assess public 
health implications in patent analysis. For instance, it could have detailed the legislation to clarify 
conflicting interpretations or revise INPI’s parameters to spell out what could (or not) be patented. 
Given that article 229-C of the Patent Act was inserted through a Provisional Measure enacted by the 
President, there were no debates in Congress that could evidence the motivation to introduce 
ANVISA’s participation in this process (Basso 2006; Kunisawa 2009).  
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pharmaceutical industry as it reduces the incentives for these firms to invest in 
incremental innovation (Raimundo 2009). 
 
However, the perspective of prior consent could be harmful to the local industrial 
development if it is not shared by representatives of national industries. Looking at 
the position of Pro-Genericos, Alanac and Abifina (Brazilian Association of Fine 
Chemicals) on the Congressional hearings for the Bill 3709, local pharmaceutical 
producers seemed reluctant in advocating against ANVISA’s role in assessing patent 
application. The president of Pro-Genericos declared in the meeting of November 
2009:  
 
In our understanding […] and we speak here in the name of all Brazilians that use generic 
medicines. We understand that it would be prudent to continue these analyses [prior consent] 
very carefully. We - excuse my petulance - we believe that both agencies [INPI and 
ANVISA] should work together to find a way to harmonise the job of examining patent 
applications. We are saying (and everything is transitory) that… we understand that at this 
exact moment, taking into account how the country is now […] it is good for Brazilian 
society to be careful with this. […] [Pior consent] is in the [patent] law and we want to keep 
it. […] We want the law to be respected (Finotti 2009b).  
 
Similarly, in January 2011 the government department that provides legal advice to 
the Executive Government, the Solicitors General (Advocacia Geral da Uniao), 
issued a statement against ANVISA’s prior approval consent (Gazeta do Povo 2011). 
The president of Pro-Genericos, Odinir Finotti, promptly reacted against it citing 
that, with ANVISA’s assessment, the arguments for requesting a patent tend to be 
more solid, thus it is important to have an agency that deals with public health 
assessing technical aspects of patent requests (ibid). Furthermore, when questioned 
about the Bill 3907/2008, the vice-president of Abifina, Nelson Brasil, replied 
“Abifina’s members understand that prior consent offered by ANVISA regarding 
pharmaceutical patent application is a legal duty that aims to fulfil national public 
health interests, that is why it should be maintained. With respect to the content of 
this legal regulation, Abifina has not established a final position” (Brasil 2010). This 
advocacy to keep the prior consent institutional arrangement also facilitates the 
expansion of generic drug products, as ANVISA has opposed grant patents to several 





This section has analysed the position of local producers and generic drug 
manufacturers in different intellectual property contestations. The evidence 
culled from newspaper articles, official documents and interviews with key 
informants suggest that these actors still have a strong identity of off-patent 
medicine producers. Their preferences and demands in different forums and 
aspects of intellectual property highlight that they are trying to protect their 
rights to replicate medicines, despite their recorded gain in innovative 
capabilities as suggested by Shadlen (Shadlen 2010). This author has pointed to 
the contradictions of promoting and encouraging research and development in 
this sector (particularly given that Brazilian firms are more able to perform 
incremental innovations) at the same time as securing the agenda of health-
oriented intellectual property (as, for example, the prior consent arrangement). 
These findings further reinforce the concepts discussed in the theoretical chapter 
of this thesis, that actors have different and, at times, conflicting preferences. All 
the examples and conflicts discussed in this section suggest that the Brazilian 
government and the local pharmaceutical firms have a stake in expanding 
innovative capabilities and the generic drug market simultaneously. Their 
preferences and demands so far strongly indicate an identity and preference for 
expansion of generic drugs rather than revising the intellectual property status 
quo. Furthermore, these findings also highlight the importance of a qualitative 
study of actors’ preferences, as a narrow approach (support vs. opposition to 




This chapter provides several reflections for this thesis. Framed as a government 
intervention to overcome a market failure, it is expected that government would have 
a strong role in stimulating and promoting these products in order to encourage a 
demand and supply. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the Brazilian 
government has discontinued its strong advocacy for generic drugs, a fact that was 
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observed during the reform period, and the market demand is apparently fragile 
according to the information culled. It seems that the support of generic drug 
manufacturers has been crucial to preserve this norm throughout the 2000s. This is 
not to dismiss the role of ANVISA in enforcing the legislation, but to highlight how 
the advocacy of generic drug producers has been crucial in reinforcing and 
legitimising the path of the Generic Drug Act. This finding is relevant for the overall 
argument for several reasons. First, it reinforces how the alternative explanation, 
proposed in the first chapter on the diffusion of the World Health Organization, can 
provide guidelines on what would be done, but it is not sufficient to promote changes 
in domestic pharmaceutical regulation. The acceptance of local stakeholders is 
crucial in order to foster and legitimise these guidelines.  
 
Second, this chapter suggests how the preferences and demands of actors are flexible 
and adjustable in the course of the interaction with the policy process, rather than 
being fixed and linear. Despite the initial resistance of local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to the regulation of off-patent medicines, they have found 
opportunities to adjust and have successfully grabbed their place in the 
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. Citing the representative of the Minister of Health’s 
speech in a seminar about Patents and Generic Medicines in Brazil, the success of the 
generic drugs in Brazil is as a result of the dynamism and entrepreneurship of local 
businessmen (Guimaraes 2009). These producers had reorganised the interest 
groups’ representation to fit the agenda of generic drug regulation, supported the 
bioequivalence requirement and the use of INN/BNN in different forums, used their 
business acumen to retail their products and were strongly opposed to several 
legislations to expand the intellectual property rights. All these highlight how their 
preferences and demands were adjusted to fit the new institutional context but, in 
turn, how they reinforce the policy path. To put it differently, had local producers not 
adapted to the generic drug regulation, would this policy have developed the way it 
did? As this chapter has demonstrated, despite Jose Serra’s advocacy to bring foreign 
generic drug firms to Brazil to stimulate competition (Serra 2002: 295), multinational 
producers such as Apotex and Rambaxy were either suspicious of the potential of the 
Brazilian market and the stability of the regulatory norm or had taken failure 
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attempts to enter the market (e.g. problems in accessing the distribution channel). 
Thus, the support of local pharmaceutical producers is apparently crucial to the path 
of generic drug policy development. 
  
Third, with respect to the content of lobbying activity and the structure of interest 
group representation, several reflections can be observed. This chapter has 
demonstrated different policy demands of generic drug producers, ranging from a 
preference for generic drug products in public procurement of medicines to 
opposition to the revision in the Patent Act and others. Pro-Genericos and other 
business associations have collaborated with government by providing information 
and educating government officials about technical aspects of pharmaceutical 
regulation. Particularly interesting is that their claims are usually framed as 
promoting Brazil’s industrial development, but also partner with government in an 
effort to provide affordable and high quality pharmaceutical products. This is not to 
say that firms are not profit-generators, but that their preferences and the way they 
interact with government is more complex than the narrow approach to “utility 
maximisers”.  
 
Yet, on the complexity of preference formation, we have also seen that these 
producers have engaged in research and development of incremental innovation but 
also have been stimulated by government to do so. This might suggest the 
controversial decision on which direction to advocate for, whether to protect their 
generic drug business or advocate for expansion of the intellectual property 
protection to cover their incremental innovator products. Similarly, the Brazilian 
government has promoted and directed its attention to stimulate research and 
development of the pharmaceutical sector. As demonstrated in this chapter, the 
Ministry of Health in particular has launched an ambitious project to decrease the 
dependency of foreign capital in this sector. Decisions such as this might include 
giving priority to purchase products locally produced at the expense of cheaper 
imported versions, arguing that, in the long term, this will develop the industrial 
capacity of Brazilian firms. It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the merit of 
each of these options or uncover the inner motivation of these actors. What this 
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evidence tells us is that, by putting more weight and advocating more heavily for one 
of these sides, the actors highlight one aspect of their preferences, thus reinforcing 
one identity. In other words, local pharmaceutical producers in Brazil still have a 
strong identity of off-patent drug manufacturers, despite their recent expansion and 
gain in capability to carry out research and development. Similarly, the Brazilian 
government strongly indicates that it opposes a revision in the Patent Act and a 
commitment to carefully consider the public health dilemmas associated with it. 
 
A final reflection is worth mentioning here as to why these local firms were able to 
adapt better to the Generic Drug reform than to the intellectual property legislation 
(which they also starkly opposed). The answer to this is not simple and is beyond the 
scope of this thesis (see the study of Shadlen (2009a) for a discussion on domestic 
political mobilisation on intellectual property in Brazil and selected Latin American 
countries). Nevertheless it is worth considering that, as opposed to the generic drug 
regulation, where there was a strong governmental commitment on the necessity to 
change the direction of off-patent drug regulation, the intellectual property debate 
remains much more controversial, opening up room for different preferences to be 
expressed. Besides, local firms had been historically limited in their research and 
development capacity. Thus, their opportunity to adapt to the generic drug regulation 
was higher vis-à-vis their chances to adjust to the IP institutional context. 
 
In sum, this chapter assessed relevant aspects of the regulatory process of generic 
drug regulation in Brazil in the 2000s that explain the political stability of the reform 
and its effects on selected actors. The next chapter also explores the policy 
development stage but focuses on its unforeseen contingencies and the reaction of 
actors that had not been engaged in this debate to date.  
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6. Public production of medicines and HIV/AIDS activists: 
new actors in the generic drug regulatory process 
 
 
This chapter further expands the analysis of the regulatory process of generic 
medicines in the 2000s and turns now to assess the stakeholders that question the 
current architecture of the pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil. Normatively, the 
generic drug regulation is an intervention to overcome market failures, thus analyses 
of its effects tend to centre on government, market demand and supply. However, a 
process-tracing approach evidenced unintended consequences of this regulatory 
policy and the entrance of groups that where not engaged in the initial stages of the 
regulatory policy reform. Theoretically, this information provides reflections on the 
evolution of actors’ preferences and highlights important aspects of structure of 
interest group representation in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. From a practical 
point of view, it raises concerns on the stringency of Brazil’s regulatory guidelines. 
 
There is an increasing apprehension among AIDS activists about the stringency of 
Brazil’s regulation for generic medicines, citing that these rules might limit 
competition and undermine access to medicines. Similarly, public pharmaceutical 
factories have voiced their struggle to adapt to this norm for different reasons and 
questioned the necessity of such strict regulation. The decision to cluster these two 
actors in this chapter was for heuristic purposes. Both activists and the public 
pharmaceutical factories were less engaged in the generic drug reform but were 
apparently affected by this policy. Also, as seen in chapter 4, public pharmaceutical 
factories have a strategic relevance to the provision of AIDS medicines, thus 
combining these two stakeholders in order to facilitate the analysis and 
understanding of this aspect of the regulatory process. Because the time frames for 
chapters 5 and 6 are alike, interactions between these stakeholders are highlighted 
when necessary.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section of this chapter analyses the 
effects of generic drug regulation on the public production of medicines, focusing on 
 206 
the interpretation and reaction of public producers to this policy. This also serves as 
background information to the following section that assesses AIDS activists’ 
preferences and demands. Much of the off-patent antiretroviral drugs supplied to the 
National AIDS Program are produced by public pharmaceutical industries, thus have 
a direct impact on the treatment of this patients. The second part deals with AIDS 
activists and assesses how they began participating in the pharmaceutical regulatory 
process, what their claims are and how this contributes to the path of generic drug 
regulation in Brazil. Similar to the previous chapter, their agenda and participation 
on the intellectual property debate is also assessed and compared to the findings of 
the previous chapter.  
 
Public pharmaceutical industries 
 
While the previous chapter demonstrated how private local pharmaceutical industries 
have successfully adapted to the generic drug reform, this chapter discusses the 
struggle of public drug producers to adjust to it. Brazil has 18 public pharmaceutical 
industries (or laboratories) that supply most of the pharmaceutical assistance 
programmes. These public producers differ in their size, management and financial 
structure (Oliveira et al. 2006; Gomes et al. 2008). While some are attached to 
universities, others are federal and the responsibility of the state government. In 
2003, public industries were responsible for supplying 84% of medicines purchased 
by the Ministry of Health; these four public industries (Farmanguinhos/Fiocruz, 
Furp-Sao Paulo, Lifal-Alagoas e Lafepe/Pernanbuco) represented 75% of the supply 
(Bastos 2006). However, in terms of value, public suppliers represented 19% of 
expenditure, while private suppliers represented 81% (Lourenco and Chaves 2004). 
Public producers are also key providers of medicines to governmental programmes, 
such as Popular Pharmacy (Miranda et al. 2009; Pinto et al. 2010). All these 
highlight their relevance to the Unified Health System in Brazil. 
 
There are repeated criticism of the production of medicines in public industries on 
the grounds that it is inefficient (cf. Kaplan and Laing 2005). However, the 
production of medicines in public industries in Brazil is justified for several reasons. 
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Firstly, Brazil has public pharmaceutical industries in different regions of the country 
and they are the most important suppliers of medicines to public health programmes 
(particularly for chronic diseases) (Oliveira et al. 2006). Secondly, these public 
factories can provide information about the manufacturing process and costs of 
production of medicines. The disclosure of this information allows the government to 
establish target prices and the knowledge of whether private laboratories are 
demanding a fair price for their patented medicines (cf. Valor Economico 2001a). 
Thirdly, if Brazil has the capacity to produce patented medicines, it also allows the 
government to make credible threats to issue a compulsory license when negotiating 
prices with patent holders (Cohen and Lybecker 2005; Flynn 2008; Nunn 2008). 
Note that the role of public laboratories is beyond the supply of cheaper medicines; it 
refers to their capacity in regulating the pharmaceutical market and serving as a 
strategic mechanism to negotiate price with patent holders.  
 
Despite this strategic relevance, in the early 1990s public laboratories were 
struggling to keep their production capacity (Bermudez 1992). However, in 1994 the 
Federal public laboratory Farmanguinhos experienced a technical and administrative 
reform under the leadership of Eloan Pinheiro, a pharmacist with long experience 
working for multinational firms (Flynn 2008: 522). Additionally, during 1998 the 
Minister Jose Serra made important investments in Brazil’s public laboratories and 
strategically expanded public production of antiretroviral medicines (Flynn 2008; 
Nunn 2008). He allocated nearly US$ 40 million in modernising the production 
capacity of these industries to bring them into compliance with the new regulatory 
rules. This investment increased these public industries’ production capacity by 
seven times (Hasenclever and al 2004). A further US$ 100 million was invested 
between 2003 and 2005 (Bastos 2006).  
 
This experience in producing AIDS medicines has increased public laboratories’ 
capacity in reverse-engineering pharmaceutical products (Cassier and Correa 2003). 
Because imitators do not usually have complete information about a given drug 
manufacturing and synthesis process, it is necessary to rediscover the knowledge 
used to formulate this drug – this procedure is referred to as reverse-engineering. 
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Compared to the research and development investment and timeframe of discovering 
a new molecule, reverse-engineering is a relatively easier process but still implies the 
use of high technological capacity. This type of research is process-oriented instead 
of being product-oriented, which innovator companies are engaged with. Yet, both 
research strategies develop technological skills and the possibility of industrial 
development (see Evans 1979: 192 - footnote 5). 
 
They [Brazilian chemists] did not have access to the knowledge that the owners of patented 
molecules held or transferred to their licensees. Nor could they rely on references in 
pharmacopoeia on the components of these drugs since they were not disclosed. These 
chemists therefore reinvented tests to identify drug components, consisting of reverse 
engineering to find their formulae and synthesis processes. The knowledge acquired exceeds 
the industrial capacities of the government laboratory which is equipped only to produce the 
pharmaceutical form of the drug (Cassier and Correa 2003: 105).  
 
According to Cassier and Correa (2003), as public laboratories gain new capabilities 
in replicating innovator medicines, they have sought to take higher technological 
steps and embarked in research and development of incremental innovations59
Cassier and Correa 2003
. 
Nevertheless, public industries still face enduring challenges to adapt to the 
pharmaceutical regulations introduced in the late 1990s ( ; 
Flynn 2008; Gomes et al. 2008). One of the main challenges of public factories is to 
adapt to the regulatory rules such as Good Manufacturing Practices and 
Bioequivalence requirements. Until 2004, only four public producers received a 
certificate for Good Manufacturing Practices (Bastos 2006). But more controversial 
is the adjustment to provide bioequivalence tests (cf. PNUD 2006; Gomes et al. 
2008; Hasenclever et al. 2008). It is interesting to note that, during the 
pharmaceutical reforms that took place in the 1990s, and particularly the generic 
drug regulation that is the core object of this analysis, the process tracing analysis has 
found that representatives of public pharmaceutical producers had limited 
participation in the discussions and the enactment of these reforms. An interview 
with a government official that had insider information about these factories 
                                                 
59 There are two considerations here. Farmaguinhos, together with Lafepe, are Brazil’s most important 
public industries in terms of technological advancement. Anecdotal information suggests that after a 
change in the direction of Farmanguinhos in 2004 there was a brain drain in the research and 
development capacity of the institute. That being said, Farmanguinhos has engaged in further research 
and development of neglect disease medications; for example, a partnership with the DNDi (a non-
profit organisation engaged in developing new treatments for malaria, visceral leishmaniasis, sleeping 
sickness, and Chagas disease) (see www.dndi.org). 
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suggested that they were concerned with the direction of the generic drug reform, 
particularly the bioequivalence requirement, but any attempt to question this was 
largely set aside by Serra’s administration (Interview with public pharmaceutical 
factory informant A 2009). 
 
Consequently, there are several reasons for the slow pace of public industries to 
adapt to the bioequivalence requirement. Firstly, and particularly problematic, is the 
fact that public pharmaceutical producers (similar to private ones) are not able to 
incorporate all stages of the manufacturing process. Their limited technological 
capacity to produce active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) forces them to obtain 
them from foreign markets such as China and India and, to a lesser extent, Brazilian 
private firms. Public purchase of API must comply with the Public Procurement 
legislation and contracts are awarded to the bidder with the lowest price possible 
(Law 8666/1993). Because of the lowest price criteria, it is argued that some of raw 
materials supplied to public pharmaceutical industries are very low quality (Gomes et 
al. 2008). Because these raw materials are frequently rejected by the Department of 
Quality Control, it needs to be reprocessed, leading to a delay and increase in the 
manufacturing process. For example, between 2003 and 2006 among the 34 batches 
of antiretroviral drugs, 28 (nearly 80%) were below the international industrial 
performance of 97% (Costa et al. 2008). 
 
The problem with the quality of raw material limits not just the capacity of public 
laboratories to adjust to the sanitary regulation, but also impacts on timetable delays 
and production costs. For instance, to produce bioequivalence tests according to 
Brazil’s generic drug resolutions, producers must fix no more than three raw material 
suppliers, but giving priority to firms in public procurement is forbidden by the 
Public Procurement Act (public institutions are not allowed to privilege 
goods/services suppliers) (Costa 2009; Oliva 2009). According to this legislation, 
public procurement must be carried out in public bids and respect the criteria of the 
lowest price. Thus, it is important to note that the difficulty of public producers to 
adjust to the generic drug regulation is beyond a matter of business strategy, costs or 
technical capacity. It is also obstructed by public administration rules (such as the 
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Law 8666). Given that public pharmaceutical producers are regulated by the same 
health norms as private pharmaceutical industries, by 2014 all medicines produced 
must adjust to bioequivalence requirements or else will not be allowed to renew their 
registration.  
 
Secondly, public producers questioned the relevance of bioequivalence as a proxy of 
quality medicines. Because public industries have a long tradition of producing and 
supplying medicines to public service, it gave room to discuss the relevance of 
bioequivalence requirements (cf. Hasenclever and al 2004; Gomes et al. 2008). The 
argument is that these medicines are in use for a long time and have had their clinical 
performance validated already. Between 1996 and 2006, around 26% (sales) of the 
AIDS medications supplied to the National AIDS Program were produced by public 
industries (Costa 2010). Although there is no study about the effects (e.g. viral loan 
resistance) of antiretroviral drugs produced in public industries on AIDS patients, 
many studies reported the significant improvement in life expectancy and quality of 
life of AIDS patients in Brazil (Esau et al. 2003; Marins et al. 2003; Hacker et al. 
2004; Teixeira et al. 2004; Campos et al. 2005; Matida et al. 2005; Dourado et al. 
2006). Furthermore, other health programmes, such as the tuberculosis health 
programme, rely heavily on public industries to supply their demands for medicines 
(see table 10) (Bastos 2006; Gomes et al. 2008). It is then argued that, because 
historically Brazil has been using non-bioequivalent medicines, it can provide 
important evidence for pharmaceutical regulation. Additionally, public producers 
argue that their medicines are not only safe but can also be therapeutically better. For 
instance, the antiretroviral didanosine (ddI) is emblematic, as Farmanguinhos 
discovered a formulation that was more effective than the one produced by the 
innovator firm, Bristol Myers Squibb. Although the product was not bioequivalent to 
the BMS original version, its bioavailability was substantially better (cf. Cassier and 






Table 10. Ministry of Health expenditure (US$) on ARV purchases per pharma. Supplier. 
Brazil, 1996-2006.  
 
Laboratory 1996-2006 % 
State level public laboratories 372,641,996 14.26 
Federal level public laboratories 289,175,408 11.06 
National private public laboratories 131,374,039 5.03 
International private laboratories 1,820,614,256 69.65 
Total 2,613,805,699 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Health/National STD and AIDS Programme 
 
 
How have public producers expressed these concerns in terms of policy preferences 
and demands? Interestingly, there are no records of public pharmaceutical producers’ 
demands to reformulate or override the generic drug regulatory framework. Actually, 
there have been several discussions on how to get round the institutional constraints 
and adjust pharmaceutical products to the bioequivalence tests. There are three 
examples of this. Firstly, in July 2003 a seminar sponsored by the National 
Association of Public Laboratories (Alfob) together with the Minister of Health 
aimed to provide information about the situation of public pharmaceutical industries 
in Brazil (ANVISA 2003a; Oliveira et al. 2006). Although this would be a key 
opportunity to demand a revision or voice their dissatisfaction with the current 
regulation, participants suggested that one of the key areas for investment should be 
the restructuring of the system of quality, acquisition and equipments to conduct 
bioequivalence and therapeutically equivalence studies (Oliveira et al. 2006: 2386).  
 
Secondly, an innovative strategy to adjust public industries to ANVISA’s 
requirement was done in 2007 with the production of Efavirenz. That year, Brazil 
issued a compulsory license (CL) of Merck’s antiretroviral Stocrin (details of this 
event will be discussed later on in this chapter) (Carta Capital 2007; Exame 2008; 
Agencia Brasil 2009). Although Brazil has been threatening to issue a CL of 
antiretroviral medicines on the grounds that they could produce cheaper versions 
locally, it was not able to promptly replicate Enfavirenz in 2007 and the government 
had to import its generic version from India. It was only in 2009 that a public and 
private partnership between Farmanguinhos and three local private firms were able to 
deliver Efavirenz (Correio Braziliense 2009; Revista de Manguinhos 2009). This 
case was emblematic as it was the first generic drug produced by a public 
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pharmaceutical factory (and still so far). While the three private firms were 
responsible for synthesising raw materials, Farmanguinhos was responsible for the 
final formulation process (Revista de Manguinhos).  
 
Thirdly, in 2009 the Sao Paulo state pharmaceutical industry together with the largest 
public pharmaceutical manufacturer in Brazil, Popular Pharmaceutical Drug 
Foundation (FURP) (Fundação para o Remédio Popular), inaugurated a new 
production unit in Americo Brasiliense to produce generic drugs for the treatment of 
chronic disease (Folha de Sao Paulo 2009; FURP 2010a). FURP has a particular role 
in supplying medicines to the state of Sao Paulo pharmaceutical assistance 
programmes (75% of its production) (Oliva 2007). In 2006, its production reached 
2.5 billion pharmaceutical units and three thousand municipalities (FURP 2010). A 
particularly important client of FURP is the "Dose Certa" programme, a Sao Paulo 
state pharmaceutical assistance programme that has supplied essential medicines 
since 1995. The state of Sao Paulo invested nearly US$ 90 million (R$ 190 milhoes) 
to build the Americo Brasiliense unit and, during Jose Serra’s administration as 
governor of Sao Paulo state (2007-2011), an additional US$ 25 million (R$ 50 
milhoes) was invested in its pre-installation (FURP 2010a). The Americo Brasiliense 
unit will be managed through a public and private partnership (PPP), with the private 
sector responsible for the supply of APIs to facilitate generic drug production (Jornal 
O Imparcial 2009). 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that the Ministry of Health has undertaken 
significant reformulations in its public laboratories. Besides the aforementioned 
challenges, public producers also face two structural market changes. Firstly, in 2006 
a Ministerial Directive (Portaria Ministerial 698/2006) decentralised to sub-national 
states the responsibility for the public purchase of essential medicines. This severely 
affected the role of public industries, which would need to compete in a pulverised 
pharmaceutical market60 Valor Economico 2009d (cf. ; Costa 2010). For instance, the 
public industry Lafep reduced its annual revenue from R$ 100 million in 2006 to R$ 
                                                 
60 Previous purchase of essential medicines was centralised at the Ministry of Health. Purchase of 
medicines from public producers does not require public auctions, thus guaranteeing a fixed demand 
for medicines produced in public industries.  
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70 million in 2008 (Valor Economico 2009d). Secondly, although reverse 
engineering capacity represented a technological gain, public laboratories still face a 
technological lag. The case of antiretroviral production is suggestive as AIDS 
patients live longer and demand more sophisticated medicines to control viral loan 
resistance, for example. There is an increasing concern about the capacity of public 
producers in replicating complex medicines such as protease inhibitors (Lago and 
Costa 2009; Costa 2010).  
 
In 2007, the Minister of Health, Jose Gomes Temporao, decided to reformulate the 
role of public pharmaceutical industries as part of the Mais Saude (More Health) 
programme, which refers to the Health Industry Complex. The intention is to 
increase the market regulatory role of these industries (Acesso Brasil 2008; 
Ministerio da Saude 2009a). In 2008, three ministerial directives initiated the 
process: (1) an inter-ministerial directive 128/2008 established that the public 
purchase of APIs should give priority to local private producers to stimulate national 
industrial development; (2) the ministerial directive 978/2008 listed several 
pharmaceutical products that are strategic for the Unified Health System (SUS), 
which refer to higher added-value pharmaceutical products usually, for example, in 
AIDS and cancer treatment; (3) while the ministerial directive 374/2008 created the 
National Program to Sponsor Public production and innovation in the Health 
Industry Complex. So far, the Ministry of Health has formed nine new public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) between seven state laboratories and 10 private companies to 
produce 24 medicines, which will be available through the National Health System 
(see annex 5) (Ministerio da Saude 2009a). It is still too early to assess the results 
and effects of this initiative. In 2009, during field research for this project, the 
Ministry of Health was still defining the business model for these public and private 
partnerships. 
 
In sum, the fact that public pharmaceutical factories have been supplying the 
governmental pharmaceutical assistance programmes for decades with medicines 
that are not bioequivalent to an innovator product might raise doubts on the relevance 
of this requirement. It is not possible to say precisely what the effects or side effects 
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are of these products to the population’s health, as it was not identified in any study 
monitoring this. Also, it was not possible to say precisely the exact number of 
medicines produced by these public factories that would be the subject of 
bioequivalence requirement (note that not all off-patent medicines are required to 
produce this certificate, only highly toxic drugs). Nevertheless, what is particularly 
interesting is the fact that many academic publications have mentioned the 
discomfort and concern of the public producers with this aspect of the generic drug 
regulation but little has been done in terms of advocacy to voice their disagreement. 
By contrast, it was possible to observe an adjustment of these public producers to the 
new institutional setting as they manoeuvre their limitations to adapt to this 
regulation (such as the bidding legislation of public procurement discussed in this 
section). Although public pharmaceutical producers have been less active in voicing 
they concern to some aspects of the generic drug regulation, AIDS activists has been 




Brazil is renowned for its vibrant HIV/AIDS activism and the engagement of 
disease-patients in the HIV/AIDS policymaking process (Galvao 2002a; Nunn 2008). 
Chapter four has demonstrated that, during the 1990s, AIDS activists centred their 
agenda on demanding the provision of medicines by pressuring the government 
through the courts and media (cf. Scheffer et al. 2005; Nunn 2008). Following this 
period of initial confrontation, AIDS activists became an important partner of the 
Ministry of Health in designing public policies and implementing prevention 
initiatives to a vulnerable population (Galvao 2000; Nunn 2008; Galvao et al. 2011). 
Finally, during field research for this study, it was possible to observe that AIDS 
activism in Brazil has evolved once again. This patient advocacy group has 
participated actively in pharmaceutical regulatory debates, not just pressuring 
government through media or protests but by closely informing decision makers 
about highly technical regulatory aspects. This section analyses this new capability 
of AIDS activism, how this came about and its implications to the generic drug 
regulation. More abstractly, this provides important lessons on the evolution of 
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interest group preferences by demonstrating how the content of AIDS activism has 
changed over time; however, it also contributes to understanding the structure of 
interest group representation in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. The latter refers 
to the fact that, as much as pharmaceutical firms have collaborated with government 
in the design of the regulatory rules for the sector, AIDS activists have also actively 
participated in these debates.  
 
Some background information about the context of AIDS policy in Brazil in the 
2000s is important in order to understand the demands of AIDS advocacy groups. 
Brazil was the first developing country to provide universal access to AIDS 
treatment for all those in need in 1996 and has provided important evidence to the 
global response to the epidemic since then (Nunn 2007; Nunn et al. 2009). The 
impact and relevance of the Brazilian response is assessed through its impressive 
health outcomes. Several studies have demonstrated a reduction of HIV/AIDS 
mother-to-child transmission, a decline in mortality, morbidity and HIV/AIDS 
related hospitalisation, and an increase in life expectancy and quality of life for 
people living with HIV/AIDS (Esau et al. 2003; Marins et al. 2003; Hacker et al. 
2004; Teixeira et al. 2004; Campos et al. 2005; Matida et al. 2005; Dourado et al. 
2006). The combination of prevention and treatment allied with government 
strategies to reduce the cost of medicines, such as price negotiations and local 
production of off-patent antiretroviral drugs, has been widely celebrated as the 
Brazilian model for AIDS treatment (Berkman et al. 2005; Cohen and Lybecker 
2005; Greco and Simao 2007).  
 
Although AIDS incidences in Brazil have been stable, the number of patients 
receiving treatment continues to increase. Patients receiving highly active 
antiretroviral therapy (HAART) have increased steadily, with an estimate of 200,000 
patients in treatment in 2010 (Comissão Nacional de DST/Aids e Hepatites Virais 
2010). Given that AIDS patients are living longer and with better quality of life, they 
will require more complex treatment (e.g. due to resistant viral strains). As 
antiretroviral drugs off-patent become clinically outdated, newer patent medicines 
are required (Nunn et al. 2007). For example, since 2008 Brazil incorporated three 
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new patent medicines to the therapeutic guidelines (Darunavir, Raltegravir and 
Etravirina). Brazil’s expenditure on AIDS care and treatment had reached US$ 201 
million in 2007 (83% of total expenditure), raising much debate about the economic 
viability of the Program (cf. Granjeiro et al. 2007) and the concern of AIDS patient 
advocacy groups. 
 
In 2001, by occasion of the debates on the Doha Development Round and the 
discussions on the TRIPS and Public Health declaration, the National AIDS Program 
began mobilising domestic activists on this matter. Records of the meeting of the 
Forum of AIDS non-governmental organisations of Sao Paulo state in October 2001 
suggest this: “The forum was invited in an urgent meeting with the national 
coordination [of HIV/AIDS] to talk about TRIPS. There will be a meeting in Doha in 
November 9th, 2001 […]” (Forum ONG/AIDS do Estado de Sao Paulo 2001: 1). The 
report continues to explain that AIDS activists were supposed to write a statement of 
support and mobilise other NGOs in Brazil and abroad, pressuring the WTO 
members to sign the TRIPS and Public Health declaration. The National AIDS 
Program requested that NGOs should enforce the statement: “Nothing in TRIPS 
agreement should limit its members from taking actions to protect public health” 
(Forum ONG/AIDS do Estado de Sao Paulo 2001: 1). In other words, the crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector and the support of the Ministry of Health created an incentive 
for AIDS groups to organise an agenda on regulation of medicines that was absent 
until them.  
 
One of the most active civil society advocacy groups in the pharmaceutical 
regulation is the network of NGOs in the Working Group of Intellectual Property 
(WGIP), created in 2001 by a joint initiative between the international non-
governmental organisations Oxfam, Action Aid and several local NGOs, such as 
IBASE and GAPA. This group is hosted by the Brazilian Network for the Integration 
of the Peoples (Rebrip) and coordinated by the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS 
Association (ABIA). Its members include organisations working with people living 
with HIV/AIDS, human rights and consumers’ rights. Initially, the GTPI’s primary 
concern was to consolidate different organisations and empower their political 
actions around intellectual property affairs (GTPI 2010). In 2003, an internal 
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decision by Rebrip tailored the group’s focus on access to medicines and intellectual 
property affairs, which previously incorporated seeds and biodiversity issues as well 
(ibid).  
 
Rebrip invited the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association (ABIA) to 
coordinate the working group. ABIA is one of the foremost non-governmental 
organisations responsible for AIDS advocacy in Brazil, but also disseminates 
accessible information about the disease and provides health interventions (such as 
support groups) to people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). The former coordinator 
of the GTPI, Carlos Passarelli, recalled that initially the core aim of the working 
group was to engage in traditional advocacy initiatives, such as to disseminate the 
implications of intellectual property affairs to public health and make this 
complex/technical topic more accessible for other Brazilian NGOs (Passarelli 2009). 
This was done by preparing seminars and workshops to empower leaderships in the 
issue (ibid). Passarelli also explained that during his tenure there was limited 
discussion about generic drug regulation and, although the issue of bioequivalence 
was raised once, the debate never evolved.  
 
However, in mid-2000 the GTPI expanded its activities and has been assisting the 
Brazilian government (executive, legislative and judiciary) in the (re)design of 
pharmaceutical regulatory rules. It is difficult to pin down exactly when this 
participation in regulatory affairs began. Based on the extensive field research for 
this study, my interpretation is that this evolution of AIDS activism relates to the 
current generation of highly-skilled activists participating in these NGOs. For 
example, Renata Reis and Gabriela Chaves have been representing NGOs activists in 
several public discussions about pharmaceutical regulation. Reis is a lawyer with 
expertise in public health and political science, while Chaves is a pharmacist with 
expertise in Public Health. Both have worked in the Pharmaceutical Assistance 
Division of Fiocruz (NAF), which is well known for its engagement in national and 
international intellectual property and access to medicines studies and advocacy (cf. 
Bermudez et al. 2000). Renata Reis is the current coordinator of GTIP and Gabriela 
Chaves is currently responsible for the Access to Medicines division of Brazil’s 
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Medicine Sans Frontier but has worked closely with ABIA in the past. With the 
expertise of those from different aspects of the pharmaceutical regulation, ABIA has 
been able to mobilise extensive support of other NGOs but has also collaborated 
more closely with the government in the regulatory process in this sector. This 
process has required constant learning on how to act in regulatory lobbying as the 
following two sections demonstrate. 
 
Regulation of antiretroviral generic drugs 
Before discussing the position and demands of Brazilian AIDS activists on the 
generic drug regulatory rules in Brazil, it is important to situate the reader in relevant 
international events on this topic. This contextual information is particularly 
important, as their criticism resembles an increasing disagreement of international 
NGOs with the stringent rules adopted by developed governments and international 
agencies to regulate generic medicines. Besides, the Brazilian case could provide 
relevant evidence for this discussion, as we shall see. 
  
The documentary evidence collected for this thesis suggests that contestation around 
bioequivalence tests and antiretroviral drugs began in 2003. The World Health 
Organization has a service to pre-qualify generic drugs and producers that intend to 
supply medicines to the United Nations procurement agencies (for example, 
UNICEF) or other organisations such as UNITAID, the Clinton Foundation and the 
Global Fund that provide medicines to developing countries. Once these producers 
are certified, they are allowed to compete in the procurement and supply of 
medicines to international agencies or countries. WHO sets its own standards to 
certify the quality and safety of medicines, including bioequivalence requirements 
(World Health Organization 2005; 2006). In August 2003, the Pre-Qualification 
Program decided to exclude from its certified list three antiretroviral drugs produced 
by Indian firms that had “been found non-compliant with international standards of 
good clinical and laboratory practices” (Hogerzeil 2004; World Health Organization 
2004b). A few months later, other Indian firms temporarily withdrew their medicines 
from the list to carry out bioequivalence tests (Reuters 2004; World Health 
Organization 2004a). These decisions raised much debate among AIDS activists and 
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Pan-American Health Organization advisors as to whether bioequivalence is a pre-
condition to define quality of medicines (Gonzalez and Rossi 2004).  
 
Gonzalez and Rossi, advisors for the Pan American Health Organization, published a 
paper in Boletin Farmacos entitled “Bioequivalence, ambiguity, opportunism and the 
case of exclusion of antiretroviral drugs from the WHO Pre-qualification list” 
(Gonzalez and Rossi 2004). The authors severely criticised the WHOs decision on 
the grounds that bioequivalence cannot be used as a parameter to assess quality of 
medicines and made an effort to clarify the place of bioequivalence in the 
manufacturing process. They also called attention to the fact that bioequivalence 
requirements can serve as technical entry barriers to limit competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector (Gonzalez and Rossi 2004: 6). Similarly, Gonzalez (2008) 
questioned the unproblematic use and the publicity of bioequivalence tests as a 
standard to access quality of medicines. What these authors claim is that regulatory 
authorities should be careful when designing their frameworks, as stringent norms 
does not necessarily assess the quality of medicines; it can reduce market 
competition and ultimately harm access to medicines.  
 
The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), through the Pan American 
Network for Drug Regulatory Harmonization, 
http://new.paho.org/hq/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1054has 
made efforts to harmonise the regulatory rules in Latin America, including Good 
Manufacturing Practices61 cf. Pan American Health 
Organization 1997
 and bioequivalence tests (
). In 2005, in an annual meeting organised by PAHO to discuss 
these issues, representatives of the Health Action International (HAI), an 
independent global network that promotes access and improve the rational use of 
essential medicines, defended the “elimination of a generalised demand for the use of 
bioequivalence for ARV products, and rather its use on a case-by-case basis” and 
“the importance of fulfilling good manufacturing practice as a determining factor in 
                                                 
61 Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) is “part of quality assurance which ensures that products are 
consistently produced and controlled to the quality standards appropriate to their intended use and as 
required by the marketing authorization. GMP is aimed primarily at diminishing the risks inherent in 
any pharmaceutical production, which may broadly be categorized in two groups: cross 
contamination/mix-ups and false labeling”.  
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the quality of drugs” (Health Action International 2006: 36). Brazil is usually quoted 
by those who contest the concept of bioequivalence as a country that has successfully 
used antiretroviral drugs without going through these tests to treat AIDS patients and 
is one of the most successful responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world 
(Gonzalez and Rossi 2004).  
http://new.paho.org/hq/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1054 
The first incursion of Brazilian AIDS activists in questioning sanitary regulatory 
rules was taken ambitiously by ABIA. A booklet published by ABIA in 2007, 
Medicamentos: falando de qualidade (Medicines: talking about quality), for the first 
time challenged the association of bioequivalent generic drugs with quality 
medicines (Ruiz and Osorio-de-Castro 2008). It explains that several steps in the 
manufacture process, such as Good Manufacturing Process, assure the quality of 
drugs and that bioequivalence should not be considered one of them. They argue that 
this misconception is diffused by those who want to make a profit out of it. Thus, 
bioequivalence is seen a technical barrier for access to medicines, as its requirement 
can reduce or delay market competition. “Without competition, there is a market 
monopoly […] its result is enhancing profit of one manufacture or a selective and 
small group”  (Ruiz and Osorio-de-Castro 2008: 48). To support these arguments, the 
authors mention the celebrated National AIDS Program: 
 
This is exactly the case of antiretroviral drug produced in public laboratories in Brazil. As 
same as similar products, it is not therapeutically equivalent to an innovator drug. But these 
drugs work for patients, as we can see in more than 10 years that these medicines have been 
used in the country. During this period, universal treatment with similar drugs has 
completely changed the face of the [AIDS] epidemic in the country. It would be completely 
absurd to say these drugs do not have quality because national similar antiretrovirals are not 
bioequivalent to a innovator version (Ruiz and Osorio-de-Castro 2008: 45-46). 
 
The motivation for this publication was initially to discuss the concept of “quality of 
medicines” because many AIDS activists were voicing that Brazilian pharmaceutical 
products were better quality than the ones produced in India and China, or that 
brand-name products were better than their generic version (Chaves 2009). Gabriela 
Chaves, responsible for organising this publication, explained: “The industry has 
done a perfect lobbying, such as that many activists are now using this discourse 
without even knowing what bioequivalence is”. Chaves is careful to emphasise that 
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bioequivalence is an important parameter, but one must assess medicines with a 
narrow therapeutically window (that is, small doses above or below the prescribed 
could be toxic)62
We [GTPI] have an advanced position related to this [interchangeable tests], we do not 
believe that bioequivalence and bioavailability is equal to quality, we don’t believe in this. 
[…] We listened to the thesis of Division of Pharmaceutical Assistance (Fiocruz) that has a 
good study on this, feet on the ground, about quality of medicines. Our flagship, WGPI 
flagship, is quality and this is not the same as ‘if you have bioequivalence and 
bioavailability this will be the best option’ (
. She points to the complexity of putting healthy individuals into 
clinical trials and the costly infrastructure required to provide these tests. “Is it so 
important to have curves exactly the same, comparing a reference product to a 
generic? Sometimes it happens to have bioavailability of a generic product better 
than a reference product”, she states. Thus, their advocacy agenda is to detach the 
discourse of bioequivalence from quality assessment, given that bioequivalence in 
itself is not a parameter to assess quality of medicine. Renata Reis, a lawyer and 
coordinator of the GTPI, corroborated this concern: 
 
Reis 2009 ). 
 
This is also the position of Celia Chaves, a pharmacist with long experience in 
pharmacology tests and president of the Brazilian Federation of Pharmacists. 
She is aligned to ABIA and GTPI’s position: 
 
What doesn’t make sense is to say that similar drugs must provide bioequivalence tests, 
because it will then be transformed into generic. In reality this is what the industry is 
pressing […] transform all similar into generic. The fact that similar drugs do not have 
bioequivalence doesn’t mean it is not good; the only difference is that it is not 
bioequivalent. In other words, I simply can’t do the same treatment [protocol] with similar 
drugs, the same treatment I was getting with an original drug, or reference or generic […]. 
Maybe I will need to use a prescription a little bit different, this doesn’t mean it is not good 
(Chaves 2009).   
 
 
The discourse of these activists raises several concerns. Firstly, increasing the 
stringency of generic drug regulation by mandating off-patent drugs to be an equal 
copy of an innovator product will not necessarily increase the quality of medicines. 
In fact, it could reduce the supply of medicines and reduce competition. Market 
competition in this context is crucial for reducing the price of medicines and 
                                                 
62 Gabriela Chaves coordinates the Access to Medicines campaign of Doctors Without Borders 
(DWB) in Brazil, but her opinions do not express the NGO’s position on this matter. She agreed to be 
interviewed for this study and clearly stated that she speaks as a pharmacist and not for the DWB. 
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increasing access to affordable medicines. A second concern is that it reduces the 
potential of national industry, as Brazil has a significant number of private 
pharmaceutical industries and the whole public pharmaceutical industry will be 
severely harmed by 2014, when the grace period to adjust their products expires. 
Thirdly, it gives a false impression that medicines produced in Brazil are less 
effective than those that are bioequivalent and produced in India, for example.  
 
How are these concerns expressed in terms of policy demands? What has been done 
to reverse or adjust the policy path? Interestingly, besides the aforementioned 
publication there was no record of advocacy or lobbying demands to reformulate the 
generic drug regulation. Chaves explains that much of the discourse of 
bioequivalence associated with quality was incorporated into the discourse of experts 
and activists to an extent that it is difficult to question. The fact that WHO requires 
these tests further legitimises and reinforces the matter. Thus, it is important to point 
out that this is not the mainstream speech of AIDS activists; while some activists are 
not concerned with pharmaceutical regulation at all, others agree that generic 
medicines must equal their innovator versions. The intention of the booklet on 
quality of medicines was to make this topic accessible and place it on the activism 
agenda, the authors argued. The acceptance of the idea that off-patent medicines 
must equal their innovator versions, and the difficulty in mobilising the bulk of AIDS 
activists against it, suggests that the regulatory concept of bioequivalence has been 
incorporated by these patients to an extent that might become difficult to reverse. 
Mostly important, we can observe, by comparing the antecedent period of the reform 
with the narrative of this section, how these activists that were not participating 
whatsoever in pharmaceutical regulation have slowly became aware of the 
implications of this rule. Thus, this also exemplifies how a narrow deduction of their 
interest, as proposed by rational choice scholars, would ignore this important element 
of the regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil. 
 
During field research for this project, it was possible to observe that some of the 
local pharmaceutical producers who did not adapt to the generic drug reform have 
had similar criticisms as the AIDS activists to the bioequivalence requirements. 
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However, when questioned about a possible collaboration with these industrialists, 
some of the NGO interviewees confirmed the little contact between them and 
mentioned a relatively recent contact with Abifina and GTPI in an ongoing project 
on intellectual property issues (discussed below). I was given two reasons for this 
limited alliance. Firstly, one interview explained the infant participation of NGOs in 
the regulatory negotiations and limited experience in regulatory advocacy practices 
(Interview with patient advocacy informant A 2010). Secondly, another interviewee 
mentioned that this could be associated with the “nature” of their interests (Interview 
with patient advocacy informant B 2009). While private firms are concerned with 
profit, activists are worried solely about public and public heath interest. 
 
To sum up what has been discussed in this section, despite these initial attempts to 
bring the issue to the agenda and voice their concerns with some aspects of the 
generic drug regulation in Brazil, this subject has not received much attention. Some 
interviewees expressed concern in bringing this topic to their advocacy agenda, as 
apparently there is a consensus among segments of their group that off-patent 
medicines should be equal to an innovator drug otherwise will not be as effective 
(Interview with patient advocacy informant A 2010). Furthermore, the support of the 
World Health Organization to the bioequivalence tests with the Pre-Qualification 
Programme and through their guidelines further legitimise this norm (cf. World 
Health Organization 2001; Embrey et al. 2009), making it difficult to convince their 
peers of the importance of debating this topic. Furthermore, the agenda of AIDS 
activism has particularly concentrated on monitoring intellectual property affairs. 
This is discussed in the next section, along with the consequences for the generic 
drug policy path. 
 
 
Multiple interests: the intellectual property debate 
 
 
The GTPI has been the most active group within civil society in voicing their 
opinions against intellectual property issues. During field research for this project, I 
also met representatives of diabetes patients. However, interviewees mentioned that 
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only recently had they learned about how intellectual property issues can affect 
access to medicines, thus they were less able to comment on the events happening in 
this field.  
 
This section discusses several important actions taken by the GTPI to contribute to 
the IP debate in Brazil. Similarly to chapter 5, the analytical exercise here is to assess 
how their intellectual property agenda affects their lobbying activity in generic drugs, 
but also the path of this regulation, assuming that actors might have multiple interests 
as discussed in chapter 2. For comparative purposes, this section is divided into the 
three intellectual property issues as presented in the previous chapter. However, there 
are other areas where AIDS activists are participating (such as compulsory license), 
which are introduced as a fourth item.  
 
Pipeline mechanism 
AIDS activists began to participate in the debate on pipeline mechanism in mid-
2000s. A revision of newspaper articles published in the 2000s evidenced that they 
began voicing their concerns over this issue in 2006 (cf. Reis and Chaves 2006). 
Their concern is that, among the 1,182 pipeline patents requested by innovator 
pharmaceutical firms, four are antiretroviral drugs and 18 have been on the list of 
exceptional medicines provided by the Unified Health System (Jurberg 2008; Terto 
Jr et al. 2009). For example, Efavirenz is an antiretroviral drug used by 87,000 of the 
190,000 patients being treated for HIV/AIDS in Brazil and was protected by a 
pipeline patent (Terto Jr et al. 2009). In 2007, the GTPI organised a seminar to 
discuss the pipeline mechanism. As a result of this event, the group decided to 
directly interfere in the problem (Interview with patient advocacy informant B 2009).  
 
Similarly to Pro-Genericos, which has gone through the courts to avoid patent 
extensions, AIDS activists have also been participating as amicus curia in several law 
suits. For instance, in November 2007 the GTIP presented to the Brazilian Prosecutor 
a petition claiming the unconstitutionality of articles in the Patent Act that refers to 
pipeline mechanism. It requested that the prosecutor file a Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality (ADI) with the Supreme Court (given that civil society cannot fill 
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the procedure by itself) (Reis et al. 2009). ADI is a judicial instrument that allows 
federal authorities to revise the constitutionality of the law or normative act. If their 
request is accepted by the Supreme Court, the legislation on pipeline mechanism can 
be removed from the legal system. GTPI claims that pipeline mechanism is 
unconstitutional for four reasons: 1) pipeline patents granted in Brazil were already 
in the public domain, which contradicts the principle of absolute novelty for patents; 
2) it violates the principle of reasonability and proportionality, as its patent is granted 
without the analysis of material requirements (the INPI does not assess these 
application, as a patent is approved based on international patent office reports); 3) it 
violates the principle of equality as it differentiates between national and foreign 
products. While national industries have to go through the INPI, foreign applications 
are submitted only to their originating countries (whose requirements can be different 
from Brazil); and 4) it violates social interests as it allows a monopoly of  knowledge 
that was already in the public domain, unnecessarily increasing the expenses on 
medications (for government and patient budgets) (Terto Jr et al. 2009: 16-17).  
 
In 2008, the GTIP’s demand received the support of the Ministry of Health. The 
Director of the Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance, Dirceu Barbano, declared 
in a newspaper interview: “From the point of view of the MoH, the Pipeline brings 
prejudice to the development of the country and has a series of impacts on the 
Brazilian public health” (Estado de Sao Paulo 2008b). Barbano cited the example of 
a cancer medicine, Gleevec, the costs of which could be reduced by 90% if there was 
no pipeline patent. Its costs are estimated at US$ 5,000 per patient/month.  
 
In May 2008, the Brazilian Prosecutor General sent the case to the Federal Supreme 
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pipeline mechanism on the grounds that 
it does not respect the principle of novelty, for those patents were already under 
public domain when granted. If accepted by the Supreme Court it could invalidate 
the patent of 565 medicines protected under this rule. Until October 2009, 11 
pharmaceutical associations (Pro-Genericos, Abifina) and NGOs had filed requests 
to participate as amicus curia in the litigation, but only Interfarma (which represents 
the interests of research-based firms) was accepted (Valor Economico 2009a). Note 
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that the initial movement to issue the ADIN was taken by the NGOs, not the business 
association. However, as soon as the Prosecutor sent the case to the Supreme Court, 
several local producer representatives joined and supported the strategy (Valor 
Economico 2009a; 2009b; 2009c). 
 
Note how the agenda of activists resembles the preferences of Pro-Genericos 
presented in the previous chapter. These activists have also used similar strategies to 
inform the government about the pipeline mechanism and its impact on the 
production of generic medicines (e.g. amicus curia). On the other hand, activists have 
taken a leadership role in mobilising the Brazilian General Prosecutor to question the 
constitutionality of the pipeline mechanism, a movement that has then been followed 
by other business associations by filling requests to participate as informants of the 
Supreme Court.  
 
TRIPS Plus agenda: polymorphs and second use 
In 2007, the representatives of GPTI became aware that the INPI was revising its 
patent standards through the newspapers. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
INPI invited representatives of the pharmaceutical sector and ANVISA to discuss a 
possibility for reformulating Brazil’s patent standards. Renata Reis requested the 
institute to allow her to participate in these discussions as a member of civil society: 
“they said I couldn’t go because it was a meeting for pharmacists, doctors and that 
was a technical meeting not a political one. […] Then I said I was gonna send my 
pharmacist. Gabriela was working with me”. She continues: “Once she got there, 
there were many industry lawyers. So we understood that it was a resistance for 
[talking to] some lawyers, not all lawyers. And they justified this by saying that those 
lawyers that were there were both chemists and lawyers” (Reis 2009). AIDS activists 
voiced that these meetings had been held in closed sessions, thus excluding the 
participation of civil society on the grounds that it should only include experts.  
 
During a public hearing in Congress, the Federal Deputy Paulo Teixeira questioned 
the president of INPI, Jorge Avila, to clarify the exclusion of chronic disease patient 
representatives of these meetings (Camara dos Deputados 2007a: 56-57). The INPI 
argued that this was due to their inexperience in conducting public consultations and 
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apologised for their clumsy behaviour (Avila in Camara dos Deputados 2007a: 61). 
While the INPI claim that this is a strictly technical matter, HIV/AIDS activists 
highlight the political component of this decision: “The interpretation of patentability 
standards is not a technical issue, but a political decision, especially in the 
pharmaceutical field” (Reis et al. 2009: 41). The relevance of this event is two-fold. 
First, it shows the importance of AIDS activists, who called attention to the politics 
of the patent application process which, so far, had been seen as a methodological 
decision ignoring the different interests in this issue. Second, it also demonstrates 
how these activists are claiming their rights to inform the government on topics 
sensitive to public health, rather than just pressure for access to medicines. The initial 
resistance of INPI to allowing their participation in technical meetings shows how 
these activists were seen as less able to contribute in the debate, thus they had to 
claim their right (and also demonstrate capacity) to collaborate in this discussions.  
 
Looking at the AIDS activists’ preferences and demands, it is possible to see similar 
demands as the ones defended by local industrialists. They also support the fact that 
second medical use and polymorphs should not be granted patent protection. The 
former is due to its lack of novelty, given that what would be protected by a patent is 
the medical therapeutic indication, not the product. This also implies a lack of 
industrial applicability, as a patent of “second medical use” would protect the effects 
of the substance on the body (not the method of manufacture). The objection to 
patent a polymorph is that polymorphism is a natural property (discovered in 
ordinary experimentation) thus cannot be considered a human invention (Reis et al. 
2009: 39-41).  
 
Particularly interesting is how the AIDS activists have voiced their demands. They 
have monitored and participated in virtually every governmental discussion on this 
topic. Besides actively participating in the INPI’s meetings on the revisions of the 
patent standards, the GTPI has also been participating in legislative activities (Reis et 
al. 2009). Regarding the Bill Law 2511/2007 that proposes to eliminate the patent of 
second medical use and polymorphs, the group wrote a complementary legal opinion, 
supporting its approval and quoting other countries that have taken similar decisions 
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(such as India and Argentina). Additionally, the group has educated Congressmen on 
the international guidelines provided by WHO, which do not recommend patent 
protection for second use and polymorphs (Reis et al. 2009). During the public 
hearings of this project in Congress, the activist Michel Lotrowska from Doctors 
Without Borders (member of GTPI) was invited to present its arguments together 
with representatives of the government and pharmaceutical industries (Camata 
2008). This highlights now only how these activists have gained space and 
legitimacy to voice their demands on technical aspects of pharmaceutical regulation, 
but also how these preferences and demands are similar to the generic drug 
manufactures. 
 
Procedure to register pharmaceutical patents in Brazil 
Regarding the discussions on the prior consent mechanism, such as Pro-Genericos, 
the GTPI has petitioned in favour of this institutional arrangement. In November 
2009, the GTPI was invited, together with other representatives of research-based 
pharmaceutical industries, for a public hearing in Congress to debate the Bill Law 
3709/2008 (which discussed the role of prior consent). The GTPI, represented by 
Celia Chaves, president of the Brazilian Federation of Pharmacists, strongly 
supported that prior consent should remain unaltered. It supported the idea that this 
institutional arrangement was important in order to keep patent examination 
standards high and thus avoid underserved patents (Chaves 2009). Furthermore, they 
argued that this arrangement is aligned with the TRIPS and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration) that states public health should override commercial interests, and with 
the 2008 WHO Global Strategy on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property (WHA 61.21) that states countries should always consider adapting their 
national legislations to fully use TRIPS flexibilities (Chaves 2009). This position was 
also aligned with ANVISA’s perspective on this issue and Pro-Genericos, which 
were also participating in this public hearing.   
 
Additional agendas 
As seen so far, the agenda of AIDS activism and local producers has synchronised 
with respect to pipeline patent, patentability standards and rules of patent 
examination. Furthermore, both actors have presented their claims in similar forums 
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and used similar strategies. However, AIDS activists have gone a step further. While 
Pro-Genericos and other representatives of national industries have been silent about 
the Brazilian government negotiation with multinational pharmaceutical firms over 
the price of antiretroviral drugs, AIDS activists have vehemently supported the use of 
TRIPS safeguards. For instance, the president of Pro-Genericos, Odinir Finotti, has 
constantly suggested that it is not the Association’s intention to challenge patent 
rights or propose amendments in the Patent Act (cf. 2009a; 2009b). This subsection 
describes two additional events in which the NGOs collaborated with government in 
cases of intellectual property debates that could impact on the market for off-patent 
antiretroviral drugs: the Tenofovir pre-grant patent requirement and the Efavirenz 
compulsory license. For clarity purposes, I will provide a brief description of each 
case and the role of AIDS activists in each of these and how these relate to the 
generic drug regulation.  
 
(1) Tenofovir and Kaletra pre-grant opposition 
In December 2006, seven NGO members of the GTPI (ABIA, Conectas, Grupo Pela 
Vidda/ SP, GAPA/SP, GAPA/RS, Gestos e GIV) filed a request with the INPI 
opposing the patent application of two antiretroviral drugs, a second patent 
application for Kaletra (Abbott), and a patent application of Gilead’s Viread 
(Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate). Pre-grant opposition is an administrative 
mechanism of the Patent Act (article 31) that allows any interested parties to provide 
documents and information to assist patent examination. Thus, the intention was to 
clarify why the INPI should not grant these two patent applications. 
 
The arguments opposing these patents were distinct. The case of Tenofovir 
Disoproxil Fumarate refers to the fact that Gilead’s requested a patent of an active 
ingredient that is used to treat HIV infections (Request Nº PI9811045-4). However, 
AIDS activists argued that the only active ingredient that acts on the virus is 
Tenofovir, while the Disoproxil assists in fostering the availability of Tenofovir to 
react with the virus, while Fumarate provides better stability for the medicines (Abia 
2006: 9). Both Tenofovir and Disoproxil had their patents expired 15 and 9 years 
prior to this new grant application. The activists also argued that the use of Fumarate 
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salt is a chemical practice known since 1963. Together, these arguments reinforced 
the fact that Gilead’s application did not fulfil the patentability requirements of the 
Brazilian legislation (article 8 of the Patent Act). In 2008, the Ministry of Health 
declared Tenofovir of public interest, which sped up the application revision by the 
INPI (Ministerio da Saude 2008; Estado de Sao Paulo 2008a). Gilead’s request was 
denied in April 2008 (INPI 2008) and its appeal denied in July 2010 (INPI 2010a), 
on similar grounds argued by the GTPI. The case of Kaletra refers to the fact that 
Abbott requested a second patent of this medication (divisional patent application, 
which split the uses of a single invention into separate patents) (Request Nº 
PI1101190-4). The first patent was granted as a pipeline mechanism and AIDS 
activists argue that, according to the Patent Act, there is no legal provision for 
divisional applications under the pipeline mechanism, thus the INPI should deny the 
patent request (Abia 2006; Chaves et al. 2008; Reis et al. 2009).  
 
Particularly interesting in these two cases is the capacity of these NGOs to provide 
information and support a decision that is highly technical, collaborating with the 
INPI in the process of patent approval rather than just using pressure or media 
fanfare to express their criticism.   
 
(2) Efavirenz compulsory license 
Efavirenz is a protease inhibitor, commercialised in Brazil by Merck under the 
brand-name Stocrin and was used by nearly half of AIDS patients in need of 
treatment in 2007 (Nunn et al. 2007). Similarly to Abbott, Merck also has a long 
tradition of negotiating price with the Brazilian government, reducing its price by 
more than 50% since 2001 (Ford et al. 2007; Nunn et al. 2007). However, as both 
Kaletra and Stocrin became a convenient treatment choice (e.g. fewer pills), more 
patients were put into treatment in 2003 and 2004. A scale-up of treatment with these 
drugs offset the price reductions offered until them (Nunn et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
the price of both drugs in Brazil was lower than the price for other middle-income 
countries with similar HIV prevalence rates, but significantly higher than the average 
price of its available generic drug version (ibid). Brazil demanded a price reduction 
of Efavirenz from US$ 1.59/daily dose to US$ 0.65/daily dose, based on the 
 231 
following two arguments. Firstly, other countries such as Thailand were paying a 
much lower price for Efavirenz than Brazil and, secondly, there were generic drug 
versions of Efavirenz produced by Indian companies at a much lower price (Simao 
2009).  
 
Facing an increase in the number of patients under treatment, thus also an increase in 
the expenditure on antiretroviral drugs, the government had three alternatives: (i) 
reduce the scope of the programme, thus limiting the number of patients; (ii) 
substantially increase the allocation of resources for AIDS treatment; or (iii) override 
patent protection and reduce the cost of Efavirenz, thus facing possible economic 
retaliations. However, since Brazil has a Federal Law mandating the government to 
provide antiretroviral drugs to all patients in need, reducing the scope of the 
programme would allow AIDS patients to file law suits against the government in the 
event of stock running out (cf. Scheffer et al. 2005). Similarly, an increase in the 
allocation of resources into AIDS treatment would be less possible given that the 
high cost of the programme had threatened its financial sustainability (Granjeiro et 
al. 2007). Thus, the third option was the most viable. Although Brazil has a long 
tradition in threatening to use a compulsory license and locally producing medicines 
to induce pharmaceutical companies into reducing their prices, this strategy was 
becoming less efficient as time went by (cf. Ford et al. 2007; Nunn et al. 2007). 
 
After several meetings with Merck, the Minister of Health, Jose Gomes Temporao, 
decided to declare Efavirenz of public interest (the first step to issuing a compulsory 
license) in April 2007 (Ministerio da Saude 2007a). On 4 April 2007, Merck offered 
a price reduction of US$ 1.10 and committed to transfer Efavirenz technology to 
Brazil by 2010 (two years before its patent expired). Furthermore, Merck counter 
argued that its price tier was established together with the World Bank, World Health 
Organization and other United Nations agencies according to the country’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Boletim da ABPI 
2007). While Brazil and Thailand have a similar HDI, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in Thailand is three times higher than Brazil (less than 1%) which, arguably, would 
not justify similar prices (Boletim da ABPI 2007). Ignoring this claims, the Minister 
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of Health Jose Gomes Temporao and President Lula signed a Decree declaring that 
Efavirenz was of public interest and issued its compulsory license (Brasil 2007). The 
compulsory license for public interest refers to the fact that Brazil could locally 
produce these drugs for non-commercial purposes but would still pay 1.5% in 
royalties for its use (Valor Economico 2007b). In his speech, President Lula ratified 
the compulsory license: 
 
It doesn’t matter if the firm is German, Brazilian, French or Argentinean. The concrete fact 
is that Brazil cannot be treated as a country that does not deserve respect. That is, we paid 
US$ 1.60 while the same medicine is sold to another country at US$ 0.60. This is rough, not 
just from an ethical perspective but from a political and economic point of view. It is 
disrespectful. It’s like the Brazilian patient is inferior to a patient in Malaysia (President Luis 
Inacio Lula da Silva in Agencia Brasil 2007).  
 
The NGOs supported the government at every step of this negotiation (GIV. 2007; 
GTPI 2007; GTPI 2007a). The National AIDS Program informally consulted the 
AIDS activists during the process. In this meeting, several alternatives were 
discussed in order to issue a compulsory license according to the Brazilian 
legislation, looking at the possibilities and constraints of each one and the 
perspective of civil society (Interview with government official D 2009). The 
relevance of Efavirenz’s compulsory license is twofold. First, it further demonstrates 
the participation of NGOs in intellectual property discussion and their role in 
supporting the government’s decision with technical information and legitimising 
this decision. Second, it illustrates the fact that their advocacy evolved beyond 
demands for access to medicines in order to monitor the regulatory bottlenecks that 
could limit the availability of medicines.  
 
The case of compulsory licence of the antiretroviral Efavirenz also adds another 
important element to the analysis of this chapter. After overriding the patent for 
Efavirenz in 2007, the government had to import its generic version from India. This 
is particularly surprisingly, as Brazil has threatened to issue a compulsory license for 
Efavirenz since 2001, arguing that it had the capacity to produce this medicine at a 
lower price in the public pharmaceutical industries (Ford et al. 2007). The fact that 
both Farmanguinhos and Lafep were able to deliver the first batch immediately after 
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the compulsory license raised much debate about the capacity of public industries to 
effectively produce medicines that require complex technological capacity.  
 
The Director of Farmanguinhos, Eduardo Costa, explained that initially Lafepe 
presented studies informing of its capacity to produce this medicine; however, it 
failed to pass in the bioequivalence tests later on (Costa 2009). Note how the 
bioequivalence norm once again affected the production capacity of these firms. 
Brazil imported a generic drug version of Efavirenz from an Indian company for two 
years following the compulsory license. It was only in 2009 that Farmanguinhos, in 
collaboration with three local private laboratories, launched its first batch of the 
bioequivalent Efavirenz. This was the first generic medicine produced by a public 
pharmaceutical industry (Revista de Manguinhos 2009). However, the price of the 
Brazilian generic version of Efavirenz is higher than the one imported from India 
(US$ 0.46/per dose), but still lower than the price offered by Merck (US$ 0.59 
against US$ 1.56/per dose). 
 
Naturally, this raises the question of the extent in which production of medicines in 
public firms is relevant to improving access to medicines in Brazil, particularly given 
that other studies have already highlighted that the prices of these drugs are much 
higher than international ones (cf. Nunn et al. 2007). Additionally, while prices of 
generic drugs are declining elsewhere, they are increasing in Brazil (ibid). 
Arguments of the relevance of public production of medicines are debatable and 
were already presented earlier on in this chapter. What is relevant here is the position 
of AIDS activists in this debate as it demonstrates that, although they have a similar 
agenda to the drug manufactures, there is no evidence of collusion between them: 
 
AIDS activists in Brazil recognize that public production of medicines is not perfect but see 
clear advantages in the Brazilian model. For these activists, the objective is access to quality 
medicine from any supplier. Whilst private drug companies do provide quality medicines, 
they are not transparent in detailing the costs of production or how they set prices. Activists 
understand that the high cost of new treatments threatens the sustainability of Brazil’s 
universal treatment programme; obtaining strategic information from public labs is therefore 
crucial to their advocacy efforts (Flynn 2008: 530). 
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Following Flynn’s assertion, the documentary research for this thesis also found that 
the position of AIDS activists regarding public production of medicines is that they 
acknowledge the place of public production, but clarify that their core agenda is the 
access to medicines campaign (Reis et al. 2009: 28; Vieira and Reis 2009). They 
support that the combination of imports, followed by local production, is essential to 
assuring the success of Efavirenz’s compulsory license; thus hoping that, with an 
increase in the scale of production and manufacturing experience, public 
pharmaceutical firms will be able to reduce these production costs (Reis et al. 2009: 




This chapter explored the unexpected effects of the generic drug regulation and the 
reaction of actors that had not been engaged in this debate to date. It shows how the 
regulation affects the production of medicines in public pharmaceutical factories and 
why they are unable to fulfil the bioequivalence requirement. Despite the 
disagreement with this component of the regulatory norm and the fact that they have 
been supplying governmental programmes for decades with products that were not 
bioequivalent, public producers decided not to publicly voice their concerns and 
made efforts to adapt to the regulatory context. In this sense, AIDS activists have 
became aware of this drawback in the production of antiretroviral medicines in 
public factories, which leads to an important finding of this chapter. 
 
This analysis of the participation of AIDS activists in the regulatory process has 
provided important evidence on how lobbying activity is a learning practice and how 
preferences are constructed within the policy process. It demonstrated that, although 
AIDS activists were less aware of the pharmaceutical regulatory process and its 
influence in their stakes during the 1990s, in the course of the 2000s their preferences 
were adjusted. AIDS activists became familiar and highly active in different aspects 
of pharmaceutical regulation, ranging from generic drugs to intellectual property 
affairs. They have also successfully mobilised other groups of civil society into these 
issues through the Working Group of Intellectual Property (GTPI). Thus, it could be 
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argued that the HIV/AIDS activism in Brazil has evolved from pressuring 
government for the provision of public goods and partners in the design and 
implementation of the Brazilian response to the epidemic in the 1990s (cf. Galvao et 
al. 2011), to a collaboration in the pharmaceutical regulatory process in the 2000s. 
As for the content of their policy preferences, they have questioned the slogan of 
“high quality medicines” attached to the generic drug products and the concept that 
off-patent medicines must be equal to its innovator version. However, this agenda 
has been offset for several reasons. One is the difficulty to go against the appealing 
slogan of “high quality products” as this has been diffused and accepted by the other 
activists and society in general. Second, they have placed more weight on the 
intellectual property agenda, which offset the advocacy agenda on the generic drug 
regulatory process. This shows that, although there are concerns over the path of the 
regulatory process of generic drugs in Brazil, little has been done to change or adjust 
this policy path or even educate decision makers about them. 
 
The analysis of the political demands of these activists also resembles the theoretical 
concepts discussed in chapter 2 on the structure of interest representation in the 
pharmaceutical sector in Brazil. This chapter has demonstrated that, similar to 
business representatives, activists have collaborated with the government in different 
intellectual property affairs. Comparing both, it is possible to observe that much of 
the advocacy agenda of these activists synchronise with the demands of Pro-
Genericos and local pharmaceutical producers in general. Both are concerned with 
the development of the pipeline mechanism, the revision of the intellectual property 
resolutions by the INPI and also the prior approval institutional arrangement for 
patent application. However, activists have gone a step further and advocated for 
compulsory license and obstructed the patent request of some antiretroviral drugs. 
Furthermore, both actors (business and NGOs) voice their claims in similar forums 
and use similar strategies (such as filling amicus curia to assist court decisions), but it 
was not possible to observe any form of collusion between them. It is also 
noteworthy that, by positioning themselves with similar policy demands as business 
representatives, AIDS activists also legitimise the claims of generic drug 
manufactures. Thus it could be said that the aggregate effect of these two phenomena 
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-- legitimising the demands of generic drug manufacturers in the intellectual property 
debates and placing less attention to the agenda on generic drug regulation -- suggest 
that AIDS activists are giving the generic drug firms a free ride to further expand 
their stakes and reinforce the path of generic drug regulation in Brazil. 
 
In summary, as the preferences of AIDS activists on the generic drugs are 
counterbalanced by the agenda on intellectual property, and as public pharmaceutical 
factories continue to adapt to the regulatory context, they both contribute to the path 
dependence process. With less resistance and weaker counter-reactions, AIDS 
activists and public producers also allow the trajectory of this regulatory policy to go 




This first part of this chapter revisits the research problem and summarises the 
empirical findings. The second section discusses the theoretical and global health 
implications of these results. Finally, the third section reflects on the limits of the 
study and avenues for further investigations. 
 
The research problem revisited and empirical findings 
 
In exploring the process of generic drug regulation in Brazil, it had been established 
that the Minister of Health and presidential hopeful, Jose Serra, promoted the reform 
as a response to a crisis in the pharmaceutical sector triggered by a scandal involving 
fake birth control pills (Dias 2003; Franca 2004; Dias and Romano-Lieber 2006). 
However, because previous studies only glossed over the antecedents to the reform 
and focused on the critical period of 1999 and 2002, little was known about the 
institutional antecedents and policy process that channeled Serra’s entrepreneur 
activity. On the other hand, much has been said about the impact of Brazil’s generic 
drug competition on the market and price structure (cf. Abreu 2004; Nishijima 2008; 
Quental et al. 2008; Rosenberg et al. 2008; Rosenberg 2009); however, there is 
hardly any evidence of its effects on actors’ preferences and how this policy evolved 
in the 2000s. This is particularly intriguing, as a regulatory shift in the 
pharmaceutical sector might require the acquiescence of a number of participants in 
the policy process. Thus, this thesis aimed to assess Brazil’s generic drug regulatory 
policy process, from its origins to the most recent developments. Apparently, no 
study has approached the generic drug regulation in Brazil from this perspective.  
 
As opposed to studies of pharmaceutical regulation, which have tended to invoke 
firms and patient advocacy groups as drivers of regulatory decisions, or even the 
diffusion of regulatory guidelines (or best practices) as determinants of national 
regulatory developments, this thesis has proposed a theoretical construct that traces 
the historical development of the regulatory policy. Based on historical institutional 
analysis, it suggested that actors’ preferences are constructed within the policy 
 238 
process and that only by assessing the different stages of the generic drug regulatory 
process (reform and development) would it be possible to understand the choices for 
this policy option and its legacy. The research findings suggest the following points. 
 
Findings on the reform determinants and actors’ preferences  
It is well known that generic drugs have been an issue of intense political credit-
claiming in Brazil, with the former Minister of Health, Jose Serra, openly publicising 
his protagonism towards the Generic Drug Act approved in 1999 and exploiting the 
political dividends associated with it. Additionally, previous studies of generic drug 
regulation have established that Jose Serra promoted the reform as a response to a 
crisis in the pharmaceutical sector (Dias 2003; Franca 2004; Dias and Romano-
Lieber 2006). This thesis also acknowledged the role of the Minister of Health; 
however, it has suggested a more nuanced analysis. The first analytical exercise of 
this thesis was to assess the institutional antecedents during this eventful period of 
reform, focusing on actors’ preferences and demands. This helped in understanding 
how and under what circumstances the policy preference for generic drug regulation 
was chosen in 1999. 
 
Although there are records of the diffusion of the World Health Organization and 
support by other developed countries for the generic drug regulation in Brazil, they 
were not sufficient to promote a major change in the pharmaceutical sector 
regulation. Chapter 4 suggested that institutional legacies and contingent events 
gradually established the institutional trajectory of the 1999 reform. While the early 
attempts to introduce generic drugs in the 1990s had created an agenda for regulating 
off-patent medicines in Brazil, the introduction of intellectual property ensured that 
the regulation of off-patent medicines became essential. Both of these events 
highlight how the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil was poorly regulated and the 
government intervention deficient. How and when the regulation of off-patent drugs 
would happen was less evident. The third event refers to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
The Brazilian government was committed to providing universal access to the 
recently developed triple therapy used in the treatment of these patients, and the 
AIDS activism movement was keen to ensure that the government remained 
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accountable to this responsibility. Thus, the combination of patent protection in a 
context of universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment and an increase in the number of 
patients had major implications for the budget of the Ministry of Health in the late 
1990s.  
 
The crisis in the pharmaceutical sector triggered by the scandal surrounding fake 
birth control pills and the price of medicines, preceding the 2002 presidential 
elections, opened a window of opportunity to produce an otherwise unlikely policy 
change. The Minister of Health, Jose Serra, together with the government leader in 
the Chamber of Deputies, Ronaldo Cesar Coelho, and the first president of the 
recently created National Health Surveillance Agency, Gonzalo Vecina Neto, 
recycled the previous bills on generic drugs and began an intense lobbying process to 
have the policy approved in Congress. Their version of the bill 2022/91 was a not a 
creation of Brazilian officials; indeed, resolutions on how to regulate these products 
(e.g. approval guidelines) were already in place. Vecina and his team consulted 
academics and advisors from international agencies and observed how this policy 
worked in other countries. In this sense, arguments of policy emulation are not 
strictly wrong, but these were not a sufficient condition to initiate a reform. This is 
particularly evidenced by the failure to implement the WHO recommendation in 
1993. Similarly, there is hardly any evidence of interest group activity in pushing the 
reform or supporting government intervention in their trademarks and manufacturing 
process; this contradicts explanatory perspectives that suggest the regulatory process, 
as captured by firms with an economic stake in the regulatory activity (cf. Stigler 
1971). In other words, generic drug reform in Brazil was “politically driven”. The 
crisis in the pharmaceutical sector occurring in a particular point of the electoral 
cycle was vital to facilitate the political entrepreneurship of Jose Serra. Had Serra 
been a Health Minister in the early 1990s it is very unlikely that this reform would 
have been possible. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, the sequence of three events 
(Congressional effort to pass bill on generic drugs, the enactment of the IP law, and 
the AIDS epidemic) paved the way for the generic drug reform in 1999. 
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After the unanimous approval of the legislation by Congress in 1999, another step to 
promote the reform was necessary. The second stage of the generic drug reform 
referred to the technical resolutions and this was under the responsibility of the 
National Health Surveillance Agency. The study of Dias has explored in detail each 
of these resolutions (Dias 2003). This was a period of intense governmental activism 
to formulate the regulatory instruments and simultaneously induce a supply and 
demand for this product. Jose Serra was also responsible for proposing the creation 
of the Brazilian Association of Generic Drug Manufacturers (Pro-Genericos), which 
would secure the demands of firms in this sector. From the demand side, the 
government had promoted intense mass public campaigns to increase awareness 
about generic drug substitution aimed at stimulating a market for this product. All 
these decisions were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and evidence a strong 
commitment of the Brazilian government to the reform. 
 
The intention to regulate the off-patent pharmaceutical sector in Brazil caused 
distress and a period of high uncertainty for pharmaceutical firms. While 
multinational firms were concerned about the mandatory requirement to revise the 
display of their trademarks, local firms were concerned with the regulation as a 
whole (both the trademark alterations and the requirement for bioequivalence tests). 
During this period, it was not possible to find any interference by AIDS activists in 
the regulatory process, although they were particularly relevant in bringing the issue 
of pharmaceuticals to the agenda. An experienced politician and public manager, 
Jose Serra, utilised the crisis in order to promote his agenda in the media and 
requested that Congress investigate the structure of costs in the pharmaceutical sector 
(other examples were discussed in Chapter 4). The media fanfare would advance the 
crisis and stretch the latitude to implement his ambitious agenda. Furthermore, two 
unforeseen events (the currency devaluation and illegitimate market competition of 
pharmaceutical products that were not yet registered as generic medicines) added 
further cause for concern to the pharmaceutical sector environment. As Chapter 2 
suggested, in a context of institutional vagueness, it is less viable for interest groups 
to behave strategically. Because future developments are to some extent unclear, it is 
difficult to choose which direction to pursue. Only by looking at the repercussions of 
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this policy is it possible to understand if there was a crucial change in the actors’ 
stances and the policy path.  
 
Findings on the evolution of preferences and policy development 
This thesis evolved to explain another stage of the regulatory process, that of policy 
development in the 2000s. Sustainability of generic drug regulation could not be 
immediately assumed for three reasons, as follows. Firstly, in general, 
pharmaceutical regulation would not be an object of a political partisanship agenda; 
however, the case of generic drugs was widely broadcasted as Serra’s political 
proprietorship, an identity of his mandate as a Minister of Health that he had been 
keen on claiming credit for. Thus, the preceding administration could try to eclipse 
policy visibility or even reverse his decisions to lower the political advantage of 
generic drugs. Secondly, local pharmaceutical firms had voiced that the high costs 
associated with the new regulatory reform would limit their possibility to adapt to the 
reform and, if this was so, it could be expected that a movement demanding a 
reversal of generic drug regulation could emerge. Lastly, Brazil had unsuccessfully 
tried to introduce generic drugs in the past. This increased ambiguity about the future 
of this policy. All these factors enhanced the uncertainty about the path of the 
reform. As Peter Hall argued, “to be pursued effectively, any policy must be 
politically, as well as economically, viable” (Hall 1986: 280-1). As Chapter 2 has 
discussed, political viability in this case refers to the actors’ support of a policy, 
which serves to legitimise it and push the trajectory further along. Thus, the aim was 
to assess the preferences and demands of selected actors on the generic drug 
regulation during the 2000s. 
 
It has been suggested in Chapter 5 that the generic drug market in Brazil has 
increased by more than 350% since the reform, with an expansion of local 
pharmaceutical firms’ competitiveness and a notable impact on the market structure 
and price (cf. Abreu 2004; Quental et al. 2008). However, this chapter has also 
claimed that government advocacy and market demand are inadequate to explain the 
development of generic drug regulation. While the government has been less 
politically active in this subject, market demand is still fragile. There is still much 
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suspicion among consumers and misunderstanding about the pharmaceutical 
products available in Brazil. Surprisingly, despite the remarkable concern regarding 
government intervention into their business, given the costs associated with it, local 
pharmaceutical firms have not just adapted to the new institutional context but 
become market leaders in this sector and strong advocates to maintain the policy 
path. This represents the second empirical finding of this thesis.  
 
As the government demonstrated credible commitments to the reform, local 
pharmaceutical manufacturers began to adapt to the new institutional context. The 
policy process affected the feasibility of advocating for the previous economic 
preference, that is, the maintenance of a similar drug product. Despite the costs 
associated with the requirement to provide the bioequivalence tests (note that there 
were very few centres capable of producing these tests), to reformulate their 
products, labelling and marketing strategies, local pharmaceutical manufacturers 
adjusted their businesses to fit the new regulatory environment. Chapter 5 evidenced 
a reformulation in the interest group organisation in this sector, with the extinction of 
Abifarma and the creation of Pro-Genericos and Febrafarma to accommodate the 
new interests in this sector. Equally important, there was a possibility to adapt as 
these firms were proficient in Brazil’s complex distribution channel. Given that 
multinational generic drug manufacturers were less able to enter the Brazilian market 
(either because of failure attempts or suspicions regarding the policy 
institutionalisation) there was latitude for local entrepreneurs to expand their 
business interests.   
 
Thus, in 2003, when there was a chance for pharmaceutical companies to express 
their reaction to the generic drug policy, they opted not to. This was during the 
government deliberation to approve Resolutions 133 and 134 that decreed that all 
similar drug products must adapt to the bioequivalence requirements by 2014. There 
was no record of interest group activity to obstruct these resolutions; in fact, as 
recalled by a government official, local firms had already adapted and did not 
express any concern with these norms (Interview with government official B 2009).  
In contrast, Chapter 5 has described several policy debates in which local 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers have supported the use of INN and the relevance of 
bioequivalence tests to assure high quality products, which foster the country’s 
industrial development. This contrasts starkly with the antecedent period, where 
these actors voice their concerns with government intervention. Finally, this chapter 
has also demonstrated that Brazilian firms are still strongly attached to an identity of 
generic drug manufacturers, despite their increasing potential in research and 
development activity. This is evidenced by their position in several intellectual 
property debates that have been taking place in Brazil throughout the 2000s, to revise 
or expand the Patent Act. By doing so, they reinforce the path of generic drug policy.  
 
Yet, on the policy development process, Chapter 6 has analysed the position of actors 
that question the current architecture of pharmaceutical regulation in Brazil and the 
unforeseen consequences associated with the public production of medicines. Its 
conclusion represents the third empirical finding of this thesis, which refers to the 
consequences of this policy in relation to the public production of medicines. There 
is a concern with the option for bioequivalence tests and its connection to the concept 
of quality of medicines. Several publications consulted for this thesis have briefly 
questioned this frame and mentioned the struggle of public producers to adapt to it 
(PNUD 2006: 5; Gomes et al. 2008: 258; Hasenclever et al. 2008: 221). Furthermore, 
it has also been mentioned that, although some medicines produced in public 
factories are not bioequivalent, experts in pharmacology suggests that these drugs are 
more effective than their innovator versions (cf. Cassier and Correa 2003: 97). 
Nevertheless, to date no study explored has detailed the preferences and concerns 
with this aspect of the generic drug regulation. Data culled for this thesis suggests 
that, despite these concerns, there has been a movement of public producers to 
overcome the institutional constraints that limit their capacity to provide 
bioequivalence tests (e.g. public procurement of raw materials) and adapt to the new 
regulatory environment. This was discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
On the other hand, AIDS activists have slowly initiated an agenda to discuss the 
relevance of bioequivalence, and of how and when it would be necessary. Their 
concern is that this scientific concept misleadingly associates generic drugs to quality 
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product (giving the impression that all other pharmaceutical products that are not 
bioequivalent as second standard) but in fact, it lifts the stringency of the regulatory 
norm, limiting market competition. With a concentrated number of suppliers, 
competition could be deficient. Similar concerns had been voiced by advisors of 
international organisations and international activists (cf. Gonzalez and Rossi 2004; 
Health Action International 2006). Nevertheless, Chapter 6 has suggested different 
reasons for the little leverage of their preferences and demands in Brazil. One refers 
to the difficulty in contesting the slogan of quality attached to the bioequivalence 
tests and the consensus around it. The second refers to their highly active agenda on 
intellectual property regulation, which might offset the advocacy in generic drug 
regulation.  
 
This study concludes by stating that generic drug regulation in Brazil is currently 
supported by local pharmaceutical firms, despite their initial opposition in 1999. 
These local entrepreneurs successfully adapted to the new regulatory environment, 
reaping the benefits of a risky business turnaround. They have maintained their 
policy preference in favour of generic drug regulation during the 2000s, in spite of 
the few governmental investments in mass media campaigns to promote these 
products among the population and the reported suspicions of consumers (health 
professionals and patients). Had these firms not adapted, pharmaceutical regulation 
in Brazil may not have changed much since 1999, and there would still be 
competition between patented and similar products. It is difficult to predict what drug 
access prices might have been without a quantitative evaluation. Nevertheless, 
studies have demonstrated that generic drug competition in Brazil has lowered the 
price of medicines that treat many chronic diseases. By concluding that business 
actors currently uphold the generic drug regulation is not to say that they captured 
the regulatory process. What this finding suggests is that actors are not permanent 
opposers/supporters of a regulatory policy. Although the findings of a single case 
study are difficult to generalise, regulators of countries with a local pharmaceutical 
industry can diminish possible opposing sentiment to a generic drug policy by 
resisting to their pressures and creating trade policies that foster competitive 
industries. For instance, by negotiating market opportunities through 
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regional/bilateral trade agreements and providing the industrialists with technical and 
financial adjustment support, regulators might be able to bargain the support of local 
pharmaceutical firms and enhance the quality and supply of important generic drugs. 
 
The second relevant finding of this thesis refers to the content of the generic drug 
policy. Although this regulation was introduced in Brazil in 1999 out of necessity to 
improve the quality standards of pharmaceutical products, those most vigorous 
supporters of access to medicines in Brazil, the HIV/AIDS NGOs, are critical of it 
today, citing that its stringency might limit the number of suppliers. Brazil has 
produced non-bioequivalent antiretroviral medicines for more than two decades in 
public factories for the National AIDS Program. Significant improvement in the 
quality of life of AIDS patients has been reported despite the use of non-
bioequivalent pharmaceutical products (associated with original medicines). The 
recent engagement of AIDS groups in the regulatory process further reinforces the 
empirical finding that actors’ preferences are constructed within the regulatory 
process, but also underscores the limitations of changing the norms once they 
becomes path dependent. Because there is a consensus among suppliers on the 
regulatory norm enacted in 1999, it has been difficult for these groups to challenge 
the current state of affairs of generic drugs in Brazil. Countries willing to introduce 
bioequivalence tests into local regulatory norms should further deliberate with 
different groups of society (e.g. pharmacologists, firms, representatives of patients) 
which medicines should be required to provide them. These findings have several 




This section revisits the theoretical parameters proposed in this thesis. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the study of pharmaceutical regulation usually revolves around the 
regulatory norm as the triumph of interest groups over governments, or on the 
diffusion of international guidelines to regulate the sector (cf. Abraham 2002; 
Carpenter 2004; Abraham 2007; Abraham 2008; Carpenter 2010). However, the 
social process discussed in this thesis did not fit these two constructions. By contrast, 
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it suggests that institutional evolution, unexpected events and government actors had 
an important role in shaping the generic drug reform in Brazil.  
 
Certainly, Brazil did not invent a generic drug regulation and, as previously 
discussed, this policy has its roots in the US FDA and subsequently diffused by the 
World Health Organization as a strategy to foster market competition, lower the price 
of medicines and consequently increase access to medicines. Although WHO and the 
US FDA have provided a stimulus for the reform, what this study has demonstrated 
is that domestic political institutions and policy legacies in Brazil primarily mediated 
the reform’s enactment and development. International pharmaceutical regulatory 
guidelines establish the parameters that are acceptable in a given sector but, in order 
to put them into practice, it is necessary to activate them. Any attempt to do so, 
particularly in the complicated regulatory environment of pharmaceuticals, places 
government and groups in a conflicting scenario. Thus, national domestic institutions 
help to explain why the idea of introducing generic drugs in Brazil did not catch on 
earlier. In other words, the finding of this thesis suggests that it is necessary to 
investigate primarily how policy legacies (e.g. regulatory regimes) affect the 
preferences and capabilities of interest groups in order to understand the extent to 
which these international guidelines in the pharmaceutical sector matter for policy 
development. It can be problematic to assume that there is only one way of 
promoting pharmaceutical regulatory reforms, to compel countries to adopt it and 
assume that institutional infrastructure to support this best practice will arise if there 
is a demand for it. For instance, why should such countries as Colombia, Bolivia and 
Nicaragua incorporate a generic drug policy as proposed by the World Health 
Organization if there is already competition in place between a patent and off-patent 
products (not bioequivalent)? Although the claim that institution matters is nothing 
new to institutionalism scholars, this finding suggests good news to health policy 
scholars concerned with the diffusion of stringent regulatory pharmaceutical norms 
that could (arguably) limit access to essential medicines. These international 
resolutions are important, but not sufficient, conditions to initiate a policy reform.  
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Similarly, as with policy diffusion arguments, the theoretical construct of regulatory 
capture explains less the case of Brazil. By contrast, the findings of this thesis 
provide strong support for core propositions aligned with historical institutionalism 
and constructivism theories. The results of this study evidence that large-scale 
pharmaceutical regulatory reforms might not always be as a result of powerful 
corporations’ lobbying activities. State actors in this case provided an important push 
to the reform. However, as suggested by Pierson (2004), the entrepreneurship of the 
decision makers much depends on the political and economic context in which they 
advocate for a reform and the timing to promote it. Promotion of generic drugs in 
Brazil was only possible given the confluence of contingent institutional legacies 
(e.g. enactment of IP regulation in 1996) and contingent events (e.g. AIDS crisis and 
scandal of fake medicines). The presence of the international guidelines to regulate 
off-patent medicines indeed contributed as a policy guide to respond to the crisis but 
it was not sufficient to move the reform forward. It is equally important to 
understand how the reform became steady. Preference formation helps in explaining 
how generic drug regulation developed in Brazil.  
 
This thesis suggests that the preferences of corporations that are supposed to capture 
the regulatory process in the pharmaceutical sector can be shaped by those processes 
themselves. It has demonstrated a clear shift in the preferences and demands of 
Brazil’s pharmaceutical industries that probably would have been left out of analyses 
that assume an actor’s identity as rational and fixed. Facing a major crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector, these firms were compelled to abandon their trademarks and 
adapt their manufacturing process to the new regulatory environment. Regulation can 
affect “which companies enter the market, what services they offer, what investment 
they make and what strategies they pursue” (Vogel 1996: 261). Thus, although firms’ 
preferences sustain the generic drug regulatory policy, this does not mean that they 
control the regulatory arena. Similarly, this thesis has highlighted how the 
unintended consequences of this reform on the production of medicines in public 
factories have called attention of the NGOs, who are learning how to act in this 
regulatory environment. AIDS NGOs were illiterate in the area of pharmaceutical 
regulation during the 1990s, but became remarkably active in both health and 
 248 
intellectual property issues in the subsequent decade. Much of this shift in their 
behaviour was promoted by the State, who empowered and financed their advocacy 
agenda during the crisis in 1999, but they slowly learned the implications of the 
regulatory norm in possibly restricting the availability of quality, affordable 
medicines.  
 
If, on the one hand, these results contribute to an understanding of the policy change 
and stability and provide an alternative model of interaction in the regulatory process 
than suggested by rational choice scholars, on the other it also contributes to studies 
of regulatory lobbying, which usually concentrate on business-government 
interactions. This study has gone a step further by including other participants of the 
policy process – the NGOs. In addition, the supply of medicines in Brazil is not 
constrained to national and multinational firms, but also includes public production 
of medicines, i.e. the government acts as regulator and producer. This adds an 
element of complexity to access actors’ preferences, but is also an opportunity to 
further investigate preference formation across different actors. It was possible to 
observe that it is not just material interests that are voiced by pharmaceutical firms, 
as they have publicly demonstrated their concern with access to medicines and 
national development issues.  
 
These results are analogous to the study of Sell and Prakash (2004), who claim that 
firms and NGOs have their share of principal beliefs and instrumental objectives. 
The Brazilian government has provided different opportunities throughout the 2000s 
for groups to express their interests on controversial regulatory issues (e.g. 
Congressional hearings and amicus curea). Most of these issues referred to a 
sophisticated understanding of pharmacology that is naturally well-known by 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products. However, NGOs have proved a 
remarkable ability and expertise with which to bargain on this topic; for instance, the 
discussion on polimorphism and second medical use. How these groups contribute to 
the policy process is not as a result of their size or wealth, but on their ability to 
persuade policy makers and the receptiveness of government departments/branches 
to their demands. Theoretically, this means two related social phenomena. Firstly, it 
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relates to theories that understand the state as both an autonomous actor and a 
structure - the core element of the institutionalism school (cf. Immergut 1998). 
Regulators can act independently to interpret public interest and the ways to achieve 
it. This is not to say that they ignore societal interest, but that their preferences 
cannot be merely reduced to private groups’ interests (Vogel 1996). Government 
actors’ interpretation is not neutral, however. Their decisions are based on (or 
constrained by) institutional capabilities and ideological biases (Vogel 1996). In this 
sense, how actors frame their demands and the constitutive role of ideas play an 
important role in this relation with government, and this relates to the other 
theoretical observation63
The second social phenomenon refers to the overlapping agendas in pharmaceutical 
regulation and actors’ multiple goals. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, regulators and 
legislators are now discussing in Brazil important amendments to the intellectual 
property law that requires the participation of different groups of society, including 
not just research-based firms but also generic drug manufactures and NGOs. Because 
this study took a different point of departure than rational choice scholars, who 
understand preferences as given and ranked, it was possible to observe and explore 
the content of firms and NGOs’ demands. Both sides of this debate have their share 
of social interests and government needs to balance between fostering innovation 
while guaranteeing a certain level of access to affordable medicines. As seen in this 
thesis, pharmaceutical firms and NGOs contribute to the construction of the 
normative frame and use similar strategies to reach decision makers. Theoretically, 
Brazil’s experience contributes to models of dynamic models of preference 
formation that sees actors’ behaviour as a function of domestic political variables 
(political structures determine not just how much influence groups have but also 
what policies they demand in the first place) (
.  
 
Hathaway 1998; Crystal 2003; Hall 
2005; Woll 2008).  
 
The study of Shadlen (2011) raised important concerns on the shift in the direction of 
local pharmaceutical firms’ preferences with respect to intellectual property. Based 
                                                 
63 In Elster terms, actor’s preference is defined as broad rationality (Elster 1983). 
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on a number of empirical evidences, the author suggests that local pharmaceutical 
firms (that were mainly producers of generic drugs) have gained important 
innovative capabilities. This new ability to produce innovator products could also 
change their support to the institutional arrangement that makes patent granting in 
Brazil stricter than other countries (as it involves both the Patent Office and the 
National Health Surveillance Agency). However, there are reasons to believe that 
this is still far from occurring. First, Chapter 6 has demonstrated that NGOs have 
been remarkably active in upholding and reinforcing ANVISA’s prior consent 
arrangement. Second, Chapter 5 suggests that, from several interviews and 
documents, there is, to some extent, disagreement between national producers on 
which direction to take (particularly members of ABIFINA and ALANAC that 
comprise similar and generic drug producers). Third, government departments and 
branches also have different opinions on these matters. While INPI has set the 
agenda for reformulating several IP resolutions, ANVISA and the Ministry of Health 
are strong supporters of the permanence of prior consent and question the necessity 
of patents for second medical use and polymorphs. Today, these topics have been the 
object of heated discussions in Congress and are apparently far from being resolved. 
In sum, the institutional mechanisms that assure regulatory policies to be stable and 
credible (policy feedbacks) are the same as those that make it difficult to propose 
new rules that might be necessary to incorporate new technological developments. If 
a theoretical lesson can be learnt from Brazil’s experience, it is that reducing the 
preferences of actors to fixed, material versus normative, will provide an overly 
superficial understanding of the pharmaceutical regulatory process. Without 
diminishing the relevance of the norm diffusion and interest group activity, the 
findings of this thesis enrich both perspectives. It emphasises the importance of 
observing how the issue at stake is being framed which, according to Hall (2005), is 
something partly under the control of actors themselves and partly dictated by the 
structure of public discourse about it.  
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Global health implications 
 
The findings of this case study can also provide insights into the ongoing global 
health deliberations. For decades, the World Health Organization has included in its 
guidelines the necessity of implementing generic drugs as a strategy to foster 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector and increase access to essential medicines 
(World Health Organization 1988; World Health Organization 2001). The 
terminology of off-patent pharmaceutical products has been adjusted throughout the 
time to incorporate various countries’ idiosyncrasies, for instance the adoption of 
multisource pharmaceutical products to include products such as similar drugs (cf. 
Homedes and Ugalde 2005a). Nevertheless, the discussion on bioequivalence has 
been constricted to scientific deliberations (Meredith 2003; World Health 
Organization 2005). As suggested in Chapter 6, NGOs and advisors of international 
organisations have only recently contested the content of regulatory norm, with the 
episode of exclusion of antiretroviral drugs produced by Indian firms that did not 
provide a certificate of equality. The argument is not that this test is unnecessary, but 
the number of drugs that should provide them might be lower than the prescription of 
WHO.  
 
Similar to Brazilian NGOs, advisors of international agencies have also expressed 
concern over the effect of this rule on developing countries. A World Bank study 
(Osewe et al. 2008: 31-32) reported the case of a Zimbabwean state-owned 
pharmaceutical industry, Varichem. Despite a capacity to produce eight HIV 
antiretroviral medicines at competitive prices, Varichem cannot export its products or 
supply the Global Fund (and any other international donor agencies that fund AIDS 
treatment). Because its industrial unit does not comply with international 
manufacturing practices, its products would not pass the WHO prequalification 
programme (that requires GMP and bioequivalence certificates)64
                                                 
64 The WHO prequalification programme provides several manufacturing criteria (based mainly on the 
WHO guidelines for pharmaceutical regulation) that firms must fulfil to be able to supply international 
donor agencies. The prequalification programme intends to coordinate and facilitate the assessment of 
the quality of products supplied by the donor agencies.  
 
. Also, a study of 
the UK Department of International Development mentions the case of Sri Lanka 
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and how its local agency does not have the necessary expertise to carry out 
bioequivalent tests (inability to conduct controlled trials in humans, for example) and 
lacks statistical and pharmacology-trained staff. They suggest that, even when 
bioequivalence data is available to local pharmaceutical producers, the innovator 
product might not be commercialised in the local market in order to establish a 
comparative study. Thus, this can represent a market barrier for many local 
pharmaceutical firms.  
 
Other advisors of the World Bank have urged that it would be inappropriate to 
assume that similar drugs have lower therapeutic efficacy than their original versions 
(Homedes et al. 2005). In countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
Bolivia and Uruguay, similar drugs represent the highest percentage of sales 
volumes. Frequently, many policy makers, users and prescribing physicians consider 
the similar and generic products to be synonymous (ibid). Also, countries that have 
aggressively implemented Generic Drug Policies, like Argentina and Chile, are 
promoting the use of similar drugs when the original drugs are off-patent (ibid). 
 
Over the past decade, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and its 
member countries have worked closely to establish harmonised procedures to 
improve the quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products marketed in the 
region. Its Working Group on Bioequivalence has also raised concerns about the 
WHO guidelines on this matter, the extent to which might limit access to medicines 
and the necessity to test off-patent medicines that have been on the market already 
(Pan American Health Organization 2008). Participants of these meeting have agreed 
that there is a political and commercial component in this concept that should be 
further explored in the following conferences, but also at the Ministry of Health level 
(ibid) (see also Health Action International (2006: 36)). The findings this thesis 
explore these concerns, suggesting that that generic drug regulation can affect the 
structure and governance of the pharmaceutical sector, which in turn affects an 
actor’s preferences and demands. This can have far-reaching implications for the 
price and supply of medicines. This is particularly important given that an estimated 
two billion people lack access to essential medicines globally. Because, in 
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developing countries, 50 to 90% of medicines are paid by patients themselves, 
affordable pricing is a core determinant of access to medicines in these countries 
(World Health Organization 2004). Additionally, pharmaceutical policy has 
sweeping effects on public health; for instance, it can limit or foster the supply of 
affordable drugs, or poorly-regulated products can cause abortions, malformation or 
even death. Thus, understanding the factors influencing the formulation and 
development of generic drug regulation is important normatively. This study has 
demonstrated that Brazil, through its regulatory reform process, has enhanced access 
to high quality, affordable medicines while preserving generic competition.  
 
Limits of the study and direction for further research 
 
The previous sections highlighted important theoretical and global health 
contributions of this thesis. This section now turns to the limitation of the thesis and 
proposes the direction for further studies.  
 
This thesis has proposed an ambitious research design, seeking a comprehensive 
understanding of the regulatory policy process and its participants’ preferences. 
Incorporating government, patient group advocacy, business and consumers into the 
analysis required multiple sources of in-depth information. While culling information 
about government, business and patient advocacy was a relatively feasible activity, 
data on consumers’ perceptions on generic drugs in Brazil was limited. Only an in-
depth assessment of nationwide public opinion polls could inform the perception of 
health professionals and consumers on this policy. Studies on policy feedback has 
suggested that public policies might have enduring effects for particular groups of 
society (e.g. providing resources or encouraging the organisation of certain groups), 
which reinforces the policy path (Campbell 2003; Mettler and Soss 2004). Thus, 
further studies should explore public opinion over this matter as they would allow a 
better understanding of the demand in relation to policy stability. 
 
The option for a single case study research design naturally implies limitations as 
much as the generalisation of the research findings. However, this qualitative, crucial 
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case of generic drug regulation in Brazil provided detailed information on the 
process of policy reform and development. It complemented well established 
approaches to study pharmaceutical regulation and as suggested additional elements 
(e.g. institutional legacy and preference formation) to be taken into account when 
analysing pharmaceutical regulation. Comparative qualitative case studies on other 
countries that have implemented generic drug policy are necessary to give an 
understanding of the extent to which conditions such as intellectual property law, the 
WHO guidelines or crisis in pharmaceutical regulation give rise to new domestic 
regulatory norm, and also the extent to which actors’ policy-reinforcement is 
concerned in policy development. Thus, it is necessary to investigate to what extent 
countries have converged in the direction of a common framework to regulate 
generic drug products and why there are national variations in these regulatory 
norms. For instance, it is crucial to understand how the politics of generic drugs 
evolve in contexts where co-payment and reimbursement systems are in place (as it 
is in the majority of European states). In these cases, government plays an important 
role in the demand of pharmaceutical products, different from developing countries. 
As the introduction of this thesis has mentioned, in developing countries access to 
medicines are mainly out-of-pocket or through fragmented pharmaceutical assistance 
programmes. How these institutional arrangements in the health sector affect the 
constituencies and political sensitiveness and mobilisation around this issue should 
also be considered. This thesis could possibly be the basis for other comparative 
institutional analyses related to developing countries’ approaches to off-patent 
medicine regulations, a field yet under-researched.  
 
The interdisciplinary nature of studies on pharmaceutical regulation is 
simultaneously a strengh and weakness. These findings can inform decision makers 
on the institutional environment in which their decisions are taken, the groups and its 
demands/position on generic drug regulation and others. However, some specific 
elements of this public policy require further investigations. For example, it was not 
the object of the analysis to understand the extent to which the introduction of 
generic drugs has influenced access to medicines. This thesis infers, from data 
provided by market analysis consultancy and business association, that there was an 
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increase in the volume of sales of particular drugs and a decrease in price. However, 
access to medicines involves elements that go beyond the price of drugs and results 
from the interplay of economic and social factors, such as access to health care and 
family income (World Health Organization 2004). Only by conducting monitoring 
and evaluation studies will it be possible to understand the impact of this policy on 
access to medicines in Brazil. Similarly, assessing the post-marketing effect 
(pharmacovigillance) of generic drugs can also provide valuable information for 
health professionals and the population on the quality of these products.  
Looking ahead, regulatory policy is a dynamic process, hence an object of constant 
monitoring and analyses for social scientists. Brazil’s successful local generic 
companies have been the target of multinational generic and research-based 
pharmaceutical firms. As mentioned in Chapter 5, several acquisitions took place in 
the mid-2000s. Brazilian local firms have also gained innovative capabilities. The 
product of these hybrid coorporations (producers of generic and original 
pharmaceutical products) is likely to bring fresh challenges to regulators. Currently, 
Brazilian officials are confronted with the question of how to regulate a new category 
of pharmaceutical products – the bioequivalent similar drugs, i.e. products that are 
equal to an innovator medicine but different from generic drugs and commercialised 
with a brand name. In the US, these are called branded generic drugs, but Brazil does 
not yet have a resolution on how to incorporate these products. This is crucial as, 
according to current norms, by 2014 all similar products must be adjusted to the 
Generic Drug Act, meaning they would need to either exclude their brand names or 
request a new patent (if eligible). A third alternative would be to promote new 
adjustments to the current regulatory path and, as this thesis has demonstrated, it can 
be a challenging task. As some issues raised in this concluding chapter suggest, 
understanding the implications of the generic drug regulatory process on an actor’s 
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Annex 1. Interview protocol 
 
Interviews were non-standardized to allow flexibility in response. According to 
Dexter (2006 [1970]), in elite interviewing the investigator is willing to let the 
interviewee teach him/her about the problem, the question or the situation instead of 
relying upon the investigator’s notion of relevance. There is no universal rule for 
conducting elite interviews; however I followed some guidelines suggested by the 
literature (cf. Richards 1996; Dexter 2006 [1970]), as follow. 
 
Mostly I tried to schedule appointments at the respondent office or a place with 
limited interruption; avoiding having other persons that are not relevant in the 
interview setting to reduce distraction. The majority of interviews were conducted at 
the respondent’s office but in some cases, particularly with business representatives, 
the conversation was arranged in a restaurant or coffee shop at lunch time. For others 
I had to conduct phone interviews because of distance or schedulling concerns. The 
process of scheduling interviews with high-level decision makers proved to be a 
fitness exercise. While businessmen and patient advocates showed a reliable agenda; 
politicians and government officials had a rather less reliable schedule. For some 
interviewees appointments had to be made weeks and sometimes months in advance 
but for others (e.g. the former health minister and governor of Sao Paulo state) I was 
supposed to be ready to get to his office at any time in a particular week. 
Additionally, in some cases the appointment was cancelled minutes before the 
interview. Besides these managerial decisions, once the interview started the 
majority of respondents were very receptive to answer all my questions.  
 
At the beginning of each interview I presented myself, the institutions I was affiliated 
with, gave a brief explanation of my project and why the respondent was important 
to my research. I also explained ethical concerns and asked for verbal permission to 
record the conversation. Well-informed interviewees are usually unwilling to accept 
the investigator’s assumptions and are willing to explain what real problems are as 
they view the matter (cf. Dexter 2006 [1970]). Interviews were semi-structured in 
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format to allow the respondent to speak freely about the topic. Sometimes this 
proved to be time consuming as some interviewees - particularly those who had long 
experience in pharmaceutical sector - began the conversation with a lecture of 
Brazil’s pharmaceutical sector dating back as far as the 1930’s. This required some 
intervention to focus the discussion on their perspectives over a particular element of 
pharmaceutical regulation. Most interviews lasted around 40-60 minutes but some 
interviewees were happy to speak longer. For example, an interview with a former 
representative of multinational pharmaceutical industries lasted more than 2 hours, 
when he gave me detailed information and documents about the process of generic 
drug reform. Similarly, an interview with a retired government official and high level 
decision maker on Brazil’s trade policy took more than 90 minutes, when he 
provided relevant information about Brazil’s industrial policy.  
 
For each group of respondents I had a particular interview guideline. This research 
instrument was constructed and adapted as new data was collected65
                                                 
65 A methodological note is relevant here as one could question the legitimacy of altering the data 
collection methods in the course of study investigation. As previously discussed, the aim of this study 
is not to produce summary quantitative data about a group of observations, but rather reflect and get as 
much information as possible about the case and social phenomena under investigation. “If a new data 
collection opportunity arises or if a new line of thinking emerges during the research, it makes sense 
to take advantage by altering data collection […]” (Eisenhardt 1989: 539).  
. Each interview 
was recorded and transcribed as soon as possible to guide the following 
investigations. I focused on the interviewee’s frame and perspective of the problem 
we were discussing. For this reason it was particularly important to invest in 
documentary research / trial interviews and get a good deal of background 
information about the problem, thus avoiding having to focus on factual information 
during the interview. For example, there are some controversies about the process of 
generic drug reform. While multinational firms were constantly referred to in the 
media as trying to obstruct the reform, representatives of multinational firms assured 
that their interest was to invest in an awareness campaign parallel to the one been 
done by the government. Note that this debate had two versions; it was not the 
purpose of this study to investigate or solve this problem. However, my intention was 
to focus on how each side interpreted that process, their claims and observable 
strategies to convince the others.  
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Normally I framed my inquiry with comments or questions that were quite open so 
the interviewee could interpret them in his/her own terms according to his/her 
experience. For example, ‘In what ways are you most affected in your business 
practice by the federal department XXX?’ or ‘What people do you hear the most 
about the issue XXX?’ The question order was also carefully considered. I began 
asking non-controversial questions to gain rapport and, move to more ‘threatening’ 
issues later on. Notes were also taken during and after the interview. I have paid 
particular attention to: a) interesting points the respondent suggested; b) particular 
ideas or problems of academic interest not related to my project (as this could be 
useful as the research moved forward); c) individuals or type of persons suggested 
that would be useful to contact. Finally, at the end of the interview I gave the 
interviewees an opportunity to talk about issues that I had not mentioned and that 
could be relevant.  I also asked for references for further interviews and suggestions 
as to whom should I see first and later. 
 
Finally, to increase validity and reliability I interviewed some respondents more than 
once (in person, by telephone or through written correspondence) to clarify 
uncertainties and ambiguities that became apparent after transcription and as new 
information appeared. I also used some additional strategies such as: cross-checking 
the information among different individuals and groups; asking the respondent to 
critique his own case (e.g. ‘Why the government is not buying this idea?’ or ‘What 
would happen if the government decides to reformulate the generic drug act now?’); 
I also tried to get as much information as I could about the issue discussed before the 
















Alberto Goldman Vice governor of Sao Paulo State and former Federal Deputy (1979-1982; 
1983-1986; 1991-1994; 1995-1998; 1999-2002; 2003-2006) 
Ana Paula Juca Manager, Department of International Sanitary Regulation, National Health 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) 
Carla Reis Economist, Department of Pharmaceutical Products, Brazilian Development 
Bank 
Carlos Codenzey Director, Department of Economics, Ministry of External Affairs 
Carlos Lessa Former President of the Brazilian Development Bank (2003-2004) 
 
Carlos Passarelli 
Coordinator, Coordination of Technical Cooperation, Department of 
STD/AIDS, Ministry of Health 
Célia Chaves President, Brazilian Federation of Pharmacists 
Dante Alario President and Founder, Biolab Pharmaceutical Industry 
Eduardo Costa Former director, Farmanguinhos Public Pharmaceutical Industry (2006-2009) 
Eduardo Jorge Former Federal Deputy (1987-1991, 1991-1995, 1995-1999, 1999-2003) 
Eduardo Martins Former director, Farmanguinhos Public Pharmaceutical Industry (1989-1993) 
Elisaldo Carlini Former president, National Health Surveillance Agency  (ANVISA) (1995-
1997) 
Eloan Pinheiro Former director, Farmanguinhos Public Pharmaceutical Industry (1993-2003) 
Fadlo Fraige President, Brazilian Federation of Diabetes 
Gabriel Tannus Executive president, Brazilian Research-based Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (Interfarma)  
Gaurino Gentil Jr Specialist, Business Development, Merck S.A. Brazil 
Gonzalo Vecina Neto Former president, National Health Surveillance Agency  (ANVISA) (1998-
1999) 
Gustavo Americano Manager, Business Development, Merck S.A. Brazil 
Henrique Moraes Permanent Brazilian Mission in the European Union. Ministry of External 
Affairs 
Jacob Frankel Researcher, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
Jaime Rabi President and Founder, Microbiologica Pharmaceutical Industry 
Jamil Haddad Former Minister of Health (1992-1993) 
João Sanches Director of External Affairs, Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Jorge Raimundo President of the Advisory Board, Brazilian Research-based Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (Interfarma) 
Jose Eduardo 
Bandeira de Mello 
Former president, Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry Association (Abifarma) 
(1993-2000) 
Jose Miguel Director, Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance, Ministry of Health 
Jose Serra Governor of Sao Paulo State and Former Minister of Health (1998-2002) 
Liane Lage Head of Chemistry Patent Division II, Brazilian Patent Office, Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
Lucas Furtado Former parliamentary assistant, Brazilian Congress 
Luciana Capanema Department of Pharmaceutical Products, Brazilian Development Bank 
Luciano Lobo Technical Coordinator, Brazilian Association of Generic Drug Manufacturers 
(Pro-Genericos) 
Luis Eugenio Portela Director, Department of Health Research, Ministry of Health 
Luis Felipe Lampreia Former Minister of External Affairs (1995-2001) 
Luis Roberto Serrano Journalist and former media assistant, Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association (Abifarma) 
Marcio Lobato Diplomat, Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs 
Maria Del Pilar Director of Institutional Affairs, Eurofarma Pharmaceutical Laboratory 
Mariângela Simão  Director, Department of STD/AIDS, Ministry of Health 
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Marília Gomes President, Brazilian Diabetes Society 
Marta Fonseca Head, Division of International Affairs, National Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA) 
Michel Lotrowska Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) and former Doctors Without 
Boarders (MSF) 
Nelson Brasil 1st Vice-President, Brazilian Association of the Fine Chemistry, Biotechnology 
and its Specialties Industries (Abifina) 
Norberto Rech Associate Director, National Health Surveillance Agency  (ANVISA) 
Odilon Costa Director of Institutional Affairs, Cristalia Pharmaceutical Industry 
Odnir Finotti Executive president, Brazilian Association of Generic Drug Manufacturers 
(Pro-Genericos) 
Omilton Visconde Jr Founder and former president, Biosintetica Pharmaceutical Industry  
 
President of State of São Paulo Pharmaceutical Product Industry Syndicate 
(Sindusfarma) 
Reinaldo Guimarães Secretary, Secretariat of Science, Technology and Strategic Supply, Ministry 
of Health  
Renata Reis Coordinator of Working Group on Intellectual Property, Brazilian AIDS 
Interdisciplinary Association (ABIA) 
Ricardo Oliva Director, Foundation for the Popular Remedy (FURP) and 
President, Public Laboratories Association (Alfob) 
Rosa Sampaio Director, Coordination of Diabetes, Ministry of Health 
Sergio Metzger President of Brazilian Youth Diabetes Association (ADJ) 
Silvio Albuquerque Director, Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs 
Telma Sales Director of External Affairs, EMS Pharmaceutical Industry 
Vera Valente Former manager, Department of Generic Medicine, National Health 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) (2000-2003) 
 
Former president, Brazilian Association of Generic Drug Manufacturers (Pro-
Genericos) (2003-2007) 
Veriano Terto Vice president, Brazilian AIDS Interdisciplinary Association (ABIA) 
Zich Moyses Director, Department of Health Economics, Ministry of Health 
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INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom  
Elize Massard da Fonseca Doctoral Thesis:   
Political Sustainability of generic drug policy in Brazil 
INTRODUCTION  
 
You have been invited to participate in a research study affiliated with the School of Social 
and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. This study aims to explain 
the development of generic drug policy in Brazil. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
For this study, you will be asked to participate in one or more interviews with the principal 
investigator of this study, Elize Massard da Fonseca. Interviews will be carried out during 
the first semester of 2009 calendar year, and each interview will last approximately 40 to 90 
minutes. Elize Massard da Fonseca may contact you for a subsequent interview to clarify 
uncertainties and ambiguities that could become apparent after transcription or as new 
information appear.  
Topics you will be asked to comment on may include but are not limited to: you and/or your 
organization’s role in the generic drug policy institutionalization and decision making 
process; changes on political/economic pharmaceutical sector environment after generic drug 
policy reform; and implication of generic policy for both local and multinational industry. 
 
Interviews might be recorded to better analyze the research findings. You have the right to 
decline that the interview be recorded and/or request that your name not be attached to any 
of the study’s findings.  
You will be provided with a copy of the study’s findings upon request.  
RISKS  
 
Your participation in this study involves no physical risk.  
BENEFITS 
 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you specifically.  
You may learn about development of Brazil’s Generic Drug policy. You or your 






EXTENT OF ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
To ensure confidentiality, data will be stored securely and will be made available only to 




Participants will not receive compensation for this interview. 
CONTACT INFORMATION  
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures you may contact the 
researcher, Elize Massard da Fonseca, at 21-26821103 or Dr Daniel Clegg, at the University 
of Edinburgh, +44-131-6503998. If you have any questions about the rights of research 
subjects or research-related injury, please contact Antonia Kearton at the office of the 
Research Ethic Committee, School of Social and Political Studies at +44-131-6513059. 
PARTICIPATION  
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. 
If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at anytime without penalty.  
CONSENT  
 
I have read the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to participate 
in this study.  
□  I agree to have my comments recorded and quoted in publications. 
□ I agree to have my comments recorded but prefer that they not be quoted in publications. 
□  I do not agree to have my comments recorded or quoted in publications.  
 
 




Investigator's signature _____________________________ Date __________  
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Annex 4. Evolution of generic drug sector in Brazil 
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Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
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Table 11. Index of generic drugs and total pharma. market (vol). Brazil, 2003-9 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Market total 1.261.555 1.257.373 1.319.652 1.374.574 1.463.288 1.556.291 1.658.695 
Evolution index 100,00 99,7 104,6 109,0 116,0 123,4 131,5 
Generic drugs 81.294 105.078 129.878 165.906 208.303 244.805 292.418 
Evolution index 100,0 129,3 159,8 204,1 256,2 301,1 359,7 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
 
 
Table 12. Index of generic drugs and total pharma. market (R$). Brazil, 2003-9 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Market total 13.567.757 15.573.702 17.580.389 19.681.994 22.217.858 24.424.810 27.273.171 
Evolution index 100,0 114,8 129,6 145,1 163,8 180,0 201,0 
Generic drugs 728.075 1.067.504 1.393.024 1.850.410 2.528.603 3.136.644 3.891.830 
Evolution index 100,0 146,6 191,3 254,2 347,3 430,8 534,5 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
 
 





Bioequivalence and therapeutic equivalence tests 
Adjustments to Good Manufacturing Practices 
Development of new generic medicines
Expansion of productive capacity 
 
Source: (Pro-Genericos 2009 - with IMS Health data) 
Note 1: Total investments between 1999 and 2004 US$ 170 millions 
Note 2: Forecast of investments until 2010 US$ 354 millions 
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Annex 5. Public-private partnerships enable 24 drugs to be 
produced nationally  
 
State Laboratories Private companies Products Treatment 
Farmanguinhos 
Globe  - Tenofovir antiretroviral 
Chemo (Argentina), 
 




Lupin (India)  - Kanamicine 
 - Cycloserine 
 - Ethionamide 











 - Desogestrel 
 - Ethinylestradiol 








 - Recombinant Factor 
VII-a  
Haemophilia  
LFQEX Roche+Nor-tec  - Mycophelonate 
(mophetil),  - 
Mycophelonate (sodium)   
Immunosuppression 
LAQFA Libbs  - Tacrolim Immunosuppression 
Funed Nortec Química, 
Blanver 
 - Tenofovir Antiretroviral 
Funed Nortec Química, 
Blanver 
 - Atorvastatin Cholesterol reduction 
Funed Not indicated   - Salbutamol Asthma 
Lafepe+Nuplam Cristália  - Clozapine 
 - Olanzapine 
 - Quetiapine (Fumarate) 
Antipsychotics 
Source: Ministerio da Saude (2009a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
